

The Wednesday



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group - Oxford

Editorial

The Other as Mirroring The Self

The question of the other has gained much interest in recent years. Prior to that, the question was of the self, solitary and self-sufficient. In fact, modern philosophy, from Descartes to Kant, was mainly concerned with finding a ground for the self. The other came in the context of ethics, for example in the famous Kantian 'Kingdom of Ends' where rational beings harmonise their aims so that they live in a well-ordered, rational society. But the real break beyond the individual self and the recognition of the other came with Fichte. Fichte problematised the question of the other and related it to self-consciousness, freedom and reason. Some of his ideas were echoed later on by Hegel.

Fichte's original work, the *Wissenschaftslehre* (or the Doctrine of Theory of Knowledge) emphasised the self-positing of the I. The I posits itself, as an empirically limited I (Self), and the not-I (Nature). But he soon came to realise that the I posits itself not only as a singular I but a plurality of Is. The I does not only face the not-I that has no freedom but also a plurality of other Is in a sphere of freedom. This becomes clear in his *Foundations of Natural Right* and *The System of Ethics*, but also in the *Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre*, Second Introduction, specially Sections 9-11.

What Fichte proposes now is his former idea of the Anstoss (check, limitation) on the self, but he gives it a more positive sense as summons (Aufforderung), in the sense of stimulus to act. The I is not individuality but a plurality of Is, each summoned by the other Is to act. The other and the summons are transcendental conditions of self-consciousness and rationality. The fact that the self is surrounded by others is made into a condition of self-consciousness. It has also been given the character of mutual recognition through the act of summoning. This mutual recognition suggests the

need to self-limit our freedom. This gives rise to the concept of natural right. But this not a simple call to respect the freedom of others. It is a higher synthesis through reason and freedom. The I faces the others not as the individuals, empirical Is, but the instantiation of reason and freedom. As Fichte says in section 9 of the 2nd Introduction:

'the only thing that exists in itself is reason, and individuality is something merely accidental. Reason is the end and personality is the means; the latter is merely a particular expression of reason, one that must increasingly be absorbed into the universal form of the same.'

Reason, through the individuals, has a drive to self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. What matters for reason is not the individual person or persons but the self-sufficiency of reason itself. But then, as individuals striving for self-sufficiency, the individual could be domineering and depriving the others of their freedom, that is why we need the concept of natural right.

Two points to make: One is that this collapsing of all Is into reason could be read in two ways: metaphysically as in a religious understanding or mystical experience. But it can also be read in an immanent way by reading the unity in reason as a moral order that all contribute to, share and partake in it.


Secondly: Fichte assumes that the I is rational and free. But what if one believed in naturalism or determinism? You may end up in this case with the Hobbesian dictum 'the war of all against all,' and this will not lead to a social harmony or a dignified humanity.

The Editor

The Nature Philosophy of Schelling

Schelling sought in his Nature Philosophy to found an Absolute foundational basis for nature in nature itself, as a creative principle that embraced natural forces as well as human freedom. His work appealed to the German Romantics and influenced Hegel's dynamic account of human history, as the article below argues.

DAVID SOLOMON



Schelling

In my last essay on Schelling (*The Wednesday*, issue 50), I described how his work, like that of other idealists such as Fichte, followed on from Kant's radical reorientation of philosophy. Kant identified the world of appearances (the phenomenal world) which we could experience by combining our sense data with categories of understanding.

These categories were prior to these sense data and not in themselves experienced. Such was the basis of our 'objective' knowledge of the world. He contrasted the phenomenal world with the world of things in themselves which were not experienced and could therefore not be known (the Noumenon). Any attempt to know things in themselves as if they were appearances would lead to contradictions, to reason going beyond itself. Only when acting ethically would we live in the realm of freedom, going beyond an observable experienced world which was determined according to the laws of nature.


