

The Wednesday



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group at Albion Beatnik - Oxford

Editorial

Enlightenment: Two perspectives

Philosophical views are always regimented into two camps. You can see this in epistemology, ethics and the philosophy of mind. Perhaps the same applies to the debate on the Enlightenment. There is on one side the analytical view which is concerned with the facts of thoughts expressed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But there is also the continental view which deals, for the most part, with the significance of these thoughts, not as a past event but as a continuous movement, from their origin to the present moment. The question, for us, revolves around the task of philosophy and how each camp views the role of philosophy in, say, interpreting the Enlightenment, as an example of lots of other issues.

The analytic view is static and looks to the Enlightenment as a matter of fact, freezes it in time and gives it an eternal essence. It has a fixed view of reason and rationality generally and of linear scientific progress. In fact, this is the meaning of the Enlightenment for analytical philosophy. The continental, in contrast, is more dynamic, evaluative and sees it as a process with a complex trajectory and as an activity that goes beyond the texts of the elite who produced them. It also raises questions about reason and rationality and their relationship to power and control. You can see that in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Adorno and Horkheimer or in the many when occasions Foucault wrote about it.

Analytical philosophy aligns itself with science and positivism, even when it rejects the strictly positivist view. It is not concerned with interpreting a movement, such as the Enlightenment, speculating on a period or being critical and evaluative. It likes to restrict itself to statements, texts and their logical structure. Its slogan, since Frege, is that there is no mixing of the philosophical with the psychological, and we could add the social and historical. It feeds

back into the established order by dismantling its arguments or ideas and converting them to a set of sentences that they need for their validity a reference to the established order, knowingly or unknowingly. It does so by masking the game of knowledge and power that ensures the supremacy of the established order. Continental philosophy on the other hand, is concerned with history, hermeneutics and social and political movements. If the analytic philosopher looks at the surface of the text, the continental looks under or behind the text to see the play of power and knowledge.

For these reasons, analytical philosophy, in dealing with the Enlightenment, is conservative. It seeks to justify its existence and the status quo or even reinforce it. The recent book by Stephen Pinker *Enlightenment Now* is such an example. It has a self-congratulatory attitude and looks for a justification for its stand in the scientific view that was celebrated by the Enlightenment thinkers. One could object that Pinker is a psychologist. But he has influenced analytic philosophers, especially in the philosophy of language. Perhaps analytical philosophy prefers to be silent on this issue as on many other issues.

Continental philosophy on the other hand has said a lot on this subject, and in a revolutionary way. It has shown no complacency with reason that became instrumental and gave a reductive view of human being and life. It did present resistance to domination and the forces behind it whether within the developed world or in its relation with the developing world.

But to be just, we possibly need both views in a form of a synthesis that enables philosophy to be relevant to the present moment, skilled and rigorous in argument, well informed on issues and critical.

The Editor

Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein is most famous for his book *Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus* (1921). His philosophy was focused on the role of language in human life and the valid and invalid uses of language. The article below discusses some of his key ideas concerning the nature of language and its relation to the world.

Part 1

RANJINI GHOSH

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Immanuel Kant explained the connection between subjective consciousness and the objective world which is outside consciousness. He said that if we have to have any meaningful experience of the world then we must have conceptual categories to understand them. These conceptual categories, for Kant, were prior to language. That is to say he did not think of these categories in terms of language. But after Kant and particularly in the early twentieth century philosophers have started emphasizing concepts of the mind given by language rather than categories given by the

mind. What they are saying is that language mediates our experience of the world and so we must be clear about the logic of language.

Wittgenstein said that we can solve the problems of philosophy if we can understand the logic of our language. In his opinion much of the problems in philosophy arise because we misunderstand language. Language has an underlying logical structure and it is important to understand the limits of what can be clearly and meaningfully said. What can be said is the same as what can be thought. He famously said ‘what can be said at all can be said clearly, and

what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence.'

The main distinction is between what can be expressed by logical propositions and what cannot be expressed by propositions but only shown. He believes that matters of ethics, religion, God, nature of reality and truth are by themselves not nonsensical but it is only when we attempt to say anything about them that they become nonsensical. They are mystical things, that are beyond the rational mind and cannot be put into words. Here all that is possible is showing and not saying. It is important to understand the nature of the relation between the logical structure of a language and its relationship to the world.

