

# The *Wednesday*



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group - Oxford

## Editorial

### *Philosophy as an Obsession*

The academic year has just started. It will see thousands of students taking philosophy as their subject of study. Their motivations vary: some are curious, others are already familiar with the subject. Their ends also differ: some will be happy with a degree, others will take it up as a life obsession or an Unending Quest as the title of Popper's Memoirs put it, and as a friend told me many years ago.

Plato talked about the Divine madness with regard to poets, but that would have applied to philosophers as well. We have the two cases of Holderlin and Nietzsche. They both suffered a mental collapse just when they were at the peak of their thought and both had a sense of a mission. They both felt passionately about poetry and philosophy and used them interchangeably for the task of thinking. Holderlin was about thirty-five when he was admitted to a clinic. But he spent the last thirty-six years of his life in the charitable care of a carpenter, Mr. Zimmer, who accommodated him in a wing of his house. It was reported that he kept writing poetry, especially when his visitors asked him to.

Nietzsche wrote a letter on his forty-fourth birthday saying he felt that his life was now complete. A month later he had a mental collapse. That happened just when he thought he was near his breakthrough with his philosophy of 'Revaluation of All Value'. But that stayed in the form of notes, now known both as *The Will to Power* and the *Nachlass*. Nietzsche didn't write after his mental collapse, apart from a few letters.

Many creative people around the time of the end of the eighteenth century suffered mental collapse or early death. There might be medical reasons for it, but it created the alleged connection between

mental exhaustion, death and the genius. A mental collapse for Goethe was predicted before his trip to Italy. It was said of him that he was a prolific poet but could not control his power of imagination. He took time off and went on a trip to Italy. It was there that he had a sudden vision that gave him insight into philosophy and science. After his return, he wrote on colours and plants. His science was quite different from the common mechanistic approach and he rejected Newton's analysis of light, and that of some biologists in terms of their examination of life. A dose of reality seems to have brought his mind to equilibrium. But he was also inspired by Kant's philosophy, especially his *Critique of Judgment* and the philosophy of Schelling.

Madness is not common among philosophers nowadays but some of their thought experiments sound a bit out of the ordinary. However, philosophy has become more realistic and technical, less directed towards poetry and spirit and more towards science and nature. But if the development of modern approaches and techniques of reasoning managed to cure philosophers of their passion and excessive imagination, has philosophy lost anything? I would argue yes, it has lost something essential: the human side of philosophy. Human worries, passions, values and meaning have been treated in a factual, objective, externalist way. This has reduced life to a set of natural facts and dropped the mystery of existence, in personal, social and metaphysical terms. You may say that is not a great loss. But the problem is that these worries are still with us and still give us the madness to do philosophy, and to consider problems that were continually discussed since the Greeks. Some madness is worth having to keep the spirit active and moving.

*The Editor*



Fichte

# Fichte's Account of Inter-Subjectivity: From Subjectivity to Communities and States

Fichte's account of subjectivity in his main work the *Wissenschaftslehre* was based on the concept of the 'I' and derived from it. That was mainly when he was working on the theoretical part of his philosophy. However, when he started on the practical side of his new critical philosophy, he needed to account for other 'I's' beside the 'I' that was the starting point of his system. He had to deal with other subjects. Fichte gave fascinating arguments to account for intersubjectivity in his two books *Foundations of Natural Right* and *The System of Ethics*. Contrary to the views that problematize the question of other minds, Fichte insists that the presence of other subjects is a condition of the subject gaining rationality and testing his freedom. He also gave an account of rationality behind individual actions and historical events through the idea that all subjects are 'tools for reason' and that there is a drive towards freedom and self-sufficiency that joins all subjects into one collective entity. It will also mean a complete freedom, since all wills will the same. The article below traces all these ideas in Fichte's major work.

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
PAUL COCKBURN

**F**ichte's account of subjectivity is based on the self-positing 'I'. Behind any perception we have, or indeed thinking that we do, there is an awareness that we are thinking or perceiving. This thinking or perceiving is an act, a fact: we can turn our attention to the world or to concepts in our

minds by an act of will. When we look at the world, or receive sensible input from it, it is clearly different to the 'I', my consciousness. The world is the 'not-I'. It is the domain of causation, where everything is caused by something else in an infinite chain of causation. But the 'I' has a will, a source of causation



*Wissenschaftslehre*



*Foundations of Natural Right*

‘in itself.’ The ‘I’ in sense-perception creates the world we see. The ‘I’ as subject strives to overcome the domain of objectivity outside of it. The empirical world is opposed to the ‘I’, and there is a ‘check’ (*Anstoss*) on the ‘I’ which limits the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is finite, not infinite, although it strives to be infinite. The infinite ‘I’ is the Absolute, or God.

