

The *Wednesday*



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group - Oxford

Editorial

Changing Times: Women in Philosophy

Mary Midgley who died two weeks ago at the age of ninety-nine had a remarkable life that spanned nearly a century of analytic philosophy. It had also seen the changing fortunes of women in education generally and philosophy in particular. Her death came just when the contribution of women to philosophy in the UK has been recognised. She would have been amused to listen to a series of lectures at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London this term, or the reading group that will be organised in the same place. The lectures and the reading group will deal with the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Phillipa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that ‘during their time at Oxford, they developed a shared philosophical agenda, method, and stance which... may mark them out as a distinct philosophical school.’ The title of the first lecture sums it up: ‘The Women are Up to Something.’ To this group, one should add the name of Mary Warnock who is slightly younger than the four and survived them all.

It is interesting that this group of lady philosophers were at Oxford at the same time, mainly at Somerville College, Oxford, on the eve of the Second World War. They were close friends and regularly met inside and outside the college to socialise and to have discussions. They were tutored by the same group of philosophers. They were also studying in the heyday of analytical philosophy that was still in its formation stage. But their female sensitivities made them see through this school of thought. This is most pronounced in the work of Midgley.

Midgley, as she records in her highly entertaining and informative memoirs, was not impressed by the linguistic turn that had started at the

beginning of the twentieth century with the work of Frege and Russell but got more affirmed in the late twenties with the publication of A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth and Logic*. She took issues with this trend and with the cult of Wittgenstein. What she objected to was the break-up of discourse into self-contained atomic sentences, cut off from their context. She tells us about ‘the standard triumphant “But what could that mean?” which was the parrot cry of brisk young men who had picked up enough logical positivism to be sure already that it couldn’t mean anything.’ I am afraid that even if Logical Positivism has now been discredited, the trend is still with us today. However, she exempted Wittgenstein himself from these charges, since he allows that ‘What lay beyond speech was, he said, the mystical, by which he did not mean nonsense but the profound, the true stuff of our lives.’

There is more to her take on the linguistic turn, reductionism, scientism, meaning and metaphysics that we might come back to. There are her major disputes with philosophers and scientists that are worth writing about. But for now, it may be helpful to mention the effect of the war on female philosophers. It was a catalyst in their rise to fame. Most of the men had to go to the army, except for a few conscientious objectors and a few male tutors. This gave women more time for one-to-one tutorials. But Midgley also suggested that the less male students there were, the more chances there were for the females to be heard. The situation now is different. It hasn’t gone full-circle yet but we now have more women studying and participating in philosophy, and many great female names contributing to all aspects of the philosophy.

The Editor

Equality: Why Is It A Philosophical Problem?

The Indian Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru once wrote that the spirit of the age is in favor of equality. Equality is an essentially contested concept. Contemporary political philosophers have argued for different forms of egalitarianism. Different forms of inequalities are justified on the basis of the different needs of people or who deserves what most. We shall discuss some major views on equality and the associated problems with each school of thought.

RANJINI GHOSH

Utilitarians have argued that distributional equality amounts to distribution of welfare. Jeremy Bentham had referred to welfare as happiness which is the net balance of pleasure over pain for any individual. If we are to assess the welfare of any individual, then we should see how happy that individual is. But welfare has also been conceptualized as desire or the preference satisfaction of the individual. Therefore, any project for distributing welfare is not concerned about how many resources individuals get but whether such resources are instrumental in giving each individual a certain level of satisfaction or happiness and whether it is measured in terms of preference fulfillment or maximizing pleasure. This school of thought also endorses a position of fulfilling everyone's welfare equally notwithstanding that this may result in certain individuals ending up with a disproportionate number of resources. Someone who has expensive taste in jewelry or cars will have to be treated equally with someone who is content with owning a bicycle.

drinking orange juice and eating wholemeal toast. If we are to equalize utility, then it appears unfair that we have to satisfy the expensive tastes of Charles. Or we may have to give Charles something else like a Ferrari car if we are not able to provide him with Bordeaux wine and pheasant. This is why Dworkin thinks that equalizing utility or welfare is unjust. But if we now change the example of the above-mentioned expensive tastes will it become less problematic? Suppose we give new born baby David more resources than new born baby Evan because David has been addicted to cocaine from birth since his mother used it throughout pregnancy and Evan's mother did not. One could also say needs and tastes are different things. Needs are objective, and tastes are subjective. We can agree to give someone a very expensive medicine or a wheelchair but not a Bordeaux wine since this is only taste.