Propositions


A proposition is something asserted as true. For example, we may say the table is black or this book is by Sartre. But propositions should not be confused with the sentences we use to express propositions. A sentence is a grammatically ordered sequence of words in any language. A sentence has to only obey grammatical rules of the language. A sentence need not be meaningful; for example, 'The cat is a window.' This sentence is nonsensical but it is grammatically correct. A proposition is what is asserted in a sentence. Different sentences maybe used at different times and places by different people to express the same proposition, for example, 'It is hot' can be said in French, German or Japanese to signify the same proposition that it is hot. We can say that a proposition is a thought conveyed by a sentence.

Ordinary language can often be philosophically misleading. Suppose we consider two propositions:

1. The table is black,
2. The lateness of his arrival was annoying.

There are two components, a subject (the table,

the lateness of his arrival) and a predicate (is black, was annoying). There is no problem with proposition (1), that there are tables in the world of which one is black. But in proposition (2) we have a problem with lateness because any person can be late but there are no things called lateness in the world. These examples show that ordinary language can sometimes lead to misunderstandings and philosophical problems of definition and understanding.



Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus

Propositions, as we saw earlier are made up of elementary propositions and it is the truth-value of elementary propositions that determine the truth of the proposition. We say an elementary proposition is true if that state of affairs exists in the world and false if it does not. So, elementary propositions are meaningful. But in the case of tautologies and logical falsehoods this may not be true. Suppose we say that 'either it is raining or it is not'. This is a tautology. Whatever might be the situation in the world it will be true. It does not tell us anything about the world. But if we say 'it is both raining and not raining' then it is a logical falsehood because both cannot be true. So, this also does not tell us anything about the world and is equally meaningless. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that since tautologies and

Philosophy

logical falsehoods do not picture anything they cannot be meaningful sentences. Therefore, when a proposition or a sentence says nothing at all, it does not give us any picture of the world.

Wittgenstein says that most propositions of philosophy are like this only i.e. nonsensical. Questions of ethics, religion, truth and reality lie outside the realm of facts and state of affairs in the world. If we try to say anything about them using our language it will be nonsense in the logical sense, in that it cannot be *stated*. Therefore, Wittgenstein argues that the world is represented by propositions and that propositions are true or false according to whether they represent or fail to represent the world. Language connects us to the world by picturing.


When we think about something in the world then our thought is a logical picture of that fact and since propositions are expressions of thought, propositions are themselves pictures of facts. The propositions of philosophy are not factual propositions, as in science. Ordinary propositions can be true or false depending upon whether they correspond to reality. But logical propositions are always true. Therefore, the truth value of logical propositions is independent of how things are in the world. Ethical or religious questions are outside the limits of language and propositions cannot picture them. That is to say such propositions cannot have sense. These are issues that cannot be put into words.

Russell's Theory Of Descriptions

Let us consider an example given by Bertrand Russell to explain the meaning of propositions and their falsity. Consider a proposition:

‘The present king of France is wise.’

We can now ask whether it is true or false. We may know that at present there is no king of



Spanish edition of the *Tractatus*

France. Since the subject term fails to refer to anything we should consider the proposition to be false. But how do we demonstrate that it is false? If we say X is wise the proposition will be true if X is indeed wise and false if X is not wise. But what happens if there is no X?

Russell was concerned that to explain whether a proposition was meaningful and also establish its falsity, we should not need to invoke the notion of subsistence i.e. the existence of that particular thing in reality. He said that names and descriptive phrases which are subjects in grammatical sentences are not genuine referring expressions and so they are misleading in a logical construct of propositions. Hence when we say ‘The present king of France is wise’ it we are actually making of three propositions:

1. That there is a king of France,
2. That there is only one king of France,
3. That this king of France is wise.

Since (1) is false, the original proposition is false. So, what has been done here is that we have broken down the original sentence into three propositions in the logical form and when we say it in this form, there will be need to refer to actual subsisting entities. This was an illustration of the underlying logical form or structure or language. Wittgenstein said that all philosophy is a critique of language. Therefore, what Russell was trying to show was that if we can translate sentences of ordinary language into the formal language of logic then there will be no risk of misunderstanding

about what is exactly being thought and said.

Logical Analysis

Logic is concerned with identifying valid forms of inference. Let us consider two arguments:

1. Either Pierre broke the clock or Andre did. Andre did not break the clock. Therefore, Pierre did.
2. It rained either on Monday or Tuesday. But there was no rain on Tuesday. Therefore, it rained on Monday.