So, we have the subject placed in the world which is experienced as the ‘not-I’, resisting us, but there is another ‘not-I’, other rational beings like us. In some way I find myself to be free. Fichte believes there is a ‘summons’ to self-activity, and this summons must be ascribed to a being outside of myself, who can already act. I have to posit this other being in relation to myself. From the moment I become conscious, I am what I freely make myself to be. It seems that Fichte is here theorizing about the parent-child relationship. Our aim is self-sufficiency, but we are born completely dependent on our parents. Over time, we are stimulated by others (e.g. parents, teachers, friends) and by taking decisions within our social environment we become persons in our own right. Fichte believes in the summons as the upbringing we receive from others. He

asks who brought up the first human couple? It cannot be another human being; therefore, it must have been a spirit that took them into his care. The human being can only become a human being among human beings. In fact, it is essential: there could not be only one human being.

Fichte’s concept of freedom is subtle: just as I recognize others as rational beings, the other recognizes me. Further, I must limit my freedom through the concept of the possibility of the other’s freedom. I should posit myself as free alongside the other without harming the other’s freedom. The rule of right is that you ‘limit your freedom through the concept of the freedom of all other persons with whom you come into contact’. This is rather abstract, and Fichte tries to flesh it out in detail in his *Foundations of Natural Right*. He goes into a great level of detail in terms of how the state should be structured and operate. He deals with many practical matters such as the treatment of criminals, traitors, murderers etc. He deals with matters such as property rights and even mining (he thinks that what is underground needs to belong to the state, so that miners would be paid whether resources such as coal were found

or not). He deals with the treatment of animals, hunting rights, taxes, even ‘cries for help’!

The rights specified by the English philosopher Locke are generally about the rights to things such as property. But Fichte emphasizes what we do – if a farmer does not work his land then it can be given to another who will. Again, if a farmer does not have enough land to feed his family, then he should be given more land so that he can.

The individuals in a state should agree a unification contract, as this is rationally the best way to live socially. This is much like Rousseau’s social contract. They become part of a whole, and the individual ‘melts into one with it’. It is an absolute duty of conscience to unite with others in a state Fichte believes. Furthermore, one cannot overthrow the state unless the community wills such an overthrow. However, in practice he thinks the current existing states are ‘makeshift’ (or states of necessity), there is no real consent of the people. States need to improve, sovereignty needs to be the real sovereign will of the people. This could be expressed in kingship or in some other way.

Rights involve the possibility of coercion - he believes that the state is necessary so that natural rights can be enforced in an ordered, just and rational way. He writes:

‘Now the citizens must be kept within these limits by coercion, and a certain, impending harm (in case they overstep them) must deter their will from deciding to overstep them. It is clear that this punishment, which is determined by criminal law, must be known to them if it is to have an effect on their will; furthermore, it is clear that, by entering into the state, they have made themselves subject to this harm, in case they overstep the law.’

But how are these rights related to ethics and

morality? Fichte believes that if we all acted according to rational morality, we would not need formal rights, as in such a utopian society we would always do the right thing.

Moral reasons, for Fichte, over-ride other considerations: we have a moral duty to ourselves, which includes most of our actions: our choice of career, our behavior in terms of such things as telling the truth, an obligation to harmonize with others, and to form a moral community which seeks the common good. He approves of the symbols used in the church to inspire people to good actions but thinks that these symbols will be superseded as abstract rational morality develops and takes over from such symbols. He believes in the perfectibility of man in the sense that we should treat all human beings as if they were capable of being perfected.

Human beings can agree only on what is rational, as rationality is part of our nature. All persons should act according to the common will. When we act upon nature in a rational way, what we do will be useful for everyone. When the unachievable final end of humanity has actually been achieved, everyone will be allowed to do everything he wills because all will ‘will’ the same.

