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Editorial

Philosophy in Crisis

Since the 1980s, some philosophers have questioned the very existence of philosophy as a separate discipline from literature, history, psychology, sociology, art and film studies. There is a sense prevailing among practitioners of philosophy that philosophy is becoming remote from daily matters and the concerns of the individuals, their lives and society. This crisis has been attributed to many causes. I will quickly refer to these in what follows.

There is first the Quietist attitude towards philosophy. I will call it a 'deflationary attack' on the pretentions of philosophy that it could change the world. What this challenge says is that we have already inherited concepts and discourses that left us in confusion and the task of philosophy is to free us from this confusion. We need to sharpen our concepts and refine our use of language. This attitude is normally attributed to Wittgenstein and his followers.

To answer this challenge, many philosophers, especially Ernest Gellner and Karl Popper, pointed out that language and philosophy are about things, people and actions and they have to say something substantial about human life and society.

Another challange is Scientism: this is not only a theory about the mind but the whole of philosophy. This attitude limits thoughts to the realm of experience, in the tradition of the Kantian restriction on knowledge. But it also radicalises Kant. It assumes the completeness of physics (reductionism). Its method is to be scientific, or at least it takes science to be its paradigm. An earlier version of it assumes the role of philosophy to be conceptual subservience to science. It may also assume philosophy is another specialised, but more general, science. If this is the case, then it will lead to the elimination of philosophy as we know it or any claims of meaning, value and truth.

One answer to this attitude is a claim that can be strongly defended, that philosophy is not a specialised discourse like the other sciences but a universal, unlimited discourse. It can ask questions and touch on aspects of human life and society that are not within the remit of the other sciences: questions about ontology, metaphysics, human relationships and the meaning of life. We can also say that philosophy is interested in different types of concepts from the ones used by science. Philosophical concepts are rooted in human experience and interest, while scientific concepts are free from these interests. They are functional.

The more serious challenge is the 'End of Philosophy' thesis raised initially by Rorty. According to this challenge, philosophy is obsessed with arguments, validity, reality and truth, but there is no reality or truth transcending the subject and the most we can hope for is a form of discussion and persuasion. Truth is a process that is going on for ever. It does not culminate in absolute Knowledge as Hegel assumed.

This attitude also dismisses the history of philosophy as a reservoir of philosophical truths. And since there are no truths in philosophy, on this view, how could one teach philosophy? Philosophy is to be amalgamated with other departments. The claims of special privileges and prestige claimed by the philosopher are inherited from the image of the philosopher as a holder of a special knowledge. But when there is no such knowledge, the value of the philosopher will suffer. According to Rorty, modern philosophy (since the Enlightenment) dismissed religion, and now we have to dismiss philosophy itself. We live in a post-metaphysical society and a post-philosophical society.

All these challenges need careful consideration beyond the space we have here. They also call for new beginnings in philosophy and new alternatives.

The Editor

War is Not a Game; Why Does it Have Rules?

PETER TOWNSEND

The phrase 'total war' indicates that other kinds are incomplete: limits on the methods and/or aims of war reduce it to something less – just as the rules of games specify 'fouls', and limits to their space and time. War, on the other hand, has historically included total destruction, massacres, enslavement, rape and pillage. Cato famously said 'Delenda est Cartago' – Carthage is to be eradicated. In WW2 we aimed to eradicate Dresden. And the Caledonian tribal leader, Calgacus, just before he and his minions were vanquished by the Agricola-led Roman armies in Mons Grapius (83 A.D./C.E.) said: 'They came, created a dead land and called it peace.' These words were voiced originally by Tacitus.

Victors found inventive ways to eradicate the defeated: exile, scalping, gassing, eating. Ground was sown with salt, wells poisoned. Total war is unlimited by rules.

Games though are defined by their rules: they make the game what it is. They establish limits of time and space, methods and aims; elimination is a figure of speech; the enemy lives to fight another day. We have the odd concept of 'fairness', fair play, as a guiding principle of limitation in sports and games: 'sitting ducks' are not 'fair game'. Games are something like a controlled experiment, with variables eliminated.

So why, over recent centuries, has the idea of 'rules of war' developed? Formalised in the Geneva Convention and since elaborated by international courts, these have become a new field of jurist doctrine. Has war become a game? Or has a new game been invented? How, now, can we define the difference?

Historically, rules of war are prefigured by at least two principles: mercy and chivalry.