Dworkin makes a distinction between 'brute luck' and 'option luck'. Brute luck means something which we have not chosen, and option luck arises from our conscious choice. If we are struck by a meteorite it will be brute luck as it wasn't out of choice but the horse we bet upon in a race if it wins is option luck. So, we can equalize utility when inequalities arise from brute luck but not option luck. Let us consider another example where Scrooge is a grumpy miserable man whose utility is very low even

The problematic issue is of subsidizing what Ronald Dworkin calls the problem of expensive tastes. Helen McCabe in an interesting article in *Philosophy Now* (January/February 2013) gives an example of this problem. Let us say Charles gets ten units of utility from drinking an expensive Bordeaux wine and eating plovers' eggs while others get ten units of utility from


though he is rich and healthy. But tiny Tim who is very poor and of ill-health is always jovial and has a high utility. Is it fair to take resources from Tim and give them to Scrooge to compensate for the difference in their characters?

Equality Of Resource Distribution

Resource egalitarianism has been identified with the views of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Dworkin says that a distributional scheme which treats people as equals is when it distributes resources so that no further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal. Dworkin has suggested a two-stage process:

1. The ambition sensitive auction
2. The insurance scheme

We shall discuss the examples given by Dworkin to analyze these positions. Let us assume there are some shipwrecked people on a deserted island. They all are assumed to have the same natural talents. To divide the resources available on the island equally among them an auction procedure is proposed. Each person is given a hundred shells to bid for all the available resources on the island. Since each person has different preferences or desires each person will decide on what resource to bid for through these shells. Anyone who prefers to engage in farming will bid for more agricultural land while some others may bid for more beach space. The one who wishes to set up a dairy farm will bid for cattle and some land. Hence everyone will bid for different resources in accordance with his or her ambitions. This appears to be a fair auction, and no one envies the other's resources. This meets the *envy* test. But in real life people are not born equal: some people are less physically capable than others. Hence even with a hundred shells such a person may end up being less well-off than the others. Her resources may be spent in meeting her special needs. Then we may need to compensate such individuals from the common pool of resources even before the start of the auction process. That is, the brute luck faced by such people needs to be taken care of in any scheme of distribution of resources. Hence Dworkin suggests that an



Jawaharlal Nehru

ambition sensitive auction scheme needs to be balanced by an insurance scheme that takes care of such brute luck inequalities.

An analogous case to the insurance scheme is the policy of progressive taxation. The rich are taxed proportionately more than the poor so that resources can be distributed to the very poor. This policy reconciles equality and the issue of just deserts, as Helen McCabe says, because it compensates for bad luck we do not deserve (being born blind) and it does not compensate for bad luck we do deserve (losing money in gambling). Dworkin thinks that we are rational agents and we need to insure ourselves against bad luck.

John Rawls sees justice as fairness. Rawls believes that it is unfair that some individuals have worse career prospects than others simply because of their class origins or family backgrounds. He proposes the difference principle which permits inequalities or differences in income and wealth but requires that they are so arranged so as to benefit the least advantaged. He also advocates the principle of the equality of opportunity for all in the labor market. But the first principle of Rawls to which he accords priority over any



Amartya Sen

other principle is the basic liberty principle. The first principle cannot be compromised to realize equality of opportunity or the difference principle.

Equality Of Capabilities

Economist Amartya Sen lays stress on the idea that distributional equality should be concerned with equalizing people's capabilities rather than equalizing resources or incomes. What is important is that people should enjoy real freedom by being able to read and write, being healthy, being politically active etc. The important thing is not how many resources we allocate to people but how much effective use they can put these resources to in improving their life conditions. Sen has proposed the idea of well-being in terms of *function*. Reading is a function, and '*capability*' is the ability to achieve a certain sort of function. If reading is a function, then literacy is a capability. The state has a role in ensuring this capability. The resource egalitarian may argue that distributing books and pencils is

enough, but Sen says that what is important is the ability of the target population to read and write.

