The *Wednesday*

Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group - Oxford

Editorial

Naturalism and the Body

We are still debating the body in philosophy. We dealt with the body in idealism, phenomenology and the materialism of Marx. It is now the time to deal with the naturalism of Nietzsche and his claim for the primacy of the body. He also claims that what does the thinking and acting is the body and that the body is in direct touch with culture and receives those qualities which culture transmits.

Nietzsche, after distancing himself from Schopenhauer, became greatly influenced by the German materialists. The materialists held that human beings are essentially bodily organisms, whose attitudes, beliefs and values are explicable by reference to physiological facts about them. This view was also associated with science. Nietzsche did show a fascination with science but he modified this position in his middle and late periods and started to include artistic vision in his later philosophy. It is this move that makes his philosophy interesting because it connects subjectivity with his wider project of presenting a critique of culture and civilization.

Nietzsche dismissed the notion of the self as a unity and replaced it with the notion of the self as a multiplicity. He then worked out a way of reconstructing the self out of this multiplicity. He thought that the body is the starting point and that the way to know about the self is through physiology. The body is a unity in multiplicity. It represents a unity of different drives, affects and instincts. There are too many of these drives and they are all vying for power. A given drive will gain mastery for a certain time.

Nietzsche raised these basic forces into basic selves. The drives have definite functions, with their own wills to power and 'to our strongest drive, the tyrant in us, not only our reason bows but also our consciousness'.

Life for him is basically a will to power. This will to power objectifies itself in the drives and the body.

For him, consciousness (or reason) falsifies. It takes sensations from the drives, turns them into images, the images into concepts and concepts into words. What gets lost is the very individuality of the experience and its direct relation to reality, through the body.

Nietzsche equates the self with the body: 'Behind your thinking and feeling, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown wise one - it is called self. It dwells in your body, it is your body' (Z, I, Despisers).

Nietzsche attributed to us 'bodily beliefs' or 'thinking' and these are beliefs embedded in our drives or instincts. He said: 'Your judgement "this is right" has a pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences' (GS, 335). Every will of each individual drive interprets other beings as helps or hindrance to the drive it serves 'for every drive wants to be master - and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit' (BGE, 6).

But then Nietzsche made the drives primitive forms of the self. They are always described in 'intentional' or 'mentalistic terms'; they have experiences, interpret, desire, choose, command and obey. But Nietzsche could say that this is just a problem of language. But if consciousness is falsification, what will happen to the body as it is subjected not only to physiology but also to cultural heritage and a certain state of civilization? This comes out in his discussion of the Last Man and nihilism. He calls the corrupted body the Last Man and the condition under which he lives, nihilism. The Last Man is a text written over several times with different interpretations. We may come back to this idea by looking at the body as a text.

The Editor

History, Nietzsche, Collingwood And Donagan

R G Collingwood's The Idea of History is perhaps the most famous book written in English on the philosophy of history. Collingwood was a practitioner of history in his work on Roman Britain, as well as a philosopher. In it he gives brief accounts of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Dilthey, Meyer and Spengler. But what did his interpreters say about his relationship to Nietzsche?

EDWARD **GREENWOOD**

R G Collingwood

R G Collingwood refers to Nietzsche on page 167. He even refers to Nietzsche's initiator into philosophy, Schopenhauer, and characterizes him as, along with the Greek philosophers, a depreciator of history as concerned with the merely ephemeral and individual and so as not achieving knowledge. If you look at the index to Collingwood's book, you will not find the name of Nietzsche, but, in fact there is one reference to him in the book. It occurs on page 296 where Collingwood writes that while we can re-enact the thought of past figures: 'We shall never know how the flowers smelt in the garden of Epicurus, or how Nietzsche felt the wind in his hair as he walked on the mountains' though the evidence for how both thought remains 'in our hands.'

