

The Wednesday



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group at Albion Beatnik - Oxford

Editorial

Post-Existentialist Humanity

The recent retrospective of Ingmar Bergman's movies at the National Film Theatre in London and, from next month, at the Oxford Phoenix Cinema, reminded me of his film *The Seventh Seal* and the play on the theme of death. A similar theme of a personalised encounter with death is hauntingly expressed in Jean Cocteau's *Orphic Trilogy*. But where are the new films that deal with metaphysics and creativity in such an imaginative way? This raises a philosophical question for me about Being and human existence. This question is no longer been asked and I want to understand why this is so.

There was a time when existential literature was in vogue, but now Humanity, both individual and social, and its destiny, is becoming less important than used to be the case. The existential anxiety of the individual in his or her everyday life, or collectively facing a danger of nuclear war, for example, is less worrying than it was four decades ago. Ironically, the possibility now of the global situation going wrong is greater than ever.

But it is not only war and politics that are becoming less worrying. Take science and technology and their impact on the individual and society. They were taken more seriously in the literature and art of the beginning of the twentieth century, or the century before, but they don't seem to concern us anymore, except as a source of entertainment. Are we now more empowered by science so that we feel confident of the new age we live in? Are we now less motivated by theoretical or philosophical questions? Are we becoming more specialised?

I want to suggest two ideas, one from Heidegger. Heidegger thinks that Being reveals itself in different forms in different epochs. It may be the case that we live in an epoch that is scientific and

technical or in a time of *Ontology of Actuality* (as Vattimo calls it, following Foucault). There is a feeling in some parts of the intellectual elite that philosophy has been superseded, in the way that Hegel thought that art had been superseded by religion and the latter by philosophy. But there is a sense that this not satisfactory. It leaves out something of the interiority of the subject that will be filled by all sort of beliefs that may come to clash with the spirit of the scientific age. This is why philosophy will not come to an end but certain views of the world might.

Perhaps there are regions of ontology in which we have adequate understanding, such as physical life, means of communication or storing information. But there are other regions in which science and technology have no say. Perhaps there is an important contribution for the idea of *ontological difference*, where Being is always ahead of the limited regions of beings and where philosophy could still do important work. It is good to have an ontology of actuality, but philosophy will always try to break through such limitations to what is possible and the not-yet. The existential concerns will somehow affirm themselves and that is why I feel from time to time the need to go back to films and literature that have been neglected.

The second idea is that philosophy at the moment seems to be flourishing, not only with the number of departments of philosophy across the world, but also in publications, discussion groups, journals and magazines. Perhaps there are certain curiosities and anxieties that the technological age can't resolve because of the limited sphere of discourse it has and that there will always be a need raise questions about Being and human existence.

The Editor

Kant And Reality



RANJINI GHOSH

Part 2

Kant was very influential through his theory of knowledge. He thought that space and time and the categories are the forms of our sensibility and understanding and that we can't see the world in itself but only how it appears to us. But does this commit Kant to a doubling of reality? Are there two worlds or only one world with two aspects?

Two Worlds

Kant agrees to the existence of the world. Kant, in contrast to Berkeley's philosophy, put forward the concept of two worlds. One, in which objects exist independently of our perception, is the noumenal world and the other, in which we perceive them, is the phenomenal world. This noumenal world (or 'Das Ding an sich' – the thing in itself) cannot be directly perceived by us. Once we see something it goes through the filter of our senses and reason and then we perceive what he calls the phenomenal world.

In the phenomenal world we don't see the thing as it really is but rather as our senses perceive it. We are not directly experiencing the world but indirectly through a filter of our senses. Bertrand Russell explains this by giving an example. Let us say everyone is born with blue spectacles. So, in that case all of us will see blue everywhere. For us the world will be blue. Once we remove those glasses,

things will appear a different colour. This will make you think that there is something faulty with our eyes. Simply speaking our vision and version of the world may be different from somebody else's, but this does not mean either of us is wrong. Our senses perceive the world differently. If we remove our senses we will not have anything to describe the object with. We cannot perceive the world fully, as our sensory equipment is limited. For example, we cannot hear ultra-sound waves or see infra-red rays. This doesn't mean that they don't exist. As Shakespeare had said, 'There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio than are dreamt of in your philosophy.'