We see that each argument has two premises and the conclusion is introduced with a therefore. We also see that the conclusion is validly inferred from the premises. The logician will present these sentences in the form 'either p or q; not q; therefore p'. The main point is if premises are true conclusions will be true. The main concern of the logician is not the truth or falsity of the premise and the conclusion but the form of the argument. When the premise of a valid argument is true then the argument is not only valid but also sound. Arguments can be valid without being sound i.e. the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed.

Picture Theory Of Meaning

Wittgenstein says there is a connection between language and the world. Both have a structure. Language starts with names, then with elementary propositions which are combinations of names and from elementary propositions to propositions. That is if we can picture the bottom of a scale as names, over that there are elementary propositions and above that are propositions. Each level in this hierarchical structure of language corresponds to a similar hierarchy in the world. Here corresponding to name we have objects, above that we have states of affairs and still above we have facts. The objects are the

ultimate constituents of the world like names are in language. This is the picture theory of meaning which explains how language and the world are connected. What Wittgenstein says is that the function of language is to allow us to picture things.

Mark Jago in an article in *Philosophy Now* (November / December 2006) gives an example of this. Suppose I want to tell my friend through a diagram that my house is the second on the right after the lights. But in the diagram, I show it to be on the left. Evidently the picture is not true to the facts. Wittgenstein emphasizes that what a picture means is independent of whether it is a truthful representation of reality. What a picture or diagram represents is only what exists in *logical space*. That is to say it is only a possible representation of reality. It is quite possible that my house could have been on the left also. The point to note is that the structure of the picture mirrors or represents the structure of a possible situation. The picture only means a possible situation. From the picture we cannot know whether it is true or false. Sentences are also like pictures. They also give possible situations. What is meant by pictures in a sentence is not the mental image we make from a sentence. What it explains is a correspondence between what it is said in the language and how it corresponds to objects, state of affairs and facts in the world.

The central problem of his earlier book *Tractatus* was: How is language possible? How is it possible to use language for describing the world? Language is a means of our communication and this raises sets of questions. First, what is the relationship of language to the world? Second, what is the relationship of language to thought? Wittgenstein said that language represents the world by depicting it. Propositions are expressions of thought; propositions are pictures of facts. Language

is essentially pictorial in character. This idea came to Wittgenstein from the use of models of trains in courts of law in Paris to depict the actual state of affairs in some case. It is from here that he is said to have got his idea about the essence of language and also its limitations. Language had to mirror exactly states of affairs in which objects were engaged. The sentences of ordinary language do not look like pictures but if they have to have any meaning then they must be capable of being analysed into elementary sentences which are pictures. The names in the sentences correspond to objects in the real world. The arrangement of the names in a sentence mirrors the arrangement of objects in the real world. Therefore, if we analyse any utterance about the world we can reduce it to names of things and the relationship between the words in the sentence that correspond to the relationship between things in the world. It is in this way that a sentence is able to picture the world.

What Wittgenstein said was that every genuine proposition must have a definite sense. No proposition could have a definite sense unless it was made up of fundamental pictorial propositions. A meaningful proposition depicts a possible state of affairs. Names in a proposition can be arranged in various ways and objects in the world can be similarly arranged in the real world. If the arrangement of the objects referred to by the proposition is identical with the arrangement of the name of the objects in the proposition then the proposition is true. If the two arrangements are different it is false.

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The question which now arises is that in our real life we often make moral judgements, aesthetic comments etc. so how do these relate to the picture theory of meaning? Wittgenstein believed that ethics does not deal with facts and the real function of language is to describe facts and describe them meaningfully. When I say some sentence then I arrange the names in a certain way which corresponds to a

possible arrangement of things in the world. If this arrangement is actually found in the world then the statement is true. If not, then it is false. But if the names are arranged in a manner in which it is not possible to arrange objects in the actual world, then my statement is meaningless. Therefore, the statements could be true, false or meaningless. The world consists of facts, facts are arrangements of objects. A language should have a structure to have any definite sense and the world also must be of that structure so that it can be represented in that language. His main thesis in his earlier book is that language and the world have to share a certain picture for it is only then that language can represent the world. There has to be an identity of two structures, of language and the world, for meaning to be possible. The structure of a proposition is its logical form. Therefore, his most famous doctrine can be said to be the claim that propositions are pictures and the pictures have elements that correspond to reality. Therefore, it is important that we have to analyse or deconstruct propositions to find out what possible state of objects in the world they actually are describing. He said that propositions of logic and mathematics and equations are merely tautologies and convey no information about the world.