Complex Equality

Michael Walzer argues that while we engage ourselves with various types of distribution applied to welfare, resources or capabilities, we overlook the meaning we attach to the goods in any distribution scheme. Different goods have different social meanings in different contexts for people. There is no single set of goods which have the same value in all contexts. He says that Rawls was wrong in suggesting that a set of primary goods could be equally distributed.

Walzer says that all distributions are just and unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake. The meanings change across time and space. For example, the concept of childcare being a family responsibility is no longer true in many societies. Every set of goods therefore is to be seen as a distinct distributive sphere with its own appropriate criteria for distribution. What is




Equalizing people's capabilities

true of the behavior of people in markets does not obtain in the family. Resources within a family are not distributed as wages and political offices and democracy should not be distributed among relatives. The same distributive standards cannot be used for different spheres. What is true of the market cannot be true of the political sphere. Thus, he calls his book *Spheres of Justice*. Inequalities are justified within any one sphere such as the economic domain. Anyone who's lazy will not get rewarded.

Priority

Thomas Nagel views the problem of equality from the point of view of every single individual since each individual has a priority ranking of his or her most urgent needs. To him the appeal of equality lies in it being acceptable to each individual. He gives the example of a person having two children: one of them is normal and happy, but the other suffers from a painful handicap. Let them be called the first and second child respectively. Suppose the person is about

to change jobs and must decide between moving to an expensive city where the second child can receive special medical treatment and schooling but where the family's standard of living will be lower and the environment dangerous for the first child, or moving to a semi-rural suburb where the first child who has an interest in sports and nature can have a good life. Suppose the gain to the first child of moving to the suburb is substantially greater than the gain to the second child of moving to the city. The second child will also suffer from the reduced standard of living of the family as well as a bad environment. For the first child the choice is between a happy life and an unhappy one. There is no way of compensating either child if any one choice is made. If he chooses to move to the city, it will be an egalitarian decision since it is more urgent to benefit the second child even though his benefit will be less. Now suppose a third child is added to this who may be happy and healthy but the problem of benefitting the second child remains since it is an urgent problem. Hence what Nagel



Jeremy Bentham

is saying is that any policy that aims to promote equality has to give priority to the individual's most urgent claims.

Egalitarianism as a policy is seen in opposition to utilitarianism and policies promoting individual rights. For instance, Rawls' theory assigns more importance to personal rights and liberties over equality and distributions. The utilitarian sees more sense in benefits given to a greater number of people. The individual rights perspective says that it is wrong to interfere with people's liberties. All three views share the assumption of moral equality between persons. They agree that moral claims of all persons are the same but disagree over what these are. The defender of rights sees them in the freedom to do things without interference from others. The utilitarian sees that each person's interest is counted in calculating the total utility of all persons. The egalitarian sees the equal claim of all persons to various advantages. While both egalitarian and utilitarian theories are concerned with outcomes the rights theories are concerned with actions rather than outcomes.

Robert Nozick thinks that all people's rights

must be equally respected. He rules out any kind of redistribution of resources apart from those which are voluntarily agreed upon. He opposes all forms of taxation since they interfere with the individual's right to autonomy. Nagel argues that what must be considered in any egalitarian claim is whether a single objective standard of urgency should be used in construing the claims of each person or whether his interests should be ranked at his own estimation of the relative importance of his actions when these are compared with the actions of others.

The Principle Of Equal Consideration Of Interests

Philosopher Peter Singer advocates a principle of equal consideration of interests which gives equal weight to the interests of all those affected by certain policy actions. It means that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act and if X stands to lose more than Y stands to gain it is better not to do the act. What the principle really means is that an interest is an interest whoever's interest it may be. He gives an example of a particular interest we may have in the relief of pain. The principle says that the ultimate moral reason for relieving pain is simply the undesirability of pain. The principle of equal consideration is like a pair of scales that weighs interest impartially. Only that side is favored whose interest is stronger. The principle is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment. Suppose that after an earthquake there are two victims, one with a crushed leg in agony and the other with a gashed thigh in slight pain. If we have only two shots of morphine left, then equal treatment would mean that we will have to give each injured person one shot. But one shot will not improve the pain of the person with the crushed leg. But giving this person a second shot would provide more relief than giving that shot to the other person who has less pain. Equal consideration of interests in this situation leads to an unequal result, which is two shots of morphine for one person and none for the other. But we should also consider that this unequal treatment is an attempt to arrive at a more egalitarian result. Giving two



Helen McCabe

shots to the more seriously injured person will bring about a situation where the degree of pain between the two persons is almost similar. So, we do not have a situation where one person is in extreme pain and the other has no pain. We now have a situation with two people in slight pain.