The Search For The Absolute

The project of the Idealists, not pursued by Kant, was to find an Absolute, unconditioned principle that brought about these two worlds and resolved the contradictions between them. On the one hand, reality presents itself to us as what is given, objective and not under our control, and the other in our actions we seem to be underdetermined by natural causes and consequently free to determine aspects of our surrounding environment. The attempt to find an absolute principle was approached differently by different philosophers. Fichte made the activities of the I, in comprehending and also affecting the world through action absolute and unconditioned. This was the Transcendental approach: the world is what it is for us, and we make it understandable and susceptible to change through our own activity. Schelling, who started off as a follower of Fichte developed alongside a philosophy in which Nature was the Absolute, the activity of the I being a manifestation of

Nature's activity. He outlined his philosophy in a series of lectures delivered in 1798 called *The First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* and an *Introduction* to this written in the following year. At this point he had not formerly broken with Fichte, and the issues he deals with in this work are an uneasy but interesting oscillation between their two positions.

Both Fichte's and Schelling's systems were absolute, unified and unconditioned, that is independent of anything outside of it that might affect or determine it. Fichte had to explain how the Absolute I could appear limited by its consciousness of objects in the world that were seemingly independent of its activity. Schelling's Absolute on the other hand was Nature. But he distinguished nature as the totality of products (*natura naturata*) from nature as the formative creative force of all things (*natura naturans*). Because of its two-foldedness, nature can be seen as the active cause of itself. The problem is that we see dualism emerging at every level of nature's productivity. Nature as dynamic energy seems opposed to the apparent long or short-term stability of inanimate objects and animate creatures. Even particular objects, such as the earth, contain principles (light, heat, electrical and chemical processes) that appear to fall outside it. Here we can see oppositions that appear in nature at all levels of scope and complexity. They all however derive from one original opposition, which Schelling describes as the tendency of the universe to objectify itself.

'The chemical phenomena, like the organic, drive us to the question of the ultimate origin of all duplicity. One factor of the chemical process always falls outside of the individual product (e.g., the Earth), it lies in a higher product; but for the chemical process of this higher sphere, its one, invariable factor again lies in a higher order, and so on to infinity. There is thus ONE universal dualism which runs throughout the whole of Nature, and the individual antitheses that we



see in the universe are only shoots of that one primal opposition, between which the universe itself exists.

What has that primal opposition itself called forth, beckoned from the universal identity of Nature? If Nature is to be thought as absolute totality, then nothing can be opposed to it, for everything falls within its sphere and nothing outside of it. It is impossible that this unlimited (from the outside) change itself into a finite being for intuition except insofar as it becomes object to itself, i.e., in its infinitude.' (First Outline. SUNY, 2004, P179).

Nature As An Absolute

In identifying Nature as an absolute starting point, what was Schelling trying to do? He was clearly interested in the latest scientific discoveries of his time and followed them closely. At the same time, he was critical of empirical science for being too focussed on the processes and effects of the natural world and contrasted this with what he called speculative science. Speculation, especially as used by Schelling and Hegel had a particular association,

devoid of the negative associations of our own use of the term (speculation as vague and empty conjecture unsupported by evidence, or risky especially financial enterprise). Speculation had a number of important connotations. The Latin word *Speculatio*, from which it is derived means spying out, contemplating.

'This identity [DS = Identity between the productive in Nature and the product] is cancelled by the empirical perspective, which sees in Nature only the effect (although on account of the continual wandering of empiricism into the field of science, we have, even in purely empirical physics, maxims which presuppose an idea of Nature as subject; such as, for example, "Nature chooses the shortest way"; "Nature is sparing in causes and lavish in effects"); the identity is also cancelled by speculation, which looks only at cause in Nature. (First Outline, PP202-203).

According to Schelling, science (German: *Wissenschaft* from *Wissen* = Knowledge),

in order to be complete, had to go beyond phenomena which could be observed and described experimentally. It had to:

a) have certainty. Schelling uses the paradoxical phrase 'absolute hypothesis' (not as in our use a tentative explanation that demands further experiments, but a fundamental cause underlying the observable phenomena).

b) be systematic. All the products of nature, organic and inorganic, and all the forces such as gravity, light, heat, magnetism, electricity and chemical process had to belong to one system. Forces which he saw as analogous to each other, such as the light / heat from the sun and the combustion of substances on earth have affinities with each other. Through analogies and affinities, different parts of nature reflect and are bound to each other.

c) contain ultimate explanations. It is not enough to describe individual phenomena



whirlpool


e.g. electricity and provide explanations of its operation. These forces have to be traced back to the original absolute dynamism of the universe and the original opposition that fragments this dynamism into particular organic and inorganic products.