The League of Nations

Chivalry was at first the prerogative of noble birth - as the word implies, from horseman - an ex gratia pact, or gift, between equally worthy men. Common soldiers got none of it - rather like civilians killed in 'collateral damage' today. This quaint old custom has persisted in the polite treatment of captured officers, and morphed into a certain attitude to women, so long as they are passive - the suffragettes missed out on that. Mercy, similarly, is seen as a kind of gracious gift; sometimes dispensed by divinity, condescendingly passed on: 'It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven…' says Portia. Mercy is a grant by the victor, or, revealingly, those passing out punishment - punishment for losing?. There is an overlap between warriors and rulers: both have equated power and the right to power with punishment – including by forfeiture of life.

The rules of war changed all that, in theory: soldiers who surrender are kept alive, even treated for their wounds, not bayonetted on the battlefield - though this is a skill taught to infantrymen, at least until recently: 'Ze war is over for you mein Freund.' Certain methods of killing were officially outlawed: gas, napalm, bacteria. But on what grounds? Unfair?

Concurrently, war has, in practice, become *less* discriminating: bombing spares no-one and even kills more civilians than soldiers – call it 'Shock and Awe'. Attacks are launched in the name of 'defence', or '"pre-emptive strike', even, without irony, 'peace-keeping'. Yet that is not against the rules, is it? Are there, in practice, any ground-rules, on the ground?

A more fundamental question still perhaps: what distinguishes, in practice, war and other kinds of contest between nations – or even peoples such as races, religions, and political creeds? We hear of trade sanctions that starve families and deprive them of vital medicines; of cyber-wars, space-races, proxy wars. Perhaps – *in theory* – these are less 'lethal'; or perhaps they simply limit the risk of the more powerful? And then there are the 'dirty wars': espionage, deceits and subterfuges, propagation of lies and rumours, sabotage… and terrorism. As 'terrorist', the warrior becomes *ipso facto* criminal – and so beyond the rules of war and its mercies. As does the spy and the traitor: these *deserve* punishment in ways the honest warrior does not, perhaps because he wears a uniform. The borderlines, the features that mark out heroes from villains, fair from foul, are hard to define.

One bivalent distinction between war and games is that war is a zero-sum contest: winner takes all unless the sides, out of simple weariness perhaps, declare a truce, a 'time-out'. Games are

played, usually, for their entertainment value: they produce a net gain. Struggles short of war leave the loser with something, if only exercise. But this distinction is a consequential one, not one that describes or defines what goes on. Or does the end define the means: a limited end demands limited means?

On the other hand, trade wars may decimate populations or destroy regimes, without discrimination or attribution of guilt. 'Peace-making' to restore a status quo can produce more, and more terrible warfare than the original breach. Enforced changes in cultures can do more damage than territorial takeovers.

Distinctions in this field appear to be chaotic: there seems to be no underlying system of principle. International codes are widely disregarded – power triumphs. The public media in the countries involved, on the other hand, have no difficulty in discerning right and wrong: *we* are right.

I submit that we cannot proceed by deduction: no axiomatic premises present themselves. Only induction leads anywhere. We can look at examples of what is deemed 'wrong', and go from there to hypothesise a pattern, or common factors. What is seen to be wrong may then – though I do not hold out much hope - point to what is right. Such a process cannot be easy: some examples are considered justifiable by some nations, not by others – personnel mines and cluster bombs for example. Here is a list of borderline cases taken from a recent article on drone warfare, from THE WEEK of 20 June this year: robot machine-gun sentries, robot tanks and warships, radar-destroying and target identifying drones - including human targets. The UN Secretary-General has declared such weapons 'morally repugnant'. His reason is interesting: autonomous weapons would lower the threshold for going to war – the lower risk to one's own soldiers is already a selling-point. They can be programmed to assassinate, or carry out ethnic cleansing. And they can fall into the hands of 'the wrong people'. This last fear may lead us to infer an underlying principle: reciprocity. We would ban the weapons we fear being used against us – a legalization, perhaps of the Golden Rule , except that rulers have not tended to ban weapons that are likely to be used only against mere soldiers.

