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The *Wednesday*

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Editorial

Happiness and the Philosopher

In the last issue of *The Wednesday* we talked about humour. We found that philosophers are not sitting comfortably with the concept of humour and have not been able to tell too many good jokes. But happiness has been their proper domain since Aristotle. He thought that happiness was the highest good – something valuable in itself – and that we seek it for its own sake. Just over a thousand years later, Schopenhauer came along and said that happiness does not exist in itself and that it's only a lack of or respite from suffering. Perhaps the kind of metaphysics that each of these two philosophers subscribed to is the cause of the difference, but the details don't concern us here.

Between these views came that of Nietzsche who thought that happiness is the wrong psychology for the human being, especially if it is cashed out in terms of pleasure and pain. For him, such a hedonistic conception is decadent and nihilistic. It is connected to what now we take to be a society of entertainment and the marketing of pleasure. Nietzsche criticises Epicurus for carrying hedonism 'far beyond any intellectual integrity.' He had by then discovered the idea of the will to power. As Nietzsche put it in the *Will to Power*: 'Pleasure appears where there is the feeling of power.'

The Utilitarians were the enemies of Nietzsche because of their principle of the happiness of the greatest number and the idea of counting the maximum number. More importantly, he rejected the hedonism (pleasure) promoted by their principle of happiness. (He called them the shopkeepers of Gower Street because Bentham and his fellow Utilitarians were based at University College London which is situated in that street). The principle was then modified by Mill who thought that there are lower and higher pleasures. But Nietzsche would not be satisfied with this modification either because the whole psychology of pleasure and pain was rejected by him. To complicate the picture, I would say that Nietzsche would say that there is pleasure and happiness for the strong, those who exercise self-overcoming (and all kinds of creative overcoming) but not for the weak who are passively seeking enjoyment.

The change that the Utilitarians introduced into the discussion of happiness was the move from theory to practice and from individual happiness to that of society. I have come across two books on happiness written by a philosopher and a lawyer, Sissela and Derek Bok. They show the different ways of discussing happiness, one contemplative and relying on the philosophical tradition, with citations from Aristotle to Russell; the other concentrating on practice and the discussion of statistics, government policies and economic systems.

Sissela Bok, a moral philosopher, in her book *Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain Science,* insists that the search for happiness should be a moral one. But the question then is whether this happiness is subjective or objective? Do I have to worry about the condition of the world around me or not? Derek Bok's book *The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from the New Research on Well-Being*, is on the empirical side where the search for happiness is full of practical interests that could be used to justify certain policies. Some philosophers take issue with this objective view of happiness and ask about how the experience of happiness feels for the individual.

Nietzsche's view is in line with the subjective view, while Bentham's is on the objective side. But the latter view seems to externalise the responsibility and concern for happiness while the Nietzschean view raises the problem of the extent and burden of overcoming, which we might discuss in another issue.

The Editor

Existential Choice in Kierkegaard's *Either / Or*

Written in 1842 and intensely personal, Soren Kierkegaard's *Either / Or*, together with *Fear and Trembling and Repetition* from the same period of his life, is regarded as one of his masterpieces, and like them is the product of a traumatic episode in his life. In 1841 he had broken off his engagement with Regine Olsen with whom he was deeply in love but whom he decided he could not marry. The split was devastating for both of them. He then left Copenhagen for Berlin where he attended philosophy lectures by F W J Schelling and began writing *Either / Or* there, which was completed at the end of 1842 and published early in the next year. Here is a new look at this work and a new analysis of its basic concepts.

DAVID SOLOMON

Part 1

In *Either / Or* Kierkegaard addresses the subject of choice: what is it to make a choice? How are we defined by the choices that we make? Do we make choices or do our choices make us? What effect do our choices have on us? In order to choose, in order to address the alternatives that face us, have we already made a choice, that is have we already chosen to choose in a particular way, to give the act of choice a certain significance? The title *Either / Or* indicates a sense of the urgency of opting for one of two alternatives, but the act of opting itself might have a different meaning for different individuals. We could choose on a practical day to day level: to drink coffee or wine, and the difference might be one of experiences and sensations. Or we might be faced with a choice between a right or wrong action, or even a choice which is also a life-changing event: will we from now on commit ourselves to a career and family, or to leading a religious life, or to one of pleasure? Or else we might decide that the act of choosing is futile and our individual choices are just amusements designed to stave off boredom.