Equality And Rights

American philosopher Ronald Dworkin contests the conventional assumption that basic liberties or rights are fundamentally in conflict with the principle of equality. He argues that individual rights make most sense if they are conceptualized as necessary for what equality requires. He wants to change the terms of the orthodox debate by asking whether a particular right is necessary to protect equality instead of asking how much equality we should give up for a particular right. He argues that economic equality and individual rights stem from the same fundamental conception of equality as independence. He believes that equality is the motor of liberalism and every defense of liberalism is also a defense of equality. Individual rights have often been seen in opposition to any notion of general welfare. He says that rights are trumps held by individuals over the general good. Rights cannot be taken for granted, as Robert Nozick does by taking the right to personal liberty and property as simply



Ronald Dworkin


axiomatic. His defense of rights is that the idea of rights and the idea of general welfare are both rooted in the same fundamental value. He points out that just as it is arbitrary to insist on rights as fundamental, it is equally arbitrary to insist on general welfare as something of fundamental importance.


General welfare is seen as fundamentally important because pleasure is a good in itself. If any policy disadvantages some people but provides overall pleasure or happiness, then it is said to be better for everyone. He believes that the only way to treat all citizens as equals is to show the same concern for each. The idea of general welfare is therefore rooted in a more fundamental idea of equality. The opposition between rights and the general good is only a surface opposition. It is a good idea, Dworkin says, to allow general welfare to be the justification for political decisions in the normal case. However, allowing individual rights to act as trumps in exceptional cases serves equality better. In order to explain this, he gives an example. Overall economic policy should be aimed at providing general welfare. But if some people because of certain disabilities end up below a minimum standard of living then this has to be corrected by recognizing their rights over the general welfare.

Poetry and Art

A Career in Philanthropy

He was known as a philanderer, a hunter
for easy women and short days of pleasure,
but when asked about his occupation,
he called himself a professional philanthropist.
He had studied anthropology, a good start to learn
about the essence of people and analyse their behaviour.
He acquired certain skills and expertise,
an intellectual curiosity that gave him a desire
constantly to stretch himself in the right direction,
check for networking possibilities, raise
his entrepreneurial spirit and be geographically mobile.
With tenacity and perseverance he was able to lure
rich women into his cosy den, where he was fast
in spinning some meaningful words to entrap them.
With the right drive and a bit of luck he got what he wanted.
His professional achievements were astronomical.





**When finally arrested after forging a will he still maintained,
that for him, who had made a career in philanthropy,
there have been few regrets.**

Poem and Artwork by *Scharlie Meeuws*

Technology and The Individual

Paul Cockburn published last week an article on technology written fifty years ago. He had some predictions that he revisits in the comments below.

I said in the previous article that the aim of technology is to produce a better standard of living, but that will make the world more materialistic, and more of a rat race. But now I recognize that technology does make life easier. However, a key aspect of technology is that it is linked into the economic system. The economy of course must always grow to make us richer. 'Big' technology projects often seem to be 'dumbing down' in terms of their design and beauty. But technology in its finest sense can be an art-form, as Heidegger argued. In this sense the implementation of small technology projects, using intermediate technology, as Schumacher argued in his book *Small is Beautiful – a study of economics as if people mattered* (1973), would be better. Technologies follow a life-cycle, from small start-ups to huge companies dominating the market, and this leads to unethical corporate behavior. As well as economic alienation, I think now that technology can break the connections we humans have with nature, and the earth. Our sanity in some sense depends on our connection with nature, and technology often breaks this connection in ways that are harmful to the human psyche and to nature.