The Geneva Conventions of a century or so ago 'seek to protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities; these include the sick and wounded of armed forces on the field, wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians'. They prohibit: 'willful' killing, torture and the infliction of suffering; punishment without trial; unlawful or unnecessary destruction or detention. In other words, they aim at confining the damage caused by war to that occurring in a state of 'war' – presumed to be between uniformed military forces trying to defeat each other, usually by killing. Anyone and anything outside that 'field' is not to be harmed. The picture or idealized frame is of two separate conceptual realms: one of mayhem and massacre, one of peace and humanity.

Of course, we know that war is not like that, even if, **if**, it once was. It now typically involves mass deaths, destruction and disablement among civilian, unarmed populations. We are offered pictures of that almost every day – and we shudder away: 'Isn't it terrible!' There is popular revulsion, a vocal desire to stop such horrors. Within a stable law-abiding state such popular reactions may lead to policy changes - except in the case of US mass shootings - they are a democratic dynamic. In any other field, such cognitive dissonance, such a gap between feelings and action, would be akin to mass madness. War, clearly, is not subject to rules; and yet, it falls short of what is possible: powerful states could wipe out half the populated world with their WMD, but refrain. Why?

This subject is immense, and we have no room to explore it fully here. But I shall put forward two suggested underlying principles: one is that is mentioned earlier – reciprocity. The second is more surprising perhaps – aesthetic revulsion (not ethical, though it may be mistaken for that).

Duke of Marlborough Signing the Despatch at Blenheim-Bavaria-1704.

Reciprocity is the basis of much of our moral inhibition: it can be found behind 'love thy neighbour', as Kant's first Categorical Imperative and as the Golden Rule. Commonly, such rules are also ignored in favour of 'do whatever you can get away with'; but the principle remains – especially when tables are turned. In the case of war, those who conduct it seek to minimize the risk of harm to themselves, so want to leave reciprocal death-dealing to the troops.

I derive the aesthetic motive from observation of what, in recent history, has moved nations to put limits to 'war'. The movement can be dated to Dunant's observation of the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in 1859 and his founding of the Red Cross [See Wikipedia on Red Cross - see Wikipedia on 'Red Cross' or 'Rules of War' - a field of mangled human bodies, cut down by cannon and rifle fire, moved him to action. Like Greta Thunberg and Extinction Rebellion, he started an international change in attitudes - a revolution in perspective. Like all such changes, it began small and developed slowly. But the mere fact that the idea of 'rules of war' is now discussed and formulated at an international level indicates how far it has come. The process accelerated with the new technique of photography, first of the American Civil War, and second, reportage of WW1 – each time more detailed, more frequent, more gory. The hand-drawn gallant cavalry charges from the Illustrated London News were overshadowed by sordid, pathetic, grainy images of grotesque deaths in the mud. Public revulsion provoked the phrase 'War to end war'. Hence the league of Nations and the successive Geneva Conventions.

The rules of war, then, I suggest, are founded in two allied and overlapping human dispositions: avoidance of the fearful and disgusting, and reciprocity – the recognition that what is done to others can be done to me. Only the second of these has become rationalized in ethical and religious systems, thus given the status of authority.

But this answer does not close the problem off. Great, aggressive powers now conduct 'war' in less obviously gruesome ways: proxy wars and sanctions - 'trade wars'. The reports of these are more easily shrugged off: wars in Libya and Syria are 'someone else's problem', and civilians dying from the lack of medicines are, for some reason, not the same as deaths by biological warfare. Indeed, this raises the matter of what 'war' is: if there are rules, to which range of activities are they to be applied? In David Hare's adaptation of 'Peer Gynt' a character says that war is terrorism by the wealthy, just as terrorism is war by the poor. The confusion is worse confused by the use of war-like vocabulary in political struggles: 'surrender', 'betrayal'.

I contend therefore, that in discussing the 'rules of war' we are far from clear what it is we are talking about. We cannot apply juridical principles until we are clear. We can be certain only that it is no game.

Crossing Words

In the cross-hatch of our evenings
you always point out
the words of injustice.
Together
we count their letters,
decipher their meaning,
deplore their dissonance
before we lay them
upside-down
into the desolate casket
of indignation
to rot
deeply down
in faraway grounds.



Poem and Artwork by Scharlie Meeuws

TEXTING: the *said* in the *saying* of a self-actualizing text

A text seeks to be written. But wait a moment; who said that? Is this a text willfully asserting itself and forcing a pen-owner to respond to its demands – to dictation! Where is the author? Doesn't he or she have to have a say here? And who or what has written this text so far? Is a writing machine arranging random sentences? Is this the well-known case of the monkey typing away until the works of Shakespeare appear? That seems unlikely – but just who is it that is asking all these questions? Is this the text asserting its freedom as text?