All of the above questions are explored by Kierkegaard in this work not however as an abstract system of thought but as a series of stories, essays, anecdotes, letters and sermons told by characters whose perspectives also express the ambivalence of the writer himself. There are many layers of ambiguity: in the book characters refer to other characters who may be real or who may be inventions of the original characters. The book is framed as a dispute between two different kinds of philosophies of life, the aesthetic and the ethical, put forward by two different figures. Their points of view are not necessarily Kierkegaard's own but both incorporate some aspects of his ambiguous and shifting points of view. It is also not clear who gets the better of whom in the dispute. The work is inconclusive, and it cannot be read as a definitive justification of either an ethical or an aesthetic way of life, and no final determination is made so that the reader is compelled to come to his / her own conclusion.

The difficulty of reading the work is increased by Kierkegaard's use of pseudonymous attribution of authorship. He himself does not claim to be the writer. The work is credited

instead to a character called Victor Eremita (Victor the Hermit). From his own account in the introduction he appears as a reclusive independent writer and philosopher, his name suggesting withdrawal from the world, meditation and reflection at a distance on the underlying themes of life. The scheme of authorship is however complicated by a second level of attribution. In the introduction Victor gives an involved and rather fantastic account of his having bought a writing table which consisted of many drawers and compartments. One of the drawers gets stuck which necessitates him having to take an axe to the whole piece of furniture. As a result of this destruction he discovers a secret compartment which turns out to contain a mass of miscellaneous papers. Victor thereupon undertakes to be the editor of these documents.

Victor divides the papers into two collections which he labels A and B. The authors of each collection appear to be friends. The author of the A collection is unnamed. We know little about him because he reveals little about himself that is not allusive and indirect. All these documents express an aesthetic philosophy of life. They include a series of epigrams, and some brilliant essays on tragedy and music, concentrating on the operas of Mozart and especially on Don Giovanni. Victor also discovers in another section of the shattered table a secret diary which is an extended account (either by the author of A or by another writer) of the seduction of a young woman by a character who labels himself Johannes. The diary is the chronicle of the affair and also contains letters mainly from him to the person he is involved with, a young woman called Cordelia, and also a few of Cordelia's letters to him.

The author of the B collection more specifically addresses himself to the A author. We know from these papers that they are friends and it is clear that he is referring and responding to some of the points made in the other's works. We know the name of the B author. His name is Wilhelm and he is a judge and also married. Judge Wilhelm is a proponent of an ethical philosophy of life, he writes about the importance of human society, of communication and sharing, of the universal in life expressed especially through having a vocation and through marriage. His style is logical and direct; he exhorts the author of A,

trying to persuade him to adopt a similar way of life. His style is in total contrast to the A author, whose writing is elliptical and seems designed not to reveal himself.

Victor in his introduction says it is not clear who gets the better of the dialogue between the A author and Judge Wilhelm, if it is actually a dialogue. He has tried to put the papers in chronological order but he cannot assume that all of the B collection were written after the A collection and therefore he is not certain in every case who is responding to whom (although he knows that some of what is in B is in response to A). So, we cannot be sure about who had the last word, and therefore about who succeeded, in persuading the other, if either did.

Straight away there is an ambiguity in what we have been given so far. Victor's story about the writing table, the drawers, the axe and the secret compartment with its papers and diary, seems so difficult to believe that we can doubt its truth and suspect that it is all an invention by him (Where did the papers come from? How did they get to be mixed up together? How did they get to be stored away in a secret compartment?) If that is so, then it follows that both the A and B writers as well as Johannes (if he is different to A) are really inventions of Victor himself, just as behind Victor stands his creator Kierkegaard. This is especially important in relation to Judge Wilhelm. If Judge Wilhelm, proponent of the ethical life, is really just an invented character and another mask for Victor, what does it say about the ethical philosophy that Wilhelm is promoting? Is it just a pose, an invention and itself an aesthetic fiction?