Kant says that to fully experience the world we have to use both our sensory as well as our reasoning apparatus. The phenomenal world is a product of the combination of our senses and the power of reason. Kant had brought about a 'Copernican Revolution' because he changed the view that the idea of the world is given to our mind, instead he said that it is our mind that gives this idea to the world. Our mind structures the world around us. What we perceive is through our apparatus of our mind. So, what we experience isn't the object itself which exists independently but rather our image or version of the object which has gone through the filter in our mind. It is very important to be clear that the object experienced isn't the



Magritte's 'C'est ne pas une pipe'

object itself but it is a representation of it. Hence if you know Magritte's painting 'C'est ne pas une pipe' which translates to 'this is not a pipe' although there is a pipe in the painting it is named such because it is essentially not a pipe, it is the representation of the pipe. It is the painting of the pipe. The same is true of a photograph: it is not the object itself.

Some prominent concepts for Kant are space and time. He says that they are subjective. As human beings we are only capable of understanding three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time. Hence any deviation from this would be incomprehensible for us.

From reading Hume, Kant had learnt that causal connections were neither observable nor logically derivable. When two events happen, we do not observe any third entity in the form of a connection between them. Therefore, connection, according to Hume, cannot be observed. But Kant saw that if there is no causal connection then there cannot be any empirical world. The science of his day had convinced him that there was causal connection between events, e.g. Newton's Laws of Motion. Therefore, Kant asked: if we cannot observe such causal connections and cannot logically deduce them, then how can we acquire knowledge of them? Kant came to the conclusion that observation and

logical derivation cannot be the only basis for knowledge.

Sensory Apparatus

Kant believes that we human beings are equipped with mental and sensory apparatus and all our experiences pass through this net of sensory apparatus. The apparatus, therefore sets the limit to our experience. Whatever the apparatus catches can only be experienced by us. But he also believed that there is an independent reality outside the world of experience which our sensory apparatus cannot catch. He called this the world of the noumenal, or things in themselves, and the world of our experience is the phenomenal world. So, he gave us three ways of knowing the world: empirical observation, logical derivation and the forms in which these are mediated by our sensory apparatus. Such forms are time, space, causal connection etc. These are required for our understanding of the world of phenomenal experience since we experience time in one dimension, space in three dimensions, causal connections between events. He also says that causal connections exist only between objects in the phenomenal world and we cannot have any knowledge of causality in the noumenal world because we do not experience it through our sensory apparatus.

Kant said that instead of assuming that our knowledge must conform to the objects it should

be the objects that conform to our knowledge. He is not saying that we make up reality in our minds. What does not pass through our sensory apparatus cannot be experienced by us and remains outside the realm of our knowledge. The world of experience is therefore different from the world of independent reality. What exists outside the limits of our apparatus cannot be experienced or known by us.

Hume and other philosophers before Kant had accepted the view that propositions can be divided into two classes. There are 'truths of reason', which Kant called analytic propositions, and which are true by definition or in the meaning of their terms. Examples are the proposition that a square has four sides or a bicycle has two wheels. These propositions could be known *a priori*, i.e. independent of experience and necessarily true. There were also contingent propositions which can be determined to be true or false based on experience or observation. But there is a problem in dividing propositions into two classes because general scientific laws are also propositions that are neither analytic nor very factual. This is a problem for all human knowledge. But Kant thought that in the real world there are certain propositions that apply to the world but cannot be derived from observation of the world. We could establish them simply by argument. They are 'synthetic *a priori*'.