Yet Nietzsche was perhaps the greatest thinker about history in the whole of the nineteenth century, and so is a serious omission from Collingwood's book. It was Nietzsche who wrote the second of the *Untimely Meditations* the superb 'The Use and Abuse of History' and the following passages, the first from *Human all too Human* part one section 2 and the second from *The Gay Science* book 5 section 357. In *Human all too Human section 2* in R J Hollingdale's Cambridge translation Nietzsche writes: 'Lack of historical sense is the family failing of philosophers; many, without being aware of it, even take the most recent manifestation of man, such as has arisen under the impress of certain religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one has to start out.' They should start rather from investigating how we became what we are. Collingwood shows no awareness in *The Idea of History* of Nietzsche's praise in section 357 of book 5 of *The Gay Science* where, in Kaufmann's translation, Nietzsche praises Hegel's teaching that 'species concepts develop *out of each other*' and speaks of Hegel's introducing 'development' into science. Earlier, in section 337, he had spoken of 'the historical sense' as both the distinctive 'virtue and disease' of the age. He felt that if one could endure experiencing the history of humanity as one's own history it could create a godlike feeling. For Nietzsche much fruitful history was rooted in the critical ability to contextualize and interpret texts developed by philologists. It was 'scientific' philology as much as natural science, which had helped undermine traditional religious and moral beliefs and set

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humanity new tasks. For both Nietzsche and Collingwood history is not just past, but lives on in the present as our formation. And a critical view of it can affect us in our present lives. Perhaps Collingwood's lack of interest in Nietzsche can be accounted for by the fact that his lectures on history were composed in the 1930's when Nietzsche's reputation had fallen to a low ebb because of his association with Nazism. Had not his sister famously been photographed receiving the Fuhrer outside the Nietzsche archive in Weimar? Nevertheless Acton's pupil J. N. Figgis had managed to transcend Nietzsche's association with bellicosity and the First World War and write a sympathetic, if critical, account of him in *The Will to Freedom* (1917) during that very war. A thinker of Collingwood's stature should have been able to shed such prejudices if he had them. But Collingwood was deeply Hegelian and, like Hegel and his admired Croce, wanted to perpetuate a form of Christianity, while Nietzsche wanted to make a clean break with it.

There is another link between the thought of Nietzsche and Collingwood which I don't think has been remarked upon. In his *Essay on Philosophical Method* of 1934, Collingwood developed an interesting differentiation between the species concepts which we use in classificatory sciences such as botany and the non-antithetical, non-oppositional concepts of philosophy where a scalar continuum is used. Thus duty is often thought to exclude inclination, as notoriously in the view of the rigorist Kant, so we cannot act from both, but, according to Collingwood, we can.

The parallel here is with section 2 in part one of *Beyond Good and Evil* 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers'. Here Nietzsche rejects the fundamental belief of metaphysicians 'the *belief in oppositions of values.'* According to this metaphysical belief goodness cannot arise by sublimation out of badness, but must descend to earth from some supersensible sphere. Nietzsche re-

jects this view. For him the will to truth and the will to deceive are not antithetical faculties with different origins but a single faculty which functions on a scale.

On pages 6 and 7 of his book *The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood,* Alan Donagan gives a brief account of Collingwood's view of philosophical concepts as scalar rather than antithetical. Donagan writes: 'Utility is good to a higher degree than pleasure. Moreover the classes of goods which exhibit these different specific forms overlap. What is ordained by duty is often both expedient and a pleasure.' But Donagan then goes on to object: 'The chief difficulty in the doctrine of the scale of forms is that unity, truth and goodness have opposites. While an adequate theory of goodness must account for its opposite, evil, the doctrine that the concept of goodness is the concept of a scale of forms seems to abolish evil altogether; for the lowest form on the scale of goods is still a good.' Donagan thinks that Collingwood abandoned the analysis of philosophy he had put forward in *the Essay on Philosophic Method* (1933) by 1939 when he wrote his *Autobiography.* Donagan nowhere mentions the parallel between Collingwood and Nietzsche in the use of scalar as opposed to antithetical concepts. I think the notion of a scalar continuum of good and bad (as opposed to an antithetical one) is an interesting one, and, though few will agree with me in this, that the notion of evil, which Donagan wants to retain, should be abandoned. I have a further reason for this. The concept of evil is linked to the concept of sin and both concepts carry too much theological and metaphysical baggage for me. It is interesting that when Donagan came to publish his book *The Theory of Morality,* 1977, (a sort of Sidgwick for our time) he took a path completely opposed to that of Nietzsche. Donagan wants to claim that the morality derived from the Hebrew Christian tradition is the correct and universal morality, just as Sidgwick wants to sanction many of the notions of the man in the street. Donagan dismisses Nietzsche's morality

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of nobility as the product of 'Nietzsche's resentful mind.' Donagan thinks that he has hoist the greatest analyst of resentment by his own petard. But I share Nietzsche's view that it is the Hebrew Christian morality which we need to turn our backs on. We need to try, as far as is possible for people brought up in the Hebrew Christian tradition, to leap back over it to the world of the ancient sophists, and of Thucydides, who tried to see things as they are and whose heir Nietzsche was. In section 429 of the notes published as *The Will to Power* Nietzsche claimed that Grote was mistaken in making the Sophists 'ensigns of morality'. On the contrary it was their honour, as it was Nietzsche's 'not to indulge in any swindle with big words and virtues.' I see Donagan as a moral dogmatist who is continuing that swindle. We must not be moral dogmatists, but moral investigators, and, in that investigation, the knowledge of history, as Nietzsche emphasized, is indispensable.