Nature As A Process Of Becoming

In his nature philosophy, Schelling stresses Nature as a process of becoming rather than being, the process of production / productivity as prior to the products themselves. In my last essay on Schelling, I discussed his use of the metaphor of a stream. The smooth flow of the stream gets impeded by a block and forms a whirlpool.

The water of the stream flows through the whirlpool and then moves on, but the configuration of the whirlpool is maintained. The whirlpool represents the products of nature, both organic and inorganic. Schelling's system implies a form of evolution. The energy of nature gets caught up in particular configurations and then flows forward in another wave creating different products in an ascending chain, culminating in the creation of humans. Once a particular species emerges, Schelling does not envisage the species changing further (in contrast to Darwinian evolution) but rather differentiating into male and female forms and reproducing that species unchanged. The system is complete with the emergence of humans, because humans can for the first time consciously understand the system as a whole, and the loop is closed.

'Every external force first passes by way of sensibility before it acts upon irritability, and sensibility is the source of life itself, precisely because through it alone the organism is torn away from universal mechanism (where one wave pushes the other forward and in which there is no standstill of force) and by this means becomes its own source of motion.' (First Outline, P137).



Darwin

Nature is envisaged as dynamic, involving active forces. This is important to Schelling because it is linked to the idea of freedom. A dynamic theory of the universe shows how we do not react passively as objects of forces outside of ourselves (as in the mechanical model of billiard balls colliding with each other), but we have our own energy. This applies to inorganic as well as organic products.

In his account of organic nature, Schelling puts great emphasis on the concepts of Sensibility and Irritation. An organism is irritated by a stimulus (e.g. touch, heat, electrical etc.) from without but reacts to this actively. In fact, it is this reaction that allows it to expand, find its level and establish its boundaries. There are also analogies in the inorganic world. The affinities of the sun (fire, heat etc.) are

different to the affinities of the earth. Oxygen (newly discovered and seen by Schelling as an intermediary element between the earth and the sun) breaks open the affinities of the earth and allows combustion to take place.

'We have not only proven that the conditions under which those causes are active are necessary in the organism by virtue of its essence and its nature, by which it is an organism at all, but we have also presented the existence of those causes themselves and their uninterrupted effectiveness in universal Nature (as conditioned by the existence of a universe generally), and we have thus joined the organism and life, even the most innocuous plant, to the eternal order of Nature by means of their final causes.' (First Outline, P172).

There are laws and there is necessity in nature, but at the same time, the products of nature are not just the recipients of outside forces, but manifest their own agency / dynamism, that is analogous to freedom.

The question really extends to the whole of Nature, for Nature produces this external, geometrical perfection for no other reason than that for which it produces inner, organic perfection. But this reason is none other than blind necessity, with which Nature acts generally. If there were chance in Nature—just one accident—then you would catch sight of Nature in universal lawlessness. Because everything that happens in Nature happens with blind necessity, everything that happens or that arises is an expression of an eternal law and of an unimpugnable form.—Therefore, you see your own understanding in Nature, so it seems to you to produce for you. And so you are only right to see in its lawful productions an analogue of freedom, because even unconditioned necessity becomes freedom once more. (First Outline, P135).

The Nature of Matter

Because Schelling's concern is with the origins of nature, he was as a consequence interested in the dispute about the nature of matter. The Newtonian explanation of matter was in terms of its composition of fundamental units, or atoms. By contrast Kant's theory of matter saw it in terms of the equilibrium of two equal forces opposed to each other. Schelling thought that both these explanations contained 'ideal presuppositions': the atomic explanation could not explain how and why individual atoms combined to produce particular larger forms, while the system of 'pure Dynamism' could not explain how dynamic forces in general could be concretised into particular products. Instead, Schelling proposed a midway principle, what he called 'Dynamic Atomism' by which the dynamic creative process as a whole differentiated into various kinds of products. His dynamic atoms were in themselves ideal but served to describe a general creative process that tended towards particular products.