He sees a clear difference between men and women. He thinks the female has an innate drive to love, interpreted by Fichte as self-sacrifice for the sake of the other. The male should be magnanimous to the ‘free being’ who has surrendered herself to him. Fichte believes economic dependence is incompatible with personal freedom, but this does not apply to wives!


In *Foundations of Natural Right*, Fichte has a section on the ‘Rights of Nations.’ He asserts that someone who does not live in a state can rightfully be coerced by someone who does live in a state to join him in his state.

In consequence, all human beings living on the earth's surface would gradually become united in a single state. In fact, he writes that several states have come to exist, because the same need for a state has occurred in different geographical locations. A state should mutually agree the security of the citizens from another state, just as it guarantees the security of its own citizens. There should be mutual recognition between states.

However, in his book entitled *Addresses to the German Nation* written in 1808 the German nation according to Fichte becomes (or will become) the expression of universal reason. What would the future 'citizen of the world' be like one wonders?

Fichte admired Rousseau, who he writes saw the terrible state of men in Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, 'grovelling in the dust like beasts, chained to the earth, without any notion of their high dignity or of the divine spark within them'. But the state of nature in which primitive man lived and which Rousseau wants to go back to is too passive for Fichte, who wants man to strive and exploit nature, and bring into being a formal community of culture. Fichte believes that man can use and develop nature to make the living conditions for humanity less hard, so the sort of society Rousseau wants is in fact the future, not a mythical past. He writes of Rousseau that he 'conceals from our view the most interesting and instructive thing of all: the struggle between reason and passion and the gradual, slow victory which the former achieves by means of exertion, effort, and labor'.

Fichte starts with the 'I', freedom and the will. But in his philosophy, it is clear that man's freedom ought to be limited. Reason and rationality are in fact the true overriding metaphysical concepts, acting within a community to eventually create an ideal society. 'Everyone is a means for realizing



*The System of Ethics.*

reason' he writes. The 'I' in fact has to freely act in a virtuous way for the good of the community, it is perhaps submerged in it. (One wonders if there are in fact many more aspects of the 'I' than this – other aspects could be passion, imagination, creativity, spirituality).

Fichte has started from the self-positing individual 'I' in perception and he is a strong opponent of materialism as he believes the individual has free will. We can exploit nature, change our material environment for the better. He then moves on to the problem of inter-subjective relations in a community of 'I's. Hegel's master-slave relationship is embryonically contained in Fichte's thoughts on inter-subjectivity. A key problem is how the will of the individual is subject to the community will. Here Fichte gives primacy to the role of reason and how agreement should follow on from rational debate. Hegel extends the concept of reason much further, so that 'Reason' becomes an immanent process in history.

## Self, Ego, Subject: Fichte versus Kant



CHRIS NORRIS

The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. Dwell in your own house, and you will know how simple your possessions are.


**Immanuel Kant**

And just as my nature is posited, so there is also nature outside mine, for my nature is not the whole of nature. Nature outside myself . . . is posited in order to explain my nature. Since my nature is determined as a drive, a determining of self by self, nature outside myself must also be determined in the same way, and this determination outside myself is the ground of the explanation of my nature.

**Johann Gottlieb Fichte**



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**Kant**

What use your talk of ego's empty shell?  
Your transcendental subject's just hot air.  
How 'I' shapes self is ego's tale to tell.

Maybe it helped your sceptic doubts to quell.  
Maybe you thought: at least there's something there.  
Yet, why your talk of ego's empty shell?

Perhaps, as mere sensations raced pell-mell,  
It seemed the one fixed frame that all could share.  
How 'I' shapes self is ego's tale to tell.

My ego posits self and world as well,  
Projects them both, a co-created pair,  
So why your talk of ego's empty shell?

Untenanted, no place for 'I' to dwell,  
Your living-quarters void, your cupboards bare:  
How 'I' shapes self is ego's tale to tell.

Opposite poles attract, like poles repel.  
So physics says, but physicists may err,  
As does your talk of ego's empty shell.

Just let my Fichtean ego break the spell  
Lest your net without fish bring new despair:  
How 'I' shapes self is ego's tale to tell.

The rumor's out: in your great citadel  
Of concepts selfhood's husks lie everywhere  
And rue your talk of ego's empty shell.