In maintaining the notion that Hebrew Christian morality is the correct one, Donagan forgets that without the existence of the Hebrew Christian God that notion has been undermined. And it has been undermined not by scholastic argument, or by natural science, but by history. Already In *Daybreak* (1881), book 1, section 95 Nietzsche had written; '*Historical refutation is the definitive refutation'*. In former times, one sought to prove that there is no God – today one indicates how the belief that there is a God could *arise* and how this belief acquired its weight and importance: a counter-proof that there is no God therefore becomes superfluous. When in former times one had refuted the 'proofs of the existence of God' put forward, there always remained the doubt whether better proofs might be adduced than those just refuted: in those days atheists did not know how to maintain a clean sweep. History has destroyed not the proofs for the existence of God, but the taste for the belief in him. In section 204 of part 6 of *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) in Judith Norman's Cambridge translation Nietzsche writes of the anti-historical Schopenhauer's 'unintelligent ranting'

Herbert Butterfield

against Hegel's sense of the importance of history. Nietzsche sees German culture in particular as representing 'a supreme and divinatory refinement of the *historical sense.*' Given the centrality of history in Nietzsche's thought, it is a great pity that Collingwood never engaged with it in *The Idea Of History.*

In *The Idea of History* Collingwood notoriously puts the chief emphasis on actions rather than events. An earthquake is an event that requires a scientific explanation. It is the actions of human beings before and after such an event that should be the historian's concern. Collingwood, moreover, emphasizes what he calls the 'inside' of an action, the motives and intentions behind it are what he sees as the historian's real subject.

He seems to tend towards a methodological individualism with collective actions explained in terms of the decisions of individual participants. Even regarding individual actions, however, we find, if we supplement *The Idea of History* with the sections on history in the *Autobiography (1939)*, some odd assumptions. On page 70, for example, he claims that the historian can only construct the 'inside' of a successful action, but not of an unsuccessful one. But why should the historian only be able to explain Nelson's plan

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
Georg Simmel

and success at Trafalgar, but not Villeneuve's plan and failure. Might he not have independent access to Villeneuve's failed plan? On page 240 of *The Idea of History* Collingwood speaks of narrative interpolation and brings the historian as narrator close to the novelist, while of course reminding us that the historian must give us the basic truth of what happened and not just fiction. This is indeed what makes Tolstoy's *War and Peace* such a 'sport' as a novel, because, when Tolstoy is dealing with historical personages such as Napoleon and the generals involved, he explicitly claims that he is telling what really happened, and the historians are not. In *The Idea of History* there is understandably a tendency to regard history as a unified enterprise rather than a congeries of related but different enterprises. This somewhat blurs the differences between writing a history of the Peloponnesian war where actions and their 'insides' are central and, say, a history of Christianity which is likely for large stretches to involve a history of ideas approach. Bishop Hatch once devoted a remarkable book to answering the question how we got from the Sermon on the Mount to the Nicene Creed. The answer was brief: Greek philosophy. But how much detail regarding polemics was involved in that brief answer?

In 1864 the twenty-year-old Nietzsche read a shortened version of David Strauss's *The Life of Jesus* with its undermining of the historicity of the Gospels. This was still the product of the younger Strauss not the older Strauss whose cultural shallowness Nietzsche was later to attack in the first historical meditation. The year after this Nietzsche wrote the famous letter to his sister which concluded 'if you wish to strive for peace of soul and happiness, then believe, if you wish to be a disciple of truth, then inquire.' We must not just accept what we have been brought up to believe, even though the belief makes us happy. Nietzsche like his friends and colleagues at Basel the theologian Franz Overbeck and the historian Jacob Burckhardt (whose lectures on Greek culture he heard and admired) knew that his age was one in which a historical revolution had taken place, a revolution which the later historian Herbert Butterfield in his *Man on his Past: The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship (1955)* would parallel to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. That revolution brought about a scientific mindedness peculiar to Western civilization. So also did the nineteenth century produce a peculiarly Western historical-mindedness.