Schelling thought empirical explanation alone would only identify the conditions according to which things happen but not the happening itself. For example, we can observe the conditions which determine changes in qualities (such as changes in the density of matter) but not the quality itself and how it comes about. The distinction was therefore not between matter and spirit, or matter and energy, but between simple / unified / undifferentiated energy and specific forms which it took. We could say that Schelling's philosophy of nature was in itself Idealist, or Speculative, because it went beyond observable nature, and in particular beyond phenomena as it was observed and experimented upon. The system he described was dynamic, living, and in sharp contrast to a mechanistic model of the universe. It appealed to the Romantics, opened the door for a rehabilitation of Spinoza into mainstream European philosophy and was an influence on Hegel's dialectic of human history.

Breaking News: No More Spring

DAVID BURRIDGE

Cliché clean-up gets underway.

*Young men's fancies, old men's regrets
no longer to be troubled.*

Sap set not to rise.

*Tight lipped buds on go-slow.
Limp leaves seek early autumn crinkle.*

*Junkie drones kick queen out.
Stinging rebuke from spokes-bee.*

*Daffs to stay tight in their onion coils:
No more littering of grassy knolls.*

*Easter a muddle in a cemetery,
declares frocked bishop.*

*Rejuvenation is no longer cool.
Celebs queue for face sag.*

*March Hare gets ASBO.
Lambs to be bred to stand still.*

*Babies refuse to be giddy.
No room on swings causes toddler riots.*

*Tossing coins to be risk assessed
Touching wood spreads Swine flu.
Shrinks call for NVQ in dreaming.*

Latest research confirms: it is indigestion!



Freeze-Frame



What if one day things everywhere ground to a halt? What if birds froze in mid-flight, people froze in mid-sentence, and planets and subatomic particles alike froze in mid-orbit? What if all change, throughout the entire universe, completely ceased for a period of, say, one year? Is such a thing possible?

Ned Markosian, 'Time', *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*

CHRIS NORRIS

No interval but some event takes place.
Sheer tedium maybe, yet the rule applies.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.

No gap vacates the plenum's tight embrace.
It cuts those in-between bits down to size.
No interval but some event takes place.

Their point, the physicists', is how they base
Whole theories on this cardinal surmise:
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.

If time should pass its passage leaves a trace.
Look: time *just is* where happenings arise.
No interval but some event takes place.

This physics-truth is one we'd better face
Before we note, inanely, how time flies.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.

We yawn and clock-watch yet the clock keeps pace
With entropy in one time-honoured guise:
No interval but some event takes place.

If nothing happened time's fast-forward would race
To close the gap and thus renormalize.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.



Still it's the kind of fantasy we chase,
That time-gap, when the lows outweigh the highs.
No interval but some event takes place.

Don't get the physics demon on your case;
He'll say such notions take the booby-prize.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.

So if you'd hoped for a short rest by grace
Of empty time, it's time to recognize:
No interval but some event takes place.

Else all the happening-voids might interlace
And spell apocalypse to the clock-wise.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space.

We conjure these scenarios, though our ace
Card's all the great time-fillers we devise.
No interval but some event takes place.

Folk-physics brings small comfort: better brace
Yourself and find new means to temporize.
Time-slots unoccupied are like null space;
No interval but some event takes place.




We in the wrestling nights


**We in the wrestling nights
fall from nearness to nearness,
as startling stones into frozen ponds.**

**We feel protected where none protects,
in slumberous shade, by a tree
that rises, always remembered
in thoughts of the lonely.**

**We are flowers of the deeper soil, loved
forever by the roots,
full of return,
eternal.**

Poem and Artwork by *Scharlie Meeuws*





Tree and Flowers

A Further Note On Nietzsche And Truth

EDWARD GREENWOOD

A friend has challenged my view that Nietzsche did not hold an outrageous view of truth by citing part one section four of *Beyond Good and Evil* entitled 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers'. It will be as well to cite the whole passage: 'We do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an object to a judgment; this is perhaps where our new language will sound most foreign. The question is how the judgment promotes and preserves life, how well it preserves, and perhaps even cultivates the type. And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include synthetic judgments *a-priori*) are the most indispensable to us, and that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the wholly invented world of the unconditional and self-identical and without a constant falsification of the world through numbers, people could not live – that a renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To acknowledge untruth as a condition of life: this usually means resisting the value feelings in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy that resists such a thing would by that gesture alone place itself beyond good and evil.'