Kant made the distinction between 'things in themselves' and 'the world of appearances'. We can know nothing about things in themselves, but when we move to the world which we experience then certain conditions have to be satisfied if any object is to be a possible object of our experience. In other words, if there is a world of objects that we can experience then certain conditions have to be satisfied before they can become our objects of experience. These are *a priori* or something about which we can have knowledge before experience. Hume and others have been wrong in insisting that all propositions must be either analytic

and *a priori* or synthetic and *a posteriori*. Kant was saying that there could be a third kind of proposition which are about the world but which cannot be validated by experience. They can be true or false about the world but still they are knowable in advance. These could be of two classes. The first is the 'Form of Sensibility' or the 'Forms of Space and Time'. They are imposed upon our experience by our sensibility. It is only in these dimensions that we can experience the world and these do not exist independently of us. Kant said that whatever objects we can experience will be located in space, i.e. spatially extended, and that events will occur in time in an ordered temporal sequence. The specification of the Form of Space is provided by geometry and that of Time by arithmetic. Both geometry and arithmetic are bodies of propositions that are neither contingent nor analytic. They are synthetic *a priori* because they specify the forms of experience or the conditions of its possibility.

They are bodies of knowledge which are given to us in advance before we can apply them to any experience. The second class of synthetic *a priori* propositions are 'Forms of Understanding' or 'Forms of Thought'. Any possible world of experience about which we can make objective statements has to be orderly and predictable. The Newtonian principle of universal causal determinism is such a type. Therefore, what Kant is arguing is that all our perceptions and experiences come to us through our sensory apparatus and mediated by Forms of our Sensibility and Forms of our Understanding. For something to be a possible experience for us they must conform to these 'Forms of Apprehension'. Therefore, the objects of our experience should appear to us to be ordered in space and time and the events in the world must appear to be causally related. But space, time and causality do not exist independently of our experience, because it is only through them that we can have an actual and possible experience. For Kant knowledge is bounded by 'possible experience'.

Rationality, Science and Metaphysics

Notes of the Wednesday Meeting 7th March 2018

PAUL COCKBURN

We discussed rationality in this meeting. Maybe emotion underlies a lot of rationality. Even rational philosophers want to win arguments and justify their views (and egos!). Rationality tends to concentrate on particulars, differentiate and dissecting particular aspects of our experience and the world. This contrasts with a mystical view, which sees the whole. This led us to think of the divided self – are the ‘rational’ and ‘mystical’ two sides of our nature, and if so how do we connect them up? And what about feelings?

In terms of our lives, there may be a process of diversity and differentiation before we sense the oneness of our experience and know ourselves better. We tend to look for successful outcomes to our projects, but failure may be just a matter of luck so perhaps we should be unattached to success or failure (although it is useful to learn from our mistakes!). When we are let down by a friend say we need to fall back on our deep beliefs, and perhaps these should be our attitude to life rather than dogmas.

Science and metaphysics

We moved on to the topic of science and metaphysics. Some philosophers deny the possibility of metaphysics. But can we do science without metaphysics? There is a scientific view held by some that only objects in the world exist, and aspects of meaning and morals (and minds!) are not objects so they have no existence. But even concepts such as mass and gravity and the laws which govern them are just as likely to exist as the objects which obey the laws. Why should our ontology be limited to observable objects?

Hume asked: ‘if we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or metaphysics, for instance; let us ask does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.’ Why should our ontology be limited to observable objects, numbers and quantities and facts? All facts are in fact theory-laden!

You Made The Dreadful Claim

EDWARD GREENWOOD

(A protest against Nietzsche's praise of war in Book One of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The first and last verses refer to his experiences in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.)



You made the dreadful claim a well fought war
Could somehow hallow that war's cause.
Weren't you, twelve years or so before,
Binding up wounds and comforting men crying,
Till forced to pause
As you grew sick, attending to the dying?

No war redeems experiences as bleak
As those your patients underwent.
Past poets might reproachless speak
Of martial glory, you knew how cold states,
Those monsters, sent
Their young men out to suffer fearful fates.

What always far outweighs what victories bring,
However fine they may appear?
Too great a price in suffering.
Wars we have won leave grief, just as wars lost,
As our minds clear,
And we can calmly contemplate the cost.