Apart from his earlier scholarly philological study of the sources of the biographer of ancient philosophers Diogenes Laertius, Nietzsche is not a first-hand historian. But he philosophized on the basis of history drawing on reliable scholars such as Wellhausen and Renan, though sometimes he lapsed into using unreliable scholars and translators as in his account in section 57 of the *Antichrist* of the Laws of Manu. He saw we have become what we are through our history and that historical investigation must underpin reflections on ethics and philosophy. He thought much English writing on ethics was vitiated by a lack of such historical finesse. A major difference between him and both Hegel and Collingwood is that they regard Christianity as the true philosophy expressed through image, allegory and poetry whereas he saw it as making literal claims which must be rejected as false.

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Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein

The Move Away from Logic to the Human

Wittgenstein's move from logical atomism in his early work the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to a 'human/language' based philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations is a fascinating study. It mirrors and is in some part is itself responsible for the 'story' of Western analytic philosophy in the 20th century.

PAUL COCKBURN

The *Tractatus* is a work which attempted to answer all the questions of philosophy in a logical way. Wittgenstein wanted to solve the problems of epistemology by proposing that knowledge is arrived at via propositional logic and truth functions applied to propositions. This to some extent followed, and then influenced, the Vienna school in the 1930s, which had philosophers such as Carnap and Schlick amongst its members. They emphasized the role of empiricism in science, and Carnap wanted to construct a language based purely on observation and 'fact'. There was thus no role for metaphysics – if a statement could not be tested experimentally, it was essentially nonsense. Wittgenstein arrived at a similar conclusion in the *Tractatus*, although he was more concerned with the logical status of truth. He showed that complex logical functions could be reduced to simple logical functions i.e. 'x' and '~x' (negation).

'What we cannot speak thereof, we must remain silent'. We 'can't' talk about metaphysics, ethics or aesthetics because such statements cannot be proved to be true or false. Metaphysical statements were thus

Schlick

Carnap

nonsense. But Wittgenstein came to recognize that language somehow did have words for concepts which were neither totally logical or falsifiable – how was this possible?

Wittgenstein became fascinated by language and its epistemological role – language itself structures our knowledge in some way. I can only experience 'my' world. Language limits what we can know. The limit can only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

Wittgenstein moved away from a 'logical calculus of propositions' in the *Tractatus* to a humanistic account of language in the Philosophical Investigations. This latter account was based on 'folk' psychology, often analysing the intentions, desires, and feelings (such as pain!) behind utterances. However only what was 'obviously' shown was allowed as an explanation, so there is no deeper account of human motivation in terms of the unconscious or meaning (hermeneutics). Much human activity was based on 'games',

following rules. Outside of the rules there was nonsense, but Wittgenstein did not give any basis for the rules. Metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics were not treated in the Investigations.

It is almost as if there are so many dangers and misconceptions that can arise in language that any 'deeper' study cannot be done. Observed behaviour is the key – mental processes behind this behaviour cannot be seen. Therefore, we have to be careful how we talk about them. Language is a useful tool which is used to help us carry out various human endeavours, whether these are building a house or researching how electrons and sub-atomic particles behave.

Language is multi-faceted and rich – it is silly to assume logic can encompass all its features. Many words have vague meanings but can still be used perfectly well. Wittgenstein starts the *Philosophical Investigations* with a discussion of Augustine's theory of language where a child is taught by its parents to attach words

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to objects. This, in Wittgenstein's view is a possible source of philosophical error as we may then assume that if we have a word then there is always a corresponding 'real' object. So, language is a source of paradox and conundrums because words are not clearly defined and have a lot of 'cultural baggage'. Furthermore, a key feature of language is that it is social. Wittgenstein showed it is impossible to have a private language which only I have access to – the essence of language is communication based on shared understanding. Another feature of language is that it must be open to correction by others.