The ambiguity puts in doubt a rather simplistic reading of Kierkegaard's philosophy according to which he is supposed to be describing stages in a life progression of Aesthetic – Ethical – Religious which are assumed to dovetail neatly

together in a logical order. Perhaps there is no progression, or rather the whole idea of a progression only exists for a person who has *already* adopted an ethical philosophy. For an aesthete there is no progression, just a series of interesting contrasting experiences of life.

In some respects, the author of A and the author of B share a common philosophical outlook, employing similar philosophical categories such as Freedom, Choice, and the importance of Possibility. But the significance of these categories differ vastly depending on whether they are viewed from either the aesthetic or the ethical perspective. For the aesthetic author of A, there is no ultimate purpose in choosing, there is no movement or development towards anything higher, no Hegelian mediation of opposites that points to a more evolved stage of life, a journey towards the Absolute. An act of choosing is made for the sake of the Interesting (an aesthetic category), to create variation, to express versatility and skill, to stave off boredom and depression. Choice for the Aesthete means experimenting with alternatives successively. The moment is all-important. There is no resolution, no anchor by which the opposites can co-exist or resolve into something else. From the ethical point of view, an aesthetic approach to life is volatile i.e. subject to sudden change, alteration, therefore unstable. There is ultimately no point to it.

> *If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or if you do not marry, you will regret both; whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret both. Laugh at the world's follies, you will regret it; weep over them, you will also regret it; if you laugh at the world's follies or if you weep over them, you will regret both; whether you laugh at the world's follies or you weep over them, you will regret both. Believe a girl,*



you will regret it; if you do not believe her, you will also regret it; if you believe a girl or you do not believe her, you will regret both; whether you believe a girl or you do not believe her, you will regret both. If you hang yourself, you will regret it; if you do not hang yourself, you will regret it; if you hang yourself or you do not hang yourself, you will regret both; whether you hang yourself or you do not hang yourself, you will regret both. This, gentlemen, is the sum of all practical wisdom. It isn't just in single moments that I view everything aeterno modo [= under eternity], as Spinoza says; I am constantly aeterno modo. Many people think that's what they are too when, having done the one or the other, they combine or mediate these opposites. But this is a misunderstanding, for the true eternity lies not behind either/or but ahead of it. So their eternity will also be in a painful succession of moments in time, since they will have the double regret to live on. My practical wisdom is easy to understand, for I have only one principle, which is not

*even my starting-point. (**A, Either / Or: An Ecstatic Lecture.**)*

Behind the aesthetic life, there is the shadow of sadness, boredom and despair. The philosophy of the aesthete is immediate, is interested in twists and turns of experience, does not recognise continuity, or at least continuity that is a development. It is deeply sceptical, it recognises no certainty. It is solitary, standing at a distance from ordinary life, unwilling or unable to communicate what is unique, beautiful, separate from the mundane and conventional. For the aesthete, the important things are Mood, Difference, rather than development, Continuity without Breaks, therefore a series of experiences always under the subject's control. Key is what is 'arbitrary', 'contingent', and what is 'accidental'. To the aesthete, theory is abstraction, the concrete, the immediate is what is important. In a brilliant essay called *The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic*, the A author analyses different kinds of love relationships through three Mozart operas, and the three different kinds of lovers that appear in them: Cherubino in The Marriage of Figaro, Papageno in the Magic Flute and most importantly Don Giovanni himself in Don Giovanni. These three lovers correspond to three different kinds of love experience: that of the dreaming, seeking, and discovering.

*Desire is thus awake but not yet specified as desire. If we remember that desire is present in all three stages, we can say that in the first stage it is specified as dreaming, in the second as seeking, in the third as desiring. The seeking desire is not yet desiring; what it seeks is only what it can desire but it does not desire it. So perhaps the most apposite description is, 'It discovers'. If we compare Papageno with Don Giovanni in this respect, the latter's journey through the world is something more than a voyage of discovery; he savours not just the adventure of travelling to discover, he is a knight who goes out to conquer (veni, vidi, vici). Discovery and conquest are here identical; indeed in a sense one can say that he forgets the discovery in the conquest, or that the discovery lies behind him, and he therefore leaves it to his servant and secretary Leporello, who keeps a list in a quite different sense from that in which I might imagine Papageno keeping accounts. Papageno picks out, Don Giovanni enjoys, Leporello checks. **(A 2, The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic)***