I also said that future scientific advances must be controlled with great care. Science exists to serve mankind, not mankind science. We now see that medicine has advanced tremendously in the last fifty years. But we are still awaiting the development of cyborgs, humans enhanced by computing technology. However, the big technological impact is perhaps more likely to come from robots, which will become

increasingly more sophisticated.

In the 1970s artificial intelligence was meant to be the next 'big thing', but it did not fulfil its early promise and fizzled out. It is much talked about now, and maybe its time has come, but it will take some clever computing programs to make it work. The biggest technological advance in the last fifty years has turned out to be in the communications industry. True to form these scientific advances in the communications industry have the potential to be harmful to people, especially young people. A harmful social 'group-think' has developed in terms of the internet and mobile phone usage which seems to deflate the individual. As ever, it is not the technology as such which causes the problem, but how human beings use it. Technology is neutral, we can choose not to use it or adapt it to lessen the harm it does. It was hard in the 1960s and since to ignore television, and it is virtually impossible now to ignore the internet.

I said that applied science may be used as the means to produce a race of free individuals. We have already benefited from technology by the mechanising of household tasks such as washing, etc. that has given us more free time, but this free time is taken away from us as in order to pay for our energy, housing, transport, education for our children etc. we seem to have to do more work.

I called for a 'striving for perfection' which is an interesting concept. Fichte believed in it and saw it as necessary for progress. But he did not foresee the social impact of technology which actually lessens our freedom, and he



Drones

lived before the large-scale environmental impact of world-wide industrial processes became evident in terms of pollution and global warming.

In my earlier article, I measured progress by the freedom of the individual, and the danger of a technology that might destroy the individual. But now I see the emphasis on the individual as misplaced. The individual is actually formed within a social environment, the family and society. We are tied strongly into our identity, and the social forces which technology unleashes on us can destroy us or harm our personality. The concern is how individuals and nations interact with each other, what forces they unleash on each other in technological terms. Current military developments in terms of drones are a great concern, and the cyborgs and robots beloved of American sci-fi films may be used in future wars. And the threat of nuclear war is ever-present.

Having worked in planning it has become clear to me that forecasting is a very difficult game to play and get right. It is very difficult

to predict which particular technologies will ‘take off’, and when they will do so. You can never predict the future, but you do have a better chance of being able to explain the past in causal terms. But the future lies open before us. The freedom we seek will not come from technology, but from within us.

A final thought on inequality and technology. Capitalism seems to suit technological advances with company ‘start-ups’ initiating and developing new technology. The capitalist ideology seems to run roughly as follows: initially new technology is expensive and needs a lot of investment capital, and to start with only rich people can afford the new product. But over time the new product becomes cheaper to produce as more and more people buy it, and poorer people are thus able to afford it. However in UK medicine, largely controlled by the state in terms of the NHS, inequality in terms of such things as access to doctors, inoculations and operations being available to all, has probably increased, largely because of regional variations and inefficiencies caused by the difficulties involved in the state running such a huge operation.

Unsaid



CHRIS NORRIS

What we observe in normal persons as slips of the tongue give the same impression as the first step of the so-called paraphasias which manifest themselves under pathologic conditions.

Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*

The things you think but fail to say,
The words that stay unsaid,
May linger till your dying day,
Unliving yet undead.

They stir in sleep's long overstay,
Like russet leaves unshed;
We wake and shake them as we may
Then rake them from our bed.

Like lines from some long-censored play
They echo in the head
While tact insists they're kept at bay
By new lines fancy-bred.

They're beasts we vainly strive to slay,
Night-prowlers daily fled
That loom up through the grey-on-grey
Where memory fears to tread.


A voice may warn: there's hell to pay,
The very hell you dread,
Should your recension once fall prey
To sub-texts long unread.

No telling what they might convey,
What old news lately sped
That says: of this be sure, that they
Won't halt the viral spread.

Just give them time and they'll betray
The dark-side lives you've led
And quell your hope that no such stray
Reminder tweak the thread.

Tough reading, your life-dossier,
Those fantasies drip-fed
Till face-to-face with the array
Of faults unedited.

It's yours, the ghost you failed to lay,
That laid you bare instead,
And so, self-haunted, found your way
Through falsehood's A-to-Z.