No wonder, then, if ego should rebel  
And pose the Fichtean question fair and square:  
How 'I' shapes self is ego's tale to tell.

For it's the ego's primal glimpse of hell,  
That Kantian answer to a hermit's prayer  
Conveyed in talk of ego's empty shell.


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I, Kant, advise you: fall for this hard sell  
And you'll have ego-trips enough to spare:  
Of 'I' there's no self-authored tale to tell.

I sought to trace the boundary that fell  
Twixt self and subject, one the ego dare  
Not cross: best talk of ego's empty shell.

Parse *transcendental*: 'unit personnel'  
Is reason's rule for games played solitaire,  
Like morals. As for self, no tale to tell.

Should you seek an instructive parallel  
Think Fichte, think my progeny: beware!  
Why chafe at talk of ego's empty shell?  
Of 'I' there's no self-authored tale to tell.



Fichte

# Like a Light on My Head

RUUD SCHUURMAN

[ruud.schuurman@linea-recta.com](mailto:ruud.schuurman@linea-recta.com)

**‘Philosophy’ means ‘loving wisdom’. ‘Wisdom’ means ‘having true knowledge’ as opposed to having relative knowledge, e.g., approximations, probabilities. While relative knowledge can come in handy (e.g., if you want to catch a bus or build a nuclear bomb), no amount of relative knowledge can yield true knowledge. To obtain true knowledge one must recognize ‘that’, i.e., that which is absolutely real. Although ‘that’ is totally common (how could it not?), it is somehow very difficult to recognize.**

**We can philosophize about ‘that’, but philosophizing tends to remain conceptual, while ‘that’ is supernatural (i.e., propertyless), and thus transcategorical (i.e., predicateless), and thus transconceptual (i.e., not a subject-term of which real predicates can be predicated). To overcome the difficulty, some ancient cultures have produced beautiful ways of pointing out ‘that’, which they variously refer to as the ultimate reality, supreme being, the truth, the good, the self, God, the way, the unconditioned, the one, and so on. They often use analogies, allegories, parables, similes, metaphors, and so on. Here I would like to present an example. Because they were often transmitted orally, there are many versions of each. So, I take the gist, and may even add a twist.**


It is as if I am unaware of wearing a light on my head that illuminates all things. Thus, wherever I look, I illuminate all things and I never see anything that is not illuminated. Subsequently, I have come to believe that the things I see, give light (i.e. have light in themselves, and also shine when I do not see them). But, of course, it is my light in which they appear, that gives them whatever light they appear to have. I am the light of all things that appear to me. The light that a thing appears to give is real, but it is not the light of the thing, it is my light.

Likewise, it is as if I am unaware that I give *being* to all things. Thus, whatever appears to me, appears to have *being* and I never see anything that does not have *being*. Subsequently, I have come to believe that the things that appear to me *are* (i.e. have *being* in themselves, and also *are* when they do not appear to me). But, of course, it is my *being* in which they appear, that gives them whatever *being* they appear to have. I am the *being* of all things that appear to me (i.e., it is my *being* in which they appear to *be*). The *being* that a thing appears to have is real, but it is not the *being* of the thing, it is my *being*.

Of course, it is but an allegory, and it goes wrong in that it seems to imply that things exist even if they are not illuminated, whereas, in reality, things are merely apparent. There are no things 'out there' that appear to me. The appearance is all there is to a thing.



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## Words For Wisdom

**In our world almost everything has its price, yet quality-states resist this kind of proprietorship. This applies to wisdom, valued in the past but maybe under-valued in today's market with its attention-grabbing ways. But what's in a word? A word can point to an experience, thing or quality. It identifies them. It is not the same as what it points to, but it helps us to imagine the reality to which it points. In this respect a word has suggestive power leading to reflection. Talking of which, it certainly surprised Socrates when the oracle singled him out as a wise person, until he realized he was aware of the limits of his knowledge.**

### WILLIAM BISHOP

**A**rguably the roots of *philosophy* lie in the wisdom tradition of the Mystery Schools, but as a living plant, philosophy rises into its own air and evolves within its conditions of becoming. In the sixth century BCE, Pythagoras identified *philosophy* as the love of wisdom; later fragments from the philosophy of Heraclitus (c. 535 – c. 475 BCE) tell us:

‘of all the words spoken, none comes quite as far as wisdom, which is the action of the mind beyond all things that can be said. Wisdom is the oneness of mind that guides and permeates all things. For wisdom listen not to me but to the *Logos* (word) and know that all is one.’