The most developed representative of these is Don Giovanni (Don Juan), who experiences the immediacy of love in the vast number and variety of his conquests, women of all ages, ranks, backgrounds, looks and temperaments. His life is a relentless and overwhelming outpouring of the force of passion and desire. For the aesthete, the deliberate and conscious moulding of these extreme passions generates the Interesting, which becomes the point of life in so far as it has a point. Parallel to the erotic passion is the passion of extreme Doubt, embodied by Goethe's Faust. The Doubter stands apart from the existence lived by ordinary people and wants to tear down its certainties. Don Juan seduces hundreds of women, Faust seduces only one – Gretchen. For the Aesthetic author of A, what counts is the intensity of this single seduction more than the number of the seducer's conquests. This he describes in the work that is the culmination of the first part of *Either / Or: The Seducer's Diary*.

In the next article on *Either / Or*, I will describe the intricacies of the seduction of Cordelia by Johannes as narrated by him in The Seducer's Diary, and then the transition from the Aesthetic to the Ethical attempted in the rejoinder of Judge Wilhelm in Part B.

A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH (1946)

(written and directed by Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger)

No one has ever dramatised a brain seizure like you guys.
An airman hallucinating on earth and its WW2 'heaven.'
Pilot Peter Carter, so English a fighting poet. One moment
in a three-strip Technicolor village, the next on a staircase
to a monochrome beyond. Blaze of aircraft crashing down.
A beach. Her cycling. You meet; grab the falling handlebars,
embrace and kiss. Not some visionary sight of a nether world.
Nor a surgeon spying the street with his camera obscura.
Nor the French messenger who lost his head. Nor the smell
of fried onions can change my mind: the idea of a sacrifice
for love. June got her man. Peter got his woman. Emeric and
you Michael got the film you wanted. AMOLAD determined
my fantasy afterlife. I was born premature three years later:
taken out of my pram; nurtured in a cinema, entranced by
black & white pearls with the option for wide screen rainbows.
Hovering betwixt and between, knowing I'd never starve.

Alan Price

Reflection

gnothi seauton

In the empire of appearances
lies this country of unlikeness,
where Narcissus gazes at his own reflection
and mistakes images for reality.

When Prometheus stole the fire from the gods
handing it out to humanity
he made it possible for modern man, Master of illusion,
to create a universe of semblance
reflected in volatile consumer objects.

Confusion reigns between certainty and knowledge
of science that believes in technical values
and thereby erases all memory.

Reflection from object to thought,
from antiquity to the present,
sees the world as phenomenal and not as substantial.
The belief that science has control
over the nature of reality
reveals itself as a recurring dream of delusion.

Science lives separately from human reality.
Reason has closed the door to the outside
and blinded by its own light, it produces
infinite geometries of the possible.

But out of the depths of nothingness
leads the path of self-knowledge,
as the warning in Apollo's temple at Delphi tells:
'gnothi seauton', know thyself.
As Socrates knew: *mastering others is strength,*
mastering yourself is true power.

Poem and Artwork by *Scharlie Meeuws*

Re-Thinking Philosophy

Notes of Wednesday Meeting Held on 26th June 2019

PAUL COCKBURN

We discussed meta-philosophy, discussing philosophy itself as an intellectual discipline. A number of questions were put to the meeting by Rahim Hassan. They included:

> Is philosophy how the ancient Greeks defined it?
>
> Does philosophy have a special essence (a particular subject matter) or is it culturally sensitive?
>
> Socrates was credited with changing the subject of philosophy from nature to the good life. He prepared the ground for religion. Plato turned it metaphysical. Aristotle made it technical. The technical aspect survived up to our time, but could other aspects of philosophy survive in our time?
>
> Philosophy started with the Greeks (according to inherited wisdom, although this point has been disputed) then was taken over by religion, science and culture. Is philosophy just the Emissary or is it the Master in all these fields? Is philosophy culturally sensitive?
>
> Is philosophy essentially metaphysical and does the over-throwing of metaphysics mean the end of philosophy? Put in different words: Does Post-Metaphysical Philosophy means the dismissal of Philosophy and the turn towards a 'Post-Philosophical Society'?