Perhaps you meant the effort, not the goal,
The labouring, not labour done,
Is what invigorates the soul,
When toil itself can seem transformed to play,
As athletes run
Delighting in each stride upon their way.

Our stillest hours inspire us to be great,
When thoughts on doves' soft feet draw near
As we withdraw to meditate.
Philosophers explore and poets dream,
And we hold dear
The worlds that they produce and we esteem.

Is it surprising a philologist
Who reads of Achillean glory,
Should tire of struggling with each twist
Of textual complexity, and praise
Heroic story,
In which, not study lamps, but cities blaze?

Surprising, no, but not to be excused
When we consider that you saw
First-hand how young men were misused
By statesmen, who pursued their devious goals
Untouched by awe
At broken bodies and tormented souls.

The Problem of War!

PAUL COCKBURN

Paul Cockburn thinks that it is time for us to have a philosophy of war – and perhaps to think about how we might stop it.

First some brief history, with some examples of wars. Nations have gone to war throughout recorded history. Sometimes a war is internal, such as the English Civil War in the 1640s, or Syria currently. In the French Revolution of the 1790s the French wanted to impose their revolutionary ideas on the rest of Europe by force – but of course in the end the rest of Europe did not want to be ruled by France! In the period 1796 to 1815 Napoleon fought numerous battles until he was eventually defeated at the battle of Waterloo.

The First World War showed the power of nationalism over the general populace in Britain, as millions volunteered to fight Germany. ‘Your

country needs you’ they were told by Kitchener and they heeded his call. Many are led by duty (or inspired?) to volunteer as soldiers to fight an enemy nation or the ‘enemy within’ to the death. If they do not fight, the enemy will conquer their land, and they do not want the status of a slave. In the First World War soldiers might have regretted volunteering, given the appalling conditions and carnage of the war, but the Second World War then followed only twenty years after the end of the First World War.

I believe there is a link between the family and a nation – both contribute to our sense of social identity, where we belong, our psychological roots. Our social identity is made up of many aspects, such as the different groups we belong to, as well as our character and our particular experiences. There are many instances of family feuds, fights

between clans or tribes, and wars are in some way these smaller conflicts magnified. There are of course other causes of wars, such as competition for resources, or expanding empires clashing. But this is perhaps a bit like family members clashing on a smaller scale, brothers, say, fighting over the ownership of a particular toy. A nation has to interact with other nations in a way that is a bit like individuals interacting. If war is declared, then our national identity becomes more important. In medieval times it was believed the monarch embodied the state in a mystical way. And the more a nation (or any group) is united under a leader, the more powerful it will be. It does seem that any leader who rules for a long time seems to 'embody' the nation in some way. This is true in democracies as well as dictatorships.

Then there is also the glory of war – heroic, death-defying feats. Many soldiers will be witness to the incredible power of being in a platoon (a small group of soldiers) and knowing that every member of the platoon will lay down his life for you if that is needed. The army is a fighting machine but it is also based on comradeship – army life is tough but ultimately based on love and sacrifice. So, the soldier is in many ways an admirable figure – brave, resourceful, serving his country and prepared to die for it. And a soldier is not allowed to question his country's motives – he has to obey orders. Currently in British cinemas we can listen again to the famous speech by Winston Churchill in the dark days of the Second World War. '[...] whatever the cost may be, we shall fight them on the beaches.... we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender'. In other words, perhaps - they shall not take our land.

I do not think the glory of war can outweigh the cost of war in terms of the suffering caused and the numbers killed. Some might hold that war is natural, part of the struggle for survival, 'survival of the fittest'. It may be true that when wars end it is possible there will be new hope and new beginnings, but this is not always the case, and in any case the cost is too great.

Over the centuries as the way in which wars are

fought has changed the 'glory' factor in war has decreased. Initially troops fought hand to hand on the ground, then bows and arrows, and then cavalry were used. The British Empire was founded on naval power, and in the 20th century wars have been progressively more dominated by air power, with planes using bombs and missiles.