Indeed S. Radhakrishnan says of a sixth century Indian philosopher who respected the Vedas, that Samkara presents the true *ideal* of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom.

Samkara saw the *absolute* as the unattainable goal towards which the finite intellect strives and when it reaches its consummation thought ceases to be what it is in our empirical life, and passes into a higher and more direct form of apprehension in which it and its object can no longer be distinguished. For Samkara the weakness of logic is in its assumption of the distinction between knower and the known - yet all duality is mental; he also believed that philosophy could carry a person to the gates of the Promised Land, but could not let them in; for that, insight or *realization* was necessary. But is *realized* Oneness identical with

wisdom? If it is then it makes philosophy as the love of wisdom into a disciplined path without a guaranteed expectation of arrival. Yet if a person reaches for the unattainable, proximity is surely an achievement! However, it is interesting to note that Samkara had a vivid emotional temperament (he was also a poet), ‘without which,’ according to Radhakrishnan, ‘philosophy tends to become a mere game of logic’.

Indian wisdom and ideas had a profound influence on Greek philosophy, particularly the Platonic tradition. It influenced Plotinus in seeking the One in mystic meditation. But such wisdom, if achieved, can hardly be communicated. Similarly, the vision that Thomas Aquinas is said to have had near the end of his life was such a powerful revelation that he completely ceased work on his great *Summa Theologica*. Can such a mystical way of seeing be equated with wisdom, and is a conscious, known state of absolute reality possible? Isn't this essentially God's department?

From a human perspective, Wisdom (*Sophia*), relating to the Universal Mind backing and sustaining phenomena, is hard to attain. Yet Heraclitus offers sound advice: ‘Listen to the *Logos*, realizing that all is one’. It is worth realizing that the Greek language was poetic rather than scientific, so a word could have several meanings. This was the case for *Logos*, which among the things it signified was ‘reason’ and the ‘word’ (possibly also in the sense of the phenomenon of language). Taking the central meaning as reason, this was essentially born, or incarnated, as a new human



**‘Adi Shankara with Disciples’  
by Raja Ravi Varma (1904)**

faculty, during the early Greek civilization, hence the rise of philosophy with its applied intellectual reasoning. However, different interpretations of the ‘Logos’ have been emphasized at different times. The Stoics interpreted it under three aspects, one of which was ‘logo spermatikos’, meaning the law of generation in the universe and the principle of active reason working in inanimate nature.

Humans were also regarded as possessing a portion of the divine Logos – the primeval fire and reason that controls and sustains the universe. Then Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – c. 50 CE) tried to reconcile Plato’s ideas with the Bible so that for him ‘Logos’ meant the first-born Son of God as the Demiurge of the world (the receptacle of ideas pervading and supporting the world).

Also, around this time in the early years of the new era the writer of the Gospel of John identified the Christ as the Logos. And then for Plotinus (c. 205 – 270) the first emanation from the One is ‘nous’, which incorporates Logos, divine mind, order and reason. And the emanation (or projection) from Nous is the World Soul. Interestingly, Indian wisdom applied the term ‘isvara’ to the intermediary acting between Brahman (as the absolute) and the world, a similar role assigned to the Logos in the West and presumably pointing


to the same reality of forceful energy or active personal identity.

Accepting the *idea* of a living spirit of reason active in the world makes listening to the Logos vital for a wise relationship to *reality*. Arguably contemplation and philosophy connect with the Logos, which allows the light of reason to enter the human world. Massimo Scaligero (1906–1980) understood the Logos to be the world’s ‘Being’ that flows in us as life – the life of ideas, which is the life of perceived reality. His treatise on *Living Thinking* goes beyond philosophy in describing the Logos as the world’s radical being that is born as the thinking force unconnected to an object (an object is a thought, which is the end product of the thinking process).

Engaging with the living thinking process can also be reaching back with one’s ‘I’ to thinking’s origin in the Logos. This is the light of thinking prior to the filter of the human body resulting in duality. But keeping an open awareness and knowing our limitations may be as much wisdom that we can normally expect. Wisdom still calls out to those with eyes to see and ears to hear and attention available, but as Heraclitus once said: ‘people dull their wits with gibberish, and cannot use their ears and eyes.’