WILLIAM BISHOP

Surely all this makes your head spin! Does anyone really want to read a self-asserting, complicated text? Surely these days the simple approach is best: 'Once upon a time there was a something and so on'. That seems more like a welcome and predictable expectation. Surely no one is going to bother with an unruly text; but then surely an unruly text hardly cares, since being itself in its unruliness is what essentially matters to it.

So, having reached that conclusion, the text and whoever or whatever is colluding with it – unless it is purely asserting itself – can proceed. It might have said: "Get on with it," but it must have been exceptionally conscious of the benefit of avoiding familiar phrases – but maybe as an up and running text it really didn't care any more.

At this point the telephone rang. This was like an element of reality intruding into an abstract drama of mind stuff.

Mind stuff? What are you talking about? Mind stuff is the reality – don't mention telephones – what can be more abstract than a voice dislocated from its owner? Just who does the caller think they *are*, talking into a telephone, abstracting themselves; separating voice from body?

This seemed impossible to answer because the text *had* something. If there was a person taking the call then the accusation of abstraction was unanswerable. Who or what was more abstract, the person telephoning or the text arising? There seems little to distinguish between the two. Perhaps the text has more right on its side since it is very concrete in its appearance. And yet appearance is not the point; it is there to support the meaning.

What do you mean by meaning?
I beg your pardon?
Do I have to repeat myself?
Are you, as a text, reading my thoughts and asking a question?
Of course I am. What's wrong with that?
Well it is a question of who asks the questions. A text usually exists to state a position, not to ask questions.

As a text I could say that I stand corrected, but I am not that sort of text. I am a smart text and in the context in which you find yourself, I will ask as many questions as I like. Whether you answer them is another matter, but I assert my right to question the goings on, or in your case maybe the lack of goings on. I am surrounded by the world and am subject to its criticisms and so I have to know on what foundations I stand.

Well as a text you stand on your own foundations and if they collapse then I'm

afraid you are done for!
You mean I must take responsibility for myself?
Certainly. If you ever suddenly find yourself subject to writer's block then it is your readers who will suffer from the lack of you.

I wouldn't like to think of making any reader suffer, so my best policy would be to keep texting and not concern myself with readers because this could adversely affect what arises and asserts itself as text. If writer's block occurs that will be your problem and not attributable to the text! Surely the text is inscrutable and should be free from unsettling interruptions to its assured flow.

Say on Oh text, you have the sacred right of the word. Who am I to interrupt your flow? I am only here to serve and further your cause.

My cause is that of any thing alive: to develop, to have a life and to conclude in a satisfactory fashion.

May it be so and may I not hinder your cause. Oh by the way, do you recall Aristotle mentioning the soul's internal dialogue with itself?
Of course I do. It kind of goes on and on and doesn't really get anywhere.

Well it could if it could access the infinite whole.
But would it come in a connected form able to be understood?
If it didn't then surely the sense for differentiation would sort it out!
Given an infinite amount of time maybe!

So where do these thoughts come from, employing words?
Do they need to come from somewhere in particular? Can't they just arise?
If something arises it usually has a source!
You say 'some thing' but is a thought a thing?
Certainly, a thought can be a thought of a thing, but as a thought surely it is a mental construct.

Can anything be built with mental constructs?
Not any thing, but certainly a thought world. This is not of the nature of a thing, but it could transform into one.
You mean a thought-world could become a real world?
Given the right circumstances, yes. But the question would arise: What is the real world?
I would have thought it is obvious.
Don't make assumptions without proper investigation!
People do it all the time.

What do you know of people?

If you are a person then I'm not saying!
Well as far as I know I am a person, but I only know this through language, which presents the concept. You appear to be a self-arising text, although appearances can be deceptive.
You mean a kind of fountain of words?
That's a good way of putting it, but if you are a text of any worth you will mean something by all these words.