Philosophical Perspectives

Notes on the Wednesday Meeting Held on 10th of October 2018

PAUL COCKBURN

We started by discussing existentialism, based on this quote from Sartre: 'Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself (and what his predecessors made for him).' Sartre emphasises the freedom we have to make choices. However, we are born into a culture and a society, so these choices often seem limited, as we follow the rules and moral principles laid down for us. Sartre believes in 'radical' choice, we can break away from the past. But we can be passive in our choices, there is an issue with 'authenticity'. We have to strive to be authentic. When we make mistakes, we can learn from them. How do I 'own' what I become, when I might have been dealt a 'bad hand' in life? There may be issues with resentment in this case. Sartre emphasizes the 'first' and 'third' person roles, but seems to largely ignore the second person, 'you'.

Sartre replaces Heidegger's title for his book *Being and Time* by *Being and Nothingness*, which sounds nihilistic. It is interesting that his plays and novels (such as *Nausea*) are perhaps as famous as his philosophy, and that in later life he became a Marxist. Many of the French existentialists such as Camus and Sartre lived through the Nazi occupation of France in the Second World War, and this, it was thought, influenced their thought particularly in terms of the absurdity and irrationality of life. They were clearly faced with difficult choices during the occupation.



Sartre

nature, but our self-consciousness and 'thinking' have alienated us from nature. Art can re-unite us with nature, even describe nature accurately in some way, bring it to life. Thus a poem could somehow be transformed into nature. Can there be an objective response to art or do we all interpret it in different ways? In looking at a painting, say, we have to think about the genre, the materials, the subject, even what motivates the artist to produce it.

Finally, we talked about the relevance of post-modernism, with one view being 'The *Wednesday*' is too much concerned with German Idealism and we should be more 'up to date'. But it was also recognised that we should pay attention to all philosophy of whatever era, and that we are all different and so are interested in different philosophers. The editor will consider any articles about any philosopher or philosophy as long as they are clearly and coherently expressed!

We moved on to discuss art. What is the cognitive content of art? How could this content be shared with philosophy? Can we do philosophy through art or is art an alternative route to the truth? What makes it the case? Art is present everywhere in a way philosophy is not, but could art ever be an alternative to discursive thought?

One theory was that a great work of art can re-unite us with nature. We were originally united with

Abstract and Non-Abstract Concepts

DAVID JONES

The being of an abstract concept emerges out of the logical relations between other concepts. Mathematical objects are usually considered to be abstract concepts. Non-abstract concepts are generalisations for a class of particular natural or artificial things which have similarities and differences in their properties and the common properties are used to define the logical domain encompassed in the concept. Such common properties can be observed of any type of being (i.e. - predication - ascribing a 'doing' or a value of 'is' to something) that is proper to the particular things and is not limited to passive properties such as shape and weight but may also include common patterns of behaviour such as those encompassed in the concepts 'criminal' and 'gravity'.

In the natural world there are individual things that have the properties of 'self-moving' which also have some awareness of their environment. The concept 'animal' is used to refer to such things even though it is known that there are several animal species. It is significant that this concept 'animal' must refer to all variations (species and particular) that are within its scope so it cannot be made into a static mental image. An image would necessarily refer to a particular and not a general class of individual things. This is why the human activity of thinking is a different one to the activity of picturing.

Another type of the general distinctions that are commonly used are those that are regarded as arising out of cultural attitudinal habit rather than the distinctions that are in the nature of things in themselves. An example of this type of distinction could be the divisions of the styles of music which are identified with names such as classical or blues etc. The set of words that comprise a language that is used for the purpose of communication is also a cultural artefact and of this type.

The Wednesday

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That Day By The Seine



How I remember that day by the Seine,
That desolate day,
When I saw that we'd have to live with your pain.

You were hunched on the bench, and your whole body shook,
Boats passed on their way,
And those walking by us leaned down to look.

Your dread had devoured all time and all space,
And made you its prey.
You bent down so no one could look at your face.

I pleaded: 'Come home', but you replied: 'No',
Determined to stay,
And left me to gaze at the current's strong flow.

I looked up as the sun on the *Invalides*' dome
Cast its bright ray,
And begged you to change and agree to come home.

How I remember that day by the Seine,
The desolate day,
When I saw that we'd have to live with your pain.

Edward Greenwood