This means there is probably something wrong with the Cartesian picture of the mind as mental theatre with a 'disembodied' self thinking. It would seem that the correct paradigm according to Wittgenstein is not 'I think' but 'thinking occurs'. However, there is still a problem with our experiences such as pain and our sense experiences. Although these are private, and we cannot know with certainty what someone else is experiencing, the inner experience of say pain or seeing a colour still remains. Is there any entity such as the self which is experiencing these sensations? Wittgenstein would probably say that it is a mistake to postulate any such entity. However aside from the puzzle of what, if anything, the self is, our experience does seem to privilege the first person. We all have a personal point of view which is key to us. This contrasts with the objective point of view, and it seems difficult to reconcile the objective and subjective. Wittgenstein's contribution to this debate is perhaps to show that the personal point of view cannot be private, the personal point of view as expressed in language is in fact based on communal norms and customs. However, if the objective is in fact just the achieving of consensus, then the notion of truth becomes problematic. Thus, the concentration on language and the epistemological can lead to relativism and non-realism, and this is what

has happened in late 20th century analytic philosophy.

Wittgenstein's philosophical journey from trying to establish the logical foundations of mathematics and propositional logic to an analysis of human behaviour and language is a fascinating one. It perhaps demonstrates the truth of the saying that the proper study of mankind is man. From a philosophical point of view, Wittgenstein is saying that it is difficult to escape our human limitations.

Footnote

Karl Popper, another great Austrian philosopher, who also came to live in England, disagreed with Wittgenstein's concentration on linguistic analysis. He compared language to the spectacles that we use to describe the world. But there was still a real world, and the interest in language and the study of it was like cleaning the spectacles, a fairly minor activity. There were real-world problems which needed solving, not just puzzles that would disappear when we examined in depth the words we used to state the puzzle. In a famous debate at the weekly Cambridge Moral Science Club in 1946, at Kings College, Popper and Wittgenstein disagreed violently, in an incident which involved Wittgenstein brandishing a poker at Popper!

Although it is not clear in detail what the argument was about, it is likely that Popper outlined some philosophical problems, such as the nature of infinity and induction. Wittgenstein interrupted, probably saying that these were linguistic puzzles rather than real problems. Although at first glance this may seem to be the 'man of science' versus the 'linguistic philosopher', this is a superficial reading, as Popper was mainly a philosopher of science rather than a scientist, and he wanted to prove that metaphysical statements were not nonsensical.

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The *Wednesday*

BOOKS

Volume 3 Out Now

The Wednesday

thinking out loud

Food for thought every Wednesday
Volume Three
(Jan 10th - 11th April 2018)

Volume 3

Volume 2

Volume 1

The Art of Dying

{... for the mind of the flesh is death ... Romans 8:6}

All things and creatures are curiously
searching for their own destruction,
their own dark way of dying,
and this necessary search investigates
incessantly a necessary end.
It is a search for the self-destructive form,
the circumference, the circle of death, the curvature
and the softness of the extinguishing object.

Oh, those feeling for an intangible grip,
according to the outline of the jug
or maybe for the elegant glass cutting of an antique bottle
or its Chinese characters that are as old
as human suffering.
See the unlikely narrowness of the neck
and the mighty belly that lazily spreads,
full of rumours and whispers like in an alcove,
crashing into the dark, in a distant, gloomy autumn night.

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
Where death happens, there is a truth.

The dying creature in the shape of an ancient vessel

maybe an old clown,

or a homeless woman, who spent her life rushing around,

surrounded by noisy children,

so full of patience, but also sickness and suffering,

fragile like porcelain that feels smooth,

like the gentleness of this woman,

who is now dying alone.

Poem and Artwork by Scharlie Meeuws

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Promises, Promises: a pantoum

CHRIS NORRIS

In the particular case of promising . . . it is appropriate that the person uttering the promise should have a certain intention, viz. here to keep his word: and perhaps of all concomitants this looks the most suitable to be that which 'I promise' does describe or record. Do we not actually, when such intention is absent, speak of a 'false' promise?

J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words*

Austin does not ponder the consequences issuing from the fact that a possibility – a possible risk – is always possible, and is in some sense a necessary possibility. Nor whether – once such a necessary possibility of infelicity is recognized – infelicity still constitutes an accident. What is a success when the possibility of infelicity continues to constitute its structure?

Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*

Words live: mean what you say, say what you mean.
Lives change: the best intentions go askew.
No loss of speech-act force with shift of scene.
No telling what performatives may do.

Lives change: the best intentions go askew.
Words count: the darkest perjurer comes clean.
No telling what performatives may do.
No truth so weak it turns to might-have-been.

Words count: the darkest perjurer comes clean.
Past counting, payback dates long overdue.
No truth so weak it turns to might-have-been.
*No end of saving pretexts, bang on cue.*

Past counting, payback dates long overdue.
Word binds to act, whatever comes between.
No end of saving pretexts, bang on cue.
Let speech-acts hold, let chance not intervene!