Wittgenstein also talked about what cannot be said by language. He believed that there are certain things which a language cannot do. It cannot talk about value because value is not part of the world. Moral and aesthetic judgements are not meaningful uses of language. The only way we can talk about the world in a meaningful manner is through the description of facts of which it is made up. He also said that the relation between language and the world which is actually a correspondence between elements of language and elements of the world cannot itself be pictured. We cannot stand outside of a language and talk about it. What a proposition pictures about the world is internal to the propositions itself and cannot be seen from somebody outside it.

by *Scharlie Meeuws*



‘Love and Wisdom’

The Curse of the Gods Gift or Malediction?

What is mental illness? How it was perceived and treated in early Greek civilisation? The article is a part of a series that started a few weeks back on the Curse of The God. Below is a discussion of the early treatments.

NONA FERDON*

We have tried to look at the most explanatory 'reasons' for the very early era of Greek philosophy. We have considered the Greeks' environment, their agricultural possibilities, their broad trading network, and even the theories of various energy fields. Now we will try to look at the evidence for the recognition of mental illness and therefore the various attempts at treating this devastating illness throughout Western civilisation

The earliest conceptions of the mind and its disorders started with the sequence of three prescientific paradigms that may broadly be considered sacred: the animistic, mythological, and the demological. These prehistoric phases of history slowly came to an end with the emergence of more advanced approaches. Certain beliefs dominated every historical period, ultimately winning out over previously existing concepts while retaining many elements of the old.

Primitive people and ancient civilisations perceived strange and unusual behaviour through a veil of mystical and mythological reference. They attributed behaviour that they could not understand to good or evil spirits for the most part. The bizarre and often frightening behaviour of the mentally disturbed was viewed as a punishment for failing to obey the teachings of the gods. Fear that demons might spread and infect others often led to cruel and barbaric treatment. These primitive therapies e.g shock, (wrapping an electric eel around the head of a depressed person), starvation, surgery (literally opening the skull of the 'patient') and exorcism, all have obvious parallels in recent



Asclepius with his Rod

history. It was about a hundred thousand years ago when Palaeolithic man wandered the earth. Even then humans tried to explore treatments for those who suffered psychic pain or behaved peculiarly (e.g. the surgery known as trephining;

boring a hole through the skull to clean out bone fragments or to relieve pressure, dates back to the Stone Age). Evidence of this has been found throughout the world, quite often showing that the patient survived and new bone had grown. In fact, this was possibly done simply to identify a tribe. Recent excavations of a site in Siberia have found a group of people all of whom had been trephined, including a child of eleven or twelve who had apparently been trephined several years before her death. We can safely assume, however, that this process was more commonly used to let evil spirits out of obviously possessed victims of mental distress. Though controversial, there is evidence that some of the early Greek doctors did use this process on their patients.

In Greece, the view that mental disorders are processes of the nervous system rather than an abstract spiritual phenomenon was first espoused by Alcmaeon in the fifth century B.C. He was possibly the most respected philosopher/physician of his time. There is some evidence that he studied under Pythagoras. He is held to be the first to suggest that health was a state of equilibrium between humours. (A theory that has proved devastating for so many over the years and was practised into the last century – if not even today in some remote cultures).

Alcmaeon's theory on sleep is that the blood withdraws from the body as we sleep to our middle

and rushes back throughout the body as we wake. However, if a person oversleeps and the blood does not rush back throughout the body we die. This theory was adopted by Aristotle in later years.

Asylum: A Word with a Deep Past

With its roots in Greek it implies a place of safety, be that safety from war, safety for orphans, religious safety and in ancient Greece translated into permanent temples of physical safety which carried the name of Aesculapiadae after the god Aesculapius – half god and half human. His symbol can be seen today on the Rod of Asclepius – a physician's staff entwined with a non-venomous snake.

The medical centres of the pre-Hippocratic days were the priestly inheritors of the secrets of healing. They would begin the treatment with imposing religious ceremonies. The powers of the god of healing were recounted. the patient would sleep near the temple and dream of the gods appearing producing the miracles of the cure; depending upon the nature of these dreams, various fermentations with deep inductions of odoriferous herbs were used.