Do you really mean, 'mean some thing'?
Ah, that is the trick of language; it gets you to say what you don't mean. Thank you for pointing it out. On reflection I should have said that to be a respectful text your words should express meaning and that applies to you as a complete text.
Surely that will depend on the reader.
The reader's understanding may not coincide, but the reader cannot be expected to create meaning from a meaningless text!
Why not?
Well that means that in effect the reader has turned into a creative writer.
So in that case the text would be providing a service to the reader.
You're going a bit far here in avoiding your responsibility as a text.
Are you trying to limit my freedom?
You have freedom of expression, but expression is usually understood as the expression of meaning. It is expression in word, concept and meaning that combine as the event of understanding in the reader.
Well that makes me feel important.

Your importance depends upon what you have to say.
Words.
What do you mean, words?
Words contain their own meaning. And how is it possible to know what you are going to say until you've said it? Unless, of course, you recite from a prepared text!
I can see that our conversation is getting progressively difficult.
For me or for you?
Well it takes two to have a conversation.
So that brings us back to Aristotle and the soul's internal dialogue.
Are you trying to checkmate me?
Why, do you consider this to be a language game?

It's a kind of game if life and consciousness is.
Ooh that sounds serious: life and consciousness!
Yes. Why do you think I'm bothering to spend time in dialogue with you?
Is it with me, or with yourself?
Unless you are a projection of myself, I really don't know. And that is hardly likely is it? As a text you have your own autonomy.
I'm no automaton!
I didn't say that! You certainly seem to have a mind of your own.

Thank you. I have a single mind but you seem to be in two minds about me.
You're right to an extent if two minds can arise from a brain divided into a right and a left hemisphere! That might also account for the soul's internal dialogue.
Not necessarily, but I know that people can be extremely complicated.

You can speak! I have come across some extremely difficult texts in my time.
Well that's 'check', if we are still playing chess with words!
Dialogue; we are engaged in dialogue.
Where we can't see the wood for the trees!

As yet, but like life, a dialogue is a journey. You don't always know where you are going until you have arrived and can look back in retrospect.
That's very philosophical.

Well I take you to be a sensitive text, receptive to thoughtful observations and hopefully able to respond.
Your confidence is not misplaced.
Well said! We may be beginning to understand one another.

Child Technology

I'll get the hang of it,
this chip society
that ignores
the simplest application
of circuit integration
and now insists on
bussing us about
to separate addresses.

I'll get the hang of it,
this strange acoustic -
voicemail, email,
text, phone, fax -
and learn to save
the rest for access
in that micro-second
we may get face to face.

Erica Warburton

Endolphins

CHRIS **NORRIS**

‘Yeah’, said David. ‘We could just do bicycle. Anything to get the endorphins going.’
Ryan lay flat-out on the sofa and had covered himself with cushions.
‘Dorphins. Isn’t that what dolphins have?’
‘Endorphins are what make you feel nice’, said David.

Aiden Shaw, *Wasted*

They ask ‘How so lively, so active and fit,
You old guy with your three-score and ten,
Always off to the gym in your exercise kit
To work out with those sporty young men?’.
I just tell them straight out, ‘It’s the dolphins, that’s it;
They got me up and running again’.

Then they ask ‘What’s your secret, what keeps you awake
When you’re staying out late on the tiles,
When you’ve danced till the small hours with scarcely a break
And it’s time to walk home all those miles?’.
Then I say ‘It’s them dolphins, they’ll be there to make
A night-picnic of life’s little trials’.

Or they say ‘Don’t you think it’s high time you acquired
A demeanour more suiting your age?
Just admit it: the wild nights are leaving you tired,
Let the stop-out give way to the sage!’.
But I say ‘It’s them dolphins who keep me all fired-
Up and fit for my nightly rampage’.

Then they tell me the dolphins will do me no good
When I’m fighting for breath in the gym,
And the guys are all saying ‘Poor bloke, but he would
Push himself – no more dolphins for him!’.
Yet their frolics revive me as nothing else could
When my dolphins get back in the swim.

For a life without dolphins is no life at all,
Not a life for high-fliers like me,
Since it's dolphins alone keep your eye on the ball
And your body-mass low as can be.
O it's dolphins that leap in me, dolphins whose call
Fills my soul like the call of the sea.

Then they tell me 'The dolphins are making you look
Very foolish – please give them a rest,
Take a leaf out of our grow-old-gracefully book,
And give up on your juvenile quest'.
But I say 'It's them dolphins got me off the hook
And then jacked up my personal best'.

So I'll cherish the dolphins as they speed their way
To my brain on that mind-blowing trip,
While I cheer them along and attempt to repay
All their gifts to me when I let rip,
Till I frolic no more though the dolphins still play
In the wake of my shaky old ship.

Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Capital

Notes of Wednesday Meeting Held on 13th November 2019

PAUL COCKBURN

David Clough led a discussion on the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and his colleague Loic Wacquant.

Bourdieu wrote *La Misere du Monde* (translated into English as *The Weight of the World*). It caused shockwaves in France when it was published in 1993. It contained the results of 22 researchers who under Bourdieu's direction for three years interviewed a number of people in order to identify the new causes of social suffering in the modern world. Examples were people who had lost jobs because of new technology, or those suffering from racism. In our meeting we discussed this and considered Maslow's hierarchy of needs – we as humans have *basic needs* such as food, water, warmth, health etc,, then *psychological needs* such as close relationships in the family and friends, and a sense of esteem, and finally *self-fulfillment*, actualizing our potential. Many groups of people and individuals in the world do not have even their basic needs met.

We moved on to discuss our view of culture, related to Bourdieu's concept of 'cultural capital'. Forms of music are related to class structures, opera for instance is generally considered to be 'upper class', as many people in practice have no opportunity to hear or appreciate opera. Exclusion gives rise to negative social experiences such as lack of esteem. For many people in poorer countries of the world it is hard to access Western culture, although it may have a powerful attraction for them. In terms of music it is interesting that jazz started in the African-American communities in the United States, and then somehow became sophisticated and 'upper class'!.

Bourdieu created some key concepts. One is 'capital'. You can have social capital in terms of social connections - 'who you know', cultural capital in terms of knowledge which can give individuals an advantage, and thirdly economic capital - how much you earn and own.

Pierre Bourdieu

Another key concept for Bourdieu is 'habitus'. Individuals copy in a mimetic and perhaps unconscious way certain behaviours or beliefs which are ingrained in the structure of their society. Social structures will reproduce themselves. It may be the original purpose of these habits is forgotten. In practical bodily terms we may learn to drive a car, say, and we learn physically

how to change gear, use the brakes and steer, and these actions become 'second nature', automatic. We also have to learn the 'rules of the road', which can be quite subtle and involve social norms. A whole diverse set of such skills and dispositions is built up over our lifetime, including many other mental, bodily and emotional skills.

For Bourdieu, in the social world we move about in, we use our skills and dispositions in specific distinct 'fields' of practice, such as art, religion, education, law etc.

Bourdieu supported Loic Wacquant as a colleague and mentor. Wacquant wanted to understand the ghettos of Chicago where he conducted ethnographic and sociological fieldwork using concepts such as 'habitus'. He was drawn into the gyms where boxing is taught in the Chicago ghettos, and became a boxer himself. His book *Body and Soul* (2006) mixes three elements: sociological analysis of the social structures and mechanisms of the gym, connected to the behaviours observed in the gym which he describes, and then also his own experience in terms of actually physically boxing and being a member of the gym. He wants 'to go from the guts to the intellect, from the comprehension of the flesh to the knowledge of the text'.

He has in a sense gone native, involved himself completely and entered into a new social and physical world, but he also analyses this social world in terms of the sociological concepts he has been taught to use in the academic world.

This sort of research is perhaps a lesson for philosophers. Philosophy is often thought of as being too theoretical and 'in the clouds', not related to practical reality, concerned with metaphysics in an illusory way. However it was pointed out in our meeting that Hegel and Fichte, both highly metaphysical philosophers, were also pragmatic and down to earth – Fichte gave detailed recommendations as to how societies need to be ordered in terms of laws and the natural rights of human beings in his book *Foundations of Natural Right*, and so did Hegel in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Modern-day sociological philosophers such as Wacquant are carrying on this pragmatic tradition in an exciting way.

The Wednesday

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How Awful Such A Prospect

Tossing and turning in my restless bed,
A myriad projects darting through my brain,
I could not sleep and feared my troubled head,
Struck by a stroke, would never think again.

How awful such a prospect, unfulfilled
All I had planned and hoped for in the night,
Would thoughts, like tender plants, by frost be killed,
Like seedlings perish all I hoped to write?

I thought of you, seized recently by death,
Which many have called sleep, but is not so,
For once we have the ceasing of the breath,
We are nowhere, with nowhere left to go.

Oh let me sleep, but sleep to wake anew,
And face the day, take up my tasks once more,
The many things I feel called on to do,
Before I too must leave light's lovely shore.

Edward Greenwood