So, what is the future of war? Nuclear war is a terrifying prospect, and as more and more countries obtain nuclear weapons there is a greater risk of it. If we go back to the analogy of the family, we do not want family members to play with dangerous toys. Does every responsible national leader have to ensure they have the most powerful weapons to ensure the protection of their countries from external threats?

There have been some examples of conflicts being avoided by getting opposing parties or nations together away from their usual home ground and using psychological techniques to try and get them to talk over their differences. The latest news that North Korea will send a team to the next winter Olympics in South Korea is heartening. In general terms, more tourism and travel may have a beneficial effect in terms of enabling people to understand different cultures better. Ideologies strongly held often seem to lead to wars as countries embrace a particular ideology and want to impose it on others.


The role of the United Nations is undermined by the fact that the superpowers do not wish to be subject to an international body which they see as frustrating their interests. International law is developing and may bring about more unity, and it is crucial in terms of ensuring justice is done in terms of war crimes such as massacres and the mistreatment of prisoners of war. Is genocide a type of war? It seems that in genocide one racial group cannot fight and is massacred or forced out of their land by a more powerful racial group. Can the Rohingya return safely to Myanmar? Only if their rights are protected in practice and reality by international law.

The human heart has war within it. Maybe the rule of war can be replaced by the rule of law? Until the human heart changes, I hope so.


When we still look for the signs

**In Mumbai the vultures no longer
encircle the Silent Towers. Our dead
are tainted by earth, wind and fire
against our faith. Zarathustra is holding his breath,
for we no longer expose our corpses to birds.
Elements have taken over in claim for a balance,
as moon and earth pull on each other evenly.
The tide's pull to the earth's gravitation are measured
and always in poise with each other.**

**We no longer acknowledge the ways of the ancients,
their indigo blue paint made to outlast time,
for they knew how to take and put back in harmony.
Now the very last trees being cut,
poisoned rivers emptied of fish, our dead
lie exposed on land shameful in nakedness,
when we still look for the signs,
sitting on money that cannot be eaten.**



Poem and Painting by *Scharlie Meeuws*



The Curse of the Gods

The Search for Ultimate Reality

NONA FERDON

At our last visit to the *Curse of the Gods* we questioned why in the area of a hundred and forty-seven thousand miles and less than 150 years could western humanity have produced so many great figures of Greek philosophy. We looked at a number of theories – none of which seem to hold up. But we have not considered the search for Mind beyond the Brain.

The Hundredth Monkey Phenomena


In the 1950s scientists began a study with Japanese Snow Monkeys that spanned more than 30 years. Their results seem to point to the idea of a ‘morphic field’, a critical mass being able to change the consciousness of all impacted by it. This study is known as 100th monkey effect.

Aristotle was one of the first to argue that space was in fact a plenum, – a background substructure filled with things. Faraday introduced the concept of a ‘field’ in relation to electricity and magnetism. Einstein himself believed that space constituted a true void until his own ideas, eventually developed into his general theory of relativity, indicated that space indeed held a plenum of activity. Max Planck, one of the founding fathers of quantum theory showed physicists that empty space was bursting with activity.

But thousands of years ago in India, ‘Akasha’ meant the basis and essence of all things in the material world. A Vedic mantra ‘*prthivyapastejovayurakasay*’ indicates the sequence of initial appearances of the ‘five basic gross elements’. First appeared space, from which air, from which fire / energy, from which the water, and therefore earth. This ‘field’ is one of the ‘five gross

elements’ and its main characteristic is sound. Akasha is the physical substrate of the quality of sound. It is the one, eternal, and all pervading physical substance, which is imperceptible and in which *all* is recorded. In the sixth century the Ionian philosophers of nature divested themselves of the methodological worldview that had dominated Mediterranean civilisation until then and attempted to comprehend the nature of the world in terms of its origins from a shared fundamental ‘stuff’ or substance. The early natural philosophers did not draw a radical distinction between mind and matter, and material and ideal reality; they reasoned that all the diversity in order that now meets the eye had risen in the course of time from the state of lesser diversity and more disorder. This process they thought had a logic and a unity all its own.