We didn't have time to discuss all these questions. But we started with a basic question, the question of defining what philosophy is. Chris Seddon pointed out that the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* gives the following definition:

> *Philosophy is the study of the most general and abstract features of the world and categories with which we think: mind, matter, reason, proof, truth etc.*

But Chris added that a single word can be associated with any number of concepts. Rather than address the question 'What is philosophy?' as if there were a single correct answer, it might be more fruitful to explore with open minds some of the interesting and useful ideas that occur to us in that context. He thought much more in line with the definition quoted from the Oxford Dictionary, which refers to 'the most general and abstract features' rather than 'fundamental', 'essential', 'ultimate', 'nature' or 'principles' of things, and which explicitly recognises the importance of studying both the features of the world and the categories with which we think. For him this leaves philosophy with the task of providing a more holistic view of the specialised subjects which have historically grown out of it, including the sciences and humanities, and the conceptual disciplines which serve them.

A key issue is: Is philosophy only problem-based or does tradition play a role? If it is only problem-based then the history of philosophy is not so important. This is the line that analytical philosophers tend to follow, but continental philosophers think history is important, and that analysing historical and cultural developments is fundamental to philosophy (including the development of philosophy itself).

In early medieval times philosophy was subservient to theology, and Aristotelianism ruled. But over time the theologians loosened the hold of theology and allowed philosophical speculation. In the end scientific and enlightenment thinking overthrew

the authority of the church and the methodology of science was developed and has had a tremendous influence on philosophy. But much of philosophy is not empirical in the way science is, and this has consequences especially for metaphysics which is not empirical. However, although there is no strict philosophical methodology, some modern philosophers would still claim philosophy is based on rationality, validity and truth.

There are many challenges to philosophy. But even if we defend philosophy against all these challenges, and judging by the state of contemporary philosophy when it is becoming irrelevant to our daily life and problems, is philosophy worth the effort?

Mike England felt that philosophy should be integrated into the fabric of culture and society more. The choices we make should be analysed in terms of the reasons and the motives for them, both at the individual level and the societal level. Philosophy should be a compulsory subject at school so as to allow individuals to feel confident to think for themselves... which could lead to the challenging of the established cannon of power.

Paul Cockburn thought that philosophy deals with high-level concepts, examining the underlying fundamental basis and assumptions of any discipline such as sociology, literature, ethics or the sciences. Philosophy should also look at the totality of our knowledge and aim to find connections and relationships between the various domains of knowledge.

Chris Seddon thought that Ethics is the field where philosophy could have a real influence, and this could lead to fundamental changes in the 'real' world. Rahim Hassan agreed and referred to the work of Martha Nussbaum. She had a social project in India to empower women and was helped by Amartya Sen, the economist and philosopher. However, Nussbaum complained that when she invited philosophers (academic philosophers) to participate in policy making conferences and programmes, these philosophers kept talking about their narrow fields and did not participate in the practical issues or the concepts that were required for dealing with these issues.

Richard Rorty

There were other useful comments by David Clough, David Burridge and others.

Final thoughts:
Philosophy deals with concepts. Carolyn Wilde thought that concepts are not created by philosophers, they are out there in the world. Chris Seddon thought concepts were more than that, they are creative. Carolyn replied that concepts are part of our language. Chris said ordinary language is weak. Carolyn then said that she objects to concepts being metaphysical and Chris agreed. Rahim Hassan thought that 'metaphysics' has to be re-defined. On Rorty's account it is that which transcends the subject. To believe that there is a truth and reality independent of (or transcending) the subject is metaphysics. Rorty rejects such a metaphysics and called for a Post-Philosophical, Post-Metaphysical society.

Ashina

CHRIS **NORRIS**

My grandson Avery, aged around 15 months at the time, had a lengthy period during which by far his favorite occupation was to sit and gaze intently at the washing machine going through its cycles. He became quite distressed if his parents tried to distract him and was clearly much happier watching 'Ashina' (his word for the machine) than viewing 'Peppa Pig' or any other Children's TV offerings.