It must be admitted that judged by the distinctions and standards developed subsequently by such movements as logical positivism, Oxford philosophy, and Wittgenstein, there is much in it which is obscure and disconcerting. Nevertheless, interpreted sympathetically, I think much of what Nietzsche says in the passage quoted is compatible with those distinctions and standards.

The opening of the passage is quite compatible with my view that Nietzsche recognizes that in

many cases it might be better for our morale if in some matters we held untrue beliefs, at least for a time, as when we hold the belief that our illness is not a mortal one, though in fact it is. In the case of art we rightly accede to fiction knowing that it is fiction. With religion it is different. We do not recognize it as fiction and, if we do, we lose religious belief. As Nietzsche says in section 6 of *The Twilight of the Idols*, the section entitled 'The Four Great Errors': 'people have faith in God *because* the feeling of fullness and strength gives them peace'. With morality and religion we are in the realm of 'imaginary cause'.

What makes Nietzsche more of a philosopher than the Emerson he admired, is that he engages with certain of the technicalities of Kant's philosophy in a way Emerson never does, in particular the doctrine which the whole of *The Critique of Pure Reason* set out to justify namely the doctrine that synthetic *a-priori* judgments exist, *i.e.* judgments which though they are *a-priori* (in modern terms analytical judgments) give us empirical information. These would be conceptual centaurs, so to speak. In the passage in *From Beyond Good and Evil* which we are discussing, Nietzsche's dealing with this problem is certainly open to objections because he seems to see them as indispensable though false judgments. In fact what he should have said is that it is false that such judgments exist, but then he could not have claimed, as he does, that they are indispensable. It is this last claim that is open to objection. His true view of synthetic *a-priori* judgments, namely that Kant did not establish their existence, as he thought he had done, is expressed forcefully and wittily in a passage earlier in the very same chapter



R. W. Emerson

of the very same work *Beyond Good and Evil*. Whereas the passage on truth is section 4 of the section 'On The Prejudices of Philosophers' (page 7 of the Cambridge translation by Judith Norman which I am using) the passage on the synthetic a-priori comes in section 11 page 12 of the same edition. It goes 'He was proud of having *discovered* a new faculty in humans, the faculty of synthetic judgments *a-priori*. Of course, he was deceiving himself here, but the development and rapid blooming of German philosophy depended on this pride, and on the competitive zeal of the younger generation who wanted, if possible to discover something even protuberant in any event 'new faculties'!" But the time has come for us to think this over. How are synthetic judgments *a-priori possible*? Kant asked himself, and what really was his answer? *By virtue of a faculty*, which is to say: enabled *by an ability*: (*Vermoegen eines Vermoegens*) unfortunately, though, not in these few words, but rather so laboriously, reverentially, and with such an extravagance of German frills and profundity that people failed to hear the comical *niaiserie allemande* in such an answer.' Kant unleashed that flirting with the 'supersensible' which gratified the basically piety-craving Germans and which led Nietzsche to see much German idealist philosophy (to which we may add Heidegger) as a 'concealed theology'. No wonder Nietzsche called Kant 'this disaster of a spider' in section

11 of *The Anti-Christ*. I think David Stove was very influenced by this criticism of Kant when in his delightful book *The Plato Cult* on page 53 he concludes by saying that after much endeavor Kant's judgment amounts to nothing more than the assertion that such judgments *are possible*. More soberly Peter Strawson concluded on page 43 of his book *The Bounds of Sense* that 'Kant really has no clear and general conception of the synthetic *a priori* at all.'

I find the last half of the passage in question the most difficult to defend. When Nietzsche talks of 'the fictions of logic' he does so, as I suggested earlier, without the benefit of much subsequent thought on the subject. If he is implying that logic is a human invention and, as being entirely a-priori, in itself tells us nothing about the empirical world, then he is right, but it is not clear that this is what he does mean. It is not clear either how acknowledging 'untruth as a condition of life' takes us beyond good and evil, unless, as may be the case, this is an implicit attack on Kant's absolute prohibition of lying in any circumstances as being evil. One thing is certain that there is nothing in the passage which conflicts with Nietzsche's view that both natural science and historical philology strive for the truth and in doing so do human kind the service of freeing it from religion.