Word binds to act, whatever comes between.
Vows broken multiply, vows kept are few.
Let speech-acts hold, let chance not intervene!
Bonds loosen and anomalies accrue.

Vows broken multiply, vows kept are few.
Meanings perdure in contexts unforeseen.
Bonds loosen and anomalies accrue.
Good faith's the rule, not fallible routine.

Meanings perdure in contexts unforeseen.
Who knows when circumstance will stage its coup?
Good faith's the rule, not fallible routine.
The slightest jolt knocks meanings out-of-true.

See how the speech-act gremlin staged its coup!
No fixed intent controls the word-machine.
Your verse-form strove yet failed to carry through.
Words code for error like a faulty gene.

Jacques Derrida

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
The I and The We

CHRIS SEDDON

Eight members of the Wednesday group met on Wednesday 1st of August in the lower room at the Opera Café, Jericho, Oxford, to discuss the concept of the Self. We started with two quotations. The first quote was from Nietzsche:

'... *the philosopher, being* necessarily *a person of tomorrow... has* needed *to be at odds with his today: his enemy has always been the ideal of today... Today... when only the herd animal gets and gives honour... the philosopher will be revealing something of his own ideal when he proposes: "Greatest of all is the one who can be the most solitary, the most hidden, the most different, the person beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the one with an abundance of will..."* (*Beyond Good and Evil* paragraph 212)

The second quote was from Heidegger:

'*The Self of everyday Dasein is the* they-self*, which we distinguish from the* authentic Self - *that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been* dispersed *into the they," and must first find itself*.' (*Being and Time* page 167)

It was argued that these philosophers wanted to extricate themselves from the herd, but that on the contrary philosophy should be concerned not just with the self but also with an integrated whole, trying to realise an equilibrium of the **I** and the **We**.
It was recognised that this is problematic - different cultures have struck a different balance between the authority of the individual and the authority of the group, and found different ways of maintaining an equilibrium.

There are also groups within groups. We heard of one instance in which the tradition of sanctuary was so important to the culture as a whole that an extended family sacrificed their lives in order to protect two men who had no other right to their protection. We also heard of Bacha Khan, the Islamic 'Peace Warrior' (1929) whose unarmed followers practised non-violence even under machine-gun fire - although many 'Peace Warriors' were killed, some of the armed soldiers refused to fire, apparently placing their common humanity above the harsh punishments they were to incur for disobeying their army commanders. Sometimes unity is created in unexpected ways - in some cultures a tradition of a life for a life between feuding families has been transformed by mandating the payment of a bride for each life lost instead, which has the effect of unifying the feuding families instead of decimating them.

It was suggested that in the teaching of Christ too, boundaries between individuals and nations, and even between God and humans are undermined:

'*Our Father in heaven*' (Matthew *chapter 6)*
'*Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: Love your neighbour as yourself.*' (Matthew *chapter 22)*
'*And who is my neighbour? ... The one who*

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had mercy... ' (Luke *chapter 10)*
'*Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me*' (Matthew *chapter 25)*

We also considered examples in which the actions of wider nation groups were regarded as morally wrong even by their own members, and not always just because of a charismatic but morally reprehensible leader. A more complex example of tensions between groups and individuals was that of a traitor to his home country guided by strong moral principles to act for another country.

After some discussion it was recognised that Kant's account of morality grounded on the categorical imperative:

> '*Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law*' (*Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* Ak 4:421)

did not preclude the idea that a wider group could be immoral, since even an entire nation might act in accord with a maxim that it could not consistently want to be applied universally. It was not however generally accepted that Kant had sufficiently defined the notion of a maxim to justify the derivation of all imperatives of duty.

The equilibrium between the self and the group was also explored briefly outside the ethical sphere. The balance between private and public grief varies across cultures. Musical genius such as Mozart's may be viewed as a personal transcendence of existing conventions even though working within them. The views were expressed that every child is a genius until they are socialised; marriage may be viewed as a joining of two partners into one flesh; and the need to belong can express itself in membership of various in-groups or substitute families.

Western Shore

remember now,
in this summer twilight,
those long Atlantic beaches,
the sigh of waters that
at last meet land,
        and the piping
of the gulls that ride
an on-shore breeze ....
        remember, too,
the afterglow of sunset
lingering,
        as though
in benediction for
a day that's past,
        or pledge
of sunrise on a further shore.

Edmund Burke