Many mentally ill were far from being recognised as truly ill people. Some of them were chosen to interpret and cure human ills themselves, as shown by the Pythias of Delphi. Many were afflicted with mental illnesses of considerable



Mediaeval treatment



Trephined skull



Trephined human skulls

severity. This may have caused many people to fear and to hate the mentally ill more than to be puzzled by them. Although some of them were taken into the temple to be healed, or even to do the healing, others, as suggested by Aristophanes, were forbidden entrance into the temple and were even chased away with stones.

But the Greek genius did not remain absorbed in mystery. It was a rational genius, acutely sensible to problems of life and keenly curious about mankind as a human being. It was the previously mentioned Alcmaeon who was preoccupied with human reason and sought the seat of reason and soul in the brain.

The temples of healing, established near medicinal springs, were usually called Aesculaplaiai and were founded by 'medical philosophers'. The membership of these medical brotherhoods was originally relatives, but as time went on outsiders were admitted and various groups formed which became known as schools. One of these most celebrated centuries was established at Epidaurus in the sixth century BC. Within the sacred enclosure there was a bathing pavilion and gymnasia. On the grounds were large and attractive trees and pathways, as well as tablets inscribed with encouraging accounts of cures already effected.

Every effort to preserve an atmosphere of cheerfulness was maintained. Tales of the marvellous cures spread throughout Greece with

the result that the patient was already in a susceptible mood upon his arrival at the centre. Before being admitted to the presence of the god he had to undergo ceremonial purification by bathing, or by the burning of incense. Oblations made to the gods were accompanied by music and fervent prayer for a revelation. Attendants related to the patients read the legends of the temple and explain the remarkable cures written on the tablets. After the patient had been properly prepared, he was permitted to approach the image of god and to allow the diseased part of his body to come into contact with the statue.

Rigorous dieting or fasting was commonly imposed as a preparation for incubation. As evening approached, preparations were made for the vision producing sleep. It was believed the god would appear more readily by having the supplicants wear white robes.

As evening approached, the patients made offerings, said their prayers, and fell asleep. During the night a priest in the guise of a god having with him a serpent or sacred dog, returned to the dormitory. He applied remedies to the patient's diseased parts, he directed the attention of a serpent to the sleeper's ear, into which it was supposed to whisper a remedy.

With such powerful suggestions and perceptual acuity through narcotics, the interpretation of the nocturnal experiences as divine visitations was a natural consequence. On the following morning the priest completed the demonstration of divine intervention by interpreting the visions or dreams of their credulous patients and leaving the impression that the gods had given him instructions regarding the treatment to be followed in each case.

Those who were not fortunate enough to have divine communications were advised to make further sacrifices and to repeat the process. If the illness still proved intractable, they were accused of impiety and urged to seek aid elsewhere. This sanctuary in Epidaurus flourished for over 800 years.

*** Nona Ferdon is a retired professor of psychology**

The *Wednesday* Books

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We are pleased to announce the publication of the first two volumes of **The *Wednesday*** in a book form. The two volumes cover the first six months. Volume one included twelve issues (1-12) plus the experimental issue; issue no. zero. Volume two includes another twelve issues (13 – 24). The issues represent the journey so far and we are pleased with this achievement. The volumes are printed by The Wednesday Press, Oxford.

We are grateful to all the writers, poets and artists who contributed throughout. Special thanks to Dennis Harrison who supported the magazine since the experimental issue and hosted the Wednesday group until the closure of his Albion Beatnik Bookstore. But Dennis is still a great supporter of the magazine and the group and we will stand by him in his future endeavours in the cultural sphere.

The Editor



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Poem and Photograph by *Scharlie Meeuws*

The Sculptor*

He hates darkness. Light becomes essential.
His demand for well-lit space is legendary.
Holding the lump of clay he kneads, caresses,
strokes it alive, turning an amorphous world
into a globe. With iron calipers he measures
from the top of the head to the tip of the beard.
How fast he adds substance with every new
handful of clay! Each time he works in more vision,
devotes himself to a more accurate measurement,
nose to back of head, ear to ear, from the top
of the back down to the nape of the neck.
With hawk-like swoops he raises ridges for eyebrows.
Under his fingers a valley forms for the mouth,
a nose lifts like a hill, a profile begins shaping
in his image. Each measure of his gaze leads
his hands further to balance the fragile borderline
between too little and too much, between too shallow
and too deep. All his senses are driving his inner solutions.
He has no time for feelings, yet he smiles when he cuts
the head with a wire. How well he knows what he is doing.
By touching, smoothing frantically as if competing with time,
he sucks in life forms, breath by breath. He fills himself
to the brim with all the faces at once. Letting go he stands,
still in doubt, whether or not he saw that it was good.