The first attempts were centred on understanding variegated world sense experience in terms of an underlying unity called ‘the One’. The One was to be found



John Stewart Bell

in a grain of sand as well as the totality of the universe. The Greeks were also aware of 'the Many'. They explained this diversity emerging from a basic original substance. Unity, they said, is always changing and is always present in the womb of diversity. According to Thales, the original unitary substance was water, while his disciple Anaximander suggested that fire, earth, and air played an equally important role: the original substance was undefined, limitless, and all-encompassing. Anaximenes, in turn, maintained that the primal substance was a mixture of water and earth that, warmed by the sun, generated plants, animals, and human beings by spontaneous creation. Heracles placed stress on eternal becoming – one cannot know any one thing in the world for what it truly is. Empedocles in turn believed all things to be composed of earth, fire and water in measures determined by the principle of love, which binds, and of hate, which separates. From fires within the earliest of time arose the primal forms that later evolved into familiar organisms.

It was Leucippus and Democritus who advanced the theory of matter and who were to make the deepest impression on modern science. They taught that all things are made up of atoms – indivisible and indestructible building blocks of the 'real world'. Atoms and all things constitute the sphere of Being, but since Atoms can and do change, Being cannot fill all of space. There must also be a Void, a sphere of Non-being. Change can occur in the world because atoms in the course of their existence adopt different positions and form different things in the Void.

Then there are Indra's pearls. On the glistening surface of each pearl are reflected all the other pearls. In each reflection, again are reflected all the infinitely many other pearls, so that by this process, reflections of reflections continue without end. All is connected and ever changing with the 'ever changing.'

Then in 1965, a young man from Belfast

named John Stewart Bell presented his theory. In short, Bell's theorem states that any physical theory that incorporates local realism cannot reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanical theory. Any electron which has been in numerous experiments agrees with the predictions of quantum mechanical theory and shows differences between correlations that could not be explained by local hidden variables. This has been taken by many as refuting the concept of local realism as an explanation of the physical phenomena under test. If Bell's conditions are correct, the results that agree with quantum mechanical theory appear to indicate faster than light effects, a contradiction in the principle of locality.

Bell summarised super determinism in 1985:

'There is a way to escape the influence of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world super deterministic, not just inanimate nature running on behind the scenes clockwork, but without our behaviour, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including being "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster – than – light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.'

Call it Bell's hypothesis, the Akashic Record, The Void, Indra's Pearls, Sheldrake's morphic field, Externalism or 'mob psychology'—one finds it quite disturbing. Could it explain our Pre-Socratics? Could a 'morphic field' have been created in that relative small area over two thousand years ago among the pre-Socratics? Could one of our Pre-Socrates have been a 100th Monkey?

Art And The Art World: Two Different Perspectives and Motives

MIKE ENGLAND

I was interviewed before one of my exhibitions two years ago. I mentioned to the journalist who interviewed me a few things about 'Art' and 'the Art World'. I told him:

It seems to me there are two different motives regarding Art and the Art World. One is motivated to discover and express, the other is a business, and business is ultimately motivated by profit. Although they appear, at first sight, to be similar, to deal in the same commodities (objects of desire that represent authenticity) and their objectives appear the same, but they are very different. One produces, the other deals.

It seems to me that to the Art World, Art is a commodity to be bought and sold. It can be used as status to show success, in financial terms, as kudos. It can also be used to launder money.

Art is motivated by a search to find answers to questions that most human beings can relate to, identify with or just naturally connect to. The main question, as far as I can see, is 'What is the meaning of life?' Art is about trying to find an answer to this question, to try and find an answer about impermanence (although impermanence is another subject that requires a lot of thinking about).

It is through absorbing, interacting and engaging with our environment, objectively and subjectively, using both our emotions and intellect, we can search and express, and