I call her my Ashina but that's not
The name they use for her, my Mum and Dad,
So maybe there's some other name she's got,

And anyway it makes me sort-of glad
If that name's wrong because it sort-of means
That nobody can share the fun we've had,

Me and Ashina. Mum told me it cleans
My shirts and shorts, my trousers, pants, and socks,
And dries them too, but I've seen big machines

Down at the laundromat with lots of clocks
And dials on them and know that's not the kind
Of job Ashina does, since she's a box-

With-screen like our TV. I've looked behind
To search for clues but nothing there apart
From all the wires and other stuff you find

On lots of plug-in things. But I can't start
To tell you what Ashina's shown to me,
This clanking dream-machine where head and heart

Find pleasures far beyond what kids' TV
Serves up for our delight. I'd say they sell
You short, those shows, because they make you see

Adorno

Things their way, like it's TV's role to tell
You not just how it goes, the toddler-tale,
But where to laugh and clap your hands as well.

That's why I watch Ashina without fail,
Why, when they turn the TV on, I shift
Discreetly to the out-house and avail

Myself of her strange power to cast adrift
Those inner fantasies kept well off-stage
In TV's view of things. Then it's her gift,

Ashina's special gift, to turn the page
On shapely tales, set all things in a spin,
Bring wondrous noises off, and so assuage

My longing that tales end as they begin,
With a return to chaos where the dance
Of glimpsed familiars and the cyclic din

Combine to cause in me a perfect trance
Of rapt attention. Sometimes it's a scene
Where every detail falls into some chance

Configuration, something there on screen
That quickly, momentarily detains
My wandering gaze as it decides between

Those flickering gestalts. So thought regains
Ashina's magic realm, the freedom lost
When TV holds the fluid mind in chains

And all loose ends tie up, though at the cost
Of miracles that else might leap to view
From the revolving stream of fragments tossed

This way and that. Then images break through
Once more and tell me: 'We're the shapes of your
Fears, hopes, desires, imaginings, a clue

To every secret wish, an endless store
Of portents, dreamscapes, auguries, and signs
That leave you, cross-legged viewer, with no more

Than a vague memory of the tangled lines,
The foam-flecked whirligig, the ceaseless flow
Of many-colored stuff that redefines

Itself at every turn yet seems to know,
Like some pulsating Sybil, how you trace
An occult pattern in the to-and-fro

That holds you spellbound. Lost in mental space,
Drawn off on wild trajectories, you scan
Those depths of primal chaos for the place

Where your kaleidoscopic trips began,
Where first Ashina caught your inner eye,
And pure imagination first outran

Those story-lines you'll soon be living by'.

The Form of the Validity and the Soundness of the Material

DAVID JONES

Philosophers make use of some technical jargon when using *syllogisms* such as deductive arguments. They talk of 'validity' and 'soundness'. As an illustration, consider the deductive argument which consists of three statements: 'all women are excellent drivers'; 'Catherine is a woman'; 'therefore Catherine is an excellent driver'. The first statement is a 'universal' statement. The second statement identifies 'a particular' as a member of the universal referred to in the first statement. The third statement makes the inference that: as 'Catherine is a woman' and 'as all women are excellent drivers' then it 'cannot be otherwise' than that 'Catherine is an excellent driver'. In this example *if the first two statements are true*, then 'it cannot be otherwise' that the third statement is also true.

The 'form' of this syllogism could be expressed with symbols such as: 'all A's are P'; 'Z is an A'; therefore 'Z is a (or has a) P'. The logical correctness of the inference in the argument is called by philosophers 'validity'. However, readers might have some reservations about whether the first statement: 'all women are excellent drivers'; and perhaps the second statement: 'Catherine is a woman' are actually true statements. If both statements are true then philosophers describe the argument in question as having the property of '*soundness*'.

Identifying the '*form*' of an argument is to see its validity or invalidity, and this is done with a type of thinking that examines the *relationships between the pure forms of the thoughts employed* which can also be called 'critical thinking'.

Identifying the '*material*' that an argument *refers to* brings into question the truth of an *observation* that is used in the construction of the argument and just as the construction of a physical object, such as a bell or the metal hull of a ship, requires 'sound' materials for the object to be fit for purpose in practical use so it is also in the construction of arguments.

Critical thinking concerns particularly the validity of the logical relationship between thoughts that are brought into a relationship to make an inference. Practical reasoning concerns particularly the correctness and completeness of observations that are used materially in inferences.

Observation and thinking each contribute to the 'reality' of philosophical insights.

The Wednesday

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