* In appreciation of the work of Pat Elmore, a well-known local sculptor and member of the RBA.





Mystical Experience: Ripples Fine and Far-Spreading

PETER CHEYNE

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From my late teens till my early thirties, I had experiences that I find entirely natural to describe as mystical. The first time, my every nerve, thought, and tendency seemed to shoot in all directions throughout the universe instilling a *physical* sense of interconnection. The interim periods of ordinary life appeared comparatively mundane, yet were enriched. Since then, I have remained convinced that all of life's episodes potentially comprise one mystical experience, a conviction defined in the dictionary, under *sacramentalism*, as the 'theory that the natural world is a reflection or imitation of an ideal, supernatural, or immaterial world' (*OED*).

An occasion around five years later, perhaps the most significant, was not of this outward expansion from within, but of being touched, seized rather, from without, as if by an intelligent ray of light, yet there was nothing visual to it. The presence was felt on my soul, and my body-soul, and the spirit-matter weave of my mouth, tongue, and lips were perilously caught up, as if I were a fish hooked. The presence had the power, I felt, to unravel entirely the thread of my existence, and the whole universe, in one tug. My soul stood long moments in the presence of the Father, aweful and perfect, terrified I had no place in his presence.

Then the Son came to me; or, I turned in fearful hope, and he was there. I felt loved, however unworthy, my soul's head on his bosom. Yet still afraid of another encounter with the Father, the Holy Spirit appeared, giving enthusiasm to renew, and stand again in the felt presence of the Supreme.

Other occasions were of a heightened sense of the repercussions of actions. Even acts of attention, discernment, and perception that would ordinarily seem minute were revealed as filled with potential for good or ill. They imparted a sense of the seemingly infinite significances and moral weight of how we face, perceive, and act with respect to our immediate surroundings, and the wider, living world. Ordinary life is afterwards transformed, but a normality of sorts returns. Familiarity, as it flows gradually back, becomes revealed as a less intense mode of the connection and meaning experienced in the powerful, elevated modes. It is therefore difficult to count or separate mystical experiences, at least in the terms that my personal account suggests. But it seems that periods of forgetfulness of the experiential intensity can be used to mark extraordinary experiences, one from another. They are, nonetheless, connected below the surface, that ordinariness being like the sea that only apparently separates islands in an archipelago.

Like ripples, the experiences of connection felt closer to ultimate reality, but still a way off. They impressed me with the sense that I have much to learn; the reason to believe that there is indeed much to learn; and the conviction that it all matters, even in the apparently slightest details. Those experiences felt like they were the more real, and the mundane experiences were inescapably a part of them.

The intense mystical episodes are as wave crests of the rippling liquid, with the periods of mundane living, the plateaus. Yet the plateaus of ordinary time have their infinitesimal ripples too: fine and far-spreading, shimmeringly beautiful. Only their intensity, not their substance, is lesser, and these same 'particles' rise also, into the higher ripples.

People do not usually talk about these things, yet surely everybody is part of it. How many do we sit and sup with, yet not know they have experienced this too? It seems now that in the lengthening plateau periods, one ought to be bringing up, educating and orienting, the here where and when one is, children, students, and so on, but also one's physical surroundings, one's own feelings even, in aesthetic sense, sense of humour, enjoyment, desire, and fun, so that nothing is turned away from the cultivating light.

The Wednesday

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Man Without A Hat



I see him now every day in my clouding thoughts.
Shoulders hunched in a raincoat crumple.
Hard wind jerks his battered case.
He is without doubt leaving,
but to where is not yet clear.
A hat would have secured his belonging:
flat cap or bowler, or an ugly helmet.
Peaked to lower his eyes and cease their upward search.
He'd know whom to follow and where to be taken.
Then the cold wind could be ignored.
His stay affirmed.

David Burridge