### Turnings

Time is turning  
turns the seasons  
you and me we all turn  
the thunder the sad  
moonlight  
the powerful people the bad guys  
the sobbing turns  
also laughter turns  
joy turns  
and becomes pain  
pain turns  
and becomes tenderness  
Saturday is coming  
when love appears  
you climb carefully you turn  
you rise you turn you become  
Private Corporal Sergeant  
Standard bearer dust  
in the battle dust in the wind  
turns and loosens  
dust in the evening  
turns clean of dust and fear  
flawless sky  
clean and dusky  
dusk turns  
immaculately  
the perfect night  
will overtake



## Poetry

### Ashram In The Welsh Hills

The highway thinned to a greasy track,  
then steady stepping up the steep incline.  
A weekend of chanting and twisting;  
damp nirvana among bleating sheep.

Swami began chanting with a squeeze box tone.  
His voice had a folk singer's whine.  
We responded with belly groans,  
I wanted to end with a comfortable rhyme.

*Omm...* was all we were allowed to intone  
swallowed up by silence, left alone.  
Not even a sorry was permitted.  
I craved an encounter to allow me to say it.

On a thin mattress on a hard wood floor,  
spent the night with spiteful thoughts,  
stinging me awake whenever I'd drift.  
Finally dropped into a dark spin,  
awoke to a day dimly lit.

Belly empty, spine stiff,  
tried to twist myself to freedom  
but my being was an aching limb.  
Time to give oneness the slip.

*David Burridge*

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### Philosophy and the Empirical

*Notes on the Wednesday Meeting Held on  
19<sup>th</sup> of September 2018*

**PAUL COCKBURN**

We tend to think that what is ‘natural’ coincides with what is good, and that what is found in nature is good. The ‘unnatural’ somehow repels us. This relates to the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ described by G E Moore in his *Principia Ethica* (1903). Feuerbach emphasized ‘Sinnlichkeit’: the sensuous, what we see with our eyes and hear with our ears. Our senses are an important part of what it is to be human, and abstractions far away from the sensual seem to be unnatural in some way. Technology and science alienate us in this way: although science starts from the empirical data scientists measure, it quickly moves into mathematical abstraction. Technology affects the world around us and outside of us, in terms of buildings, cars etc. and our physical environment. Modern technology however such as the social media in terms of using the internet seems to be able to affect the ‘inside’ of the human in psychological terms, degrading our thought.

On a different note: Much of philosophy is not based on empirical grounds. It is theory led and it tries to justify beliefs. In phenomenology for example we look at how things appear in consciousness. Marx wanted to make philosophy practical, to create heaven on earth in terms of economic production, whereas Hegel saw God as living in the community in a transcendental sense. Maybe there is not enough ‘data’ for philosophy to work on and there is a danger it does not connect with the real world. In the context of politics, Hegel as he finished his work *The Phenomenology of Spirit* wrote to a friend in 1806 that he saw Napoleon – ‘this *soul of the world* riding out of the city..... (he) reaches out over the world to master it’. Perhaps this was an abstraction taken too far – or was it? Populist individualistic politicians seem to be gaining power now in our world.

### *The Wednesday*

**Editor:** Dr. Rahim Hassan

**Contact Us:**

[rahimhassan@hotmail.co.uk](mailto:rahimhassan@hotmail.co.uk)

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## *Three Cosmologies*



Avicenna walked by mosques in Isfahan,  
Or looked up from a roof in Hamadan  
In the belief an angel moved each sphere.  
His mind was never touched by Pascal's fear  
Of the infinity of silent spaces  
On which a hidden God had left no traces.  
But both were ignorant of what we know,  
How waves from what Pascal thought silent show  
The galaxies receding from us fast  
And everything becoming still more vast  
At speeds whose growing rate can't fail to daze.  
So Pascal's fear and Avicenna's gaze  
And all that the night sky produced of awe  
Take second place to scientific law.  
Religion can no longer weave its spell  
With the creation myths it used to tell.  
The God of Genesis is now no more  
And mathematics takes the place of lore.

*Edward Greenwood*

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To receive it regularly, please write to the editor: [rahimhassan@hotmail.co.uk](mailto:rahimhassan@hotmail.co.uk)