Wittgenstein, Embodiment and Love

DAVID CLOUGH

Wittgenstein may refer to Augustine at the start of *Philosophical Investigations* but only to disagree with him. Action provokes thought. It always will, he implies in *Culture and Value*. He refers to the acts of a baby. But the French philosophers have to deal with Descartes and perhaps Rousseau. Ricoeur says it is 'the symbol' that provokes thought and then goes on to discuss metaphor. One can see this in both Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur who sees how Husserl traces both the strange emerging interiority of the body and how we recast our internally imagined acts as phenomena in the world. By this means the self becomes a quasi-natural object and our soul, or being, feels connected with the world.

Somehow things seem less transparent, I thought, than in Peter Winch who was mentioned in our last debate (see issue 52 of *The Wednesday*). But concentrating on Peter Winch's early book *The Idea of Social Science* overlooks most of his later work, which like Murdoch, was on moral philosophy. Nevertheless, it was still the case that metaphysics now seems like an unnecessary abstraction; one that always made philosophy the last word, whether the philosopher concerned was Hegel or Averroes. Merleau-Ponty said more about embodiment than Wittgenstein but Wittgenstein seems to lack the strong shadow of the Nietzschean 'Death of God' which is also stronger in Heidegger, in part through the influence of thinkers like Spengler. DZ Phillips had gone to Swansea in Wales to study with Rush Rees but as a believer. Non-believing Wittgensteinians see his pre-occupation in his essays on literature with the absent God aspects of RS Thomas as surprising, while other theologians like Fergus Kerr are more Thomist than Phillips was.

For non-believing Wittgensteinians, Descartes was important for the enlightenment but not so important for the self. It is true though that Sartre and Husserl kept some of the Cartesian self alive,

and that Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur had to deal with that. But in the end embodiment or action philosophy had to be primary. This had put a squeeze on Neoplatonist Augustinian thinking.

Augustine and his confessions give us an account of time and ideas about self-disclosure or autobiographical writing but also certain problems.



St. Augustine

What remains could be what scholars like Werner Jeanrond and Gerald O'Daly call 'a theology of love' and it links to thinkers like Kierkegaard, Arendt and Martha Nussbaum. But when Marjorie Perloff's *Wittgenstein's Ladder* looks at American poetry, does Wittgenstein get to do any actual climbing, having earlier said we should stay where we are? Probably not. Perloff talks rather about a strangeness within the ordinary. In contrast to this, Nussbaum in *Upheavals of Thought* (p528-34) discusses Love and St Augustine. Nussbaum had already praised Henry James in her first book on literature, *Love's Knowledge*, and that title gives a clue to what is going on in *Upheavals of Thought*.

The approaches to ladders in Fichte and Wittgenstein avoid 'caritas' or Christian love, in the same way discussions of the interpersonal in the recent psychoanalysis and phenomenology avoid it. If one saw an absence of Hegelian self and other thinking there, now it is becoming clearer how the Augustinian aspects in Kierkegaard and Nussbaum concern the debate about love, something also brought up in a recent day on Iris Murdoch. But unlike Kierkegaard neither Murdoch nor Nussbaum are writing specifically as Christians. In Augustine, there is the thought (perhaps hypothetical) that the love of God is preferable to that of the neighbour. But most modern philosophers whether religious or not either argue for equality here or that only the neighbour matters.

As hinted at, there are plenty of philosophers who try to link Heidegger and Wittgenstein. It has been claimed that all actions are socialised. But how do Wittgensteinians deal with the imperfections of the other or the social? As with phenomenology, ignoring Honneth, the issue of recognition is lacking in Marx or psychoanalysis. Glendinning links Wittgenstein and Derrida through Marx.

Reading sketches for *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein sees Copernicus and Darwin as thinkers who were not atheist or secularist but openers of a new fertile point of view. But unlike Derrida and Ricoeur he does not put Freud or Marx in the same position. A new notation was the buzz word. Here, reminding me of Merleau-Ponty, nonsense starts to become sense. Whatever we think of Ricoeur's rather scattered criticisms of Marx and Hegel, Derrida is, according to *Spectres of Marx*, much more negative, if not about Marx, then about existing Marxist post-revolutionary experience. If in Derrida's view the three blows to pre-modern idea of man included Freud, this was a kind of 'fourth blow'. So said Glendinning in his lecture series on Europe after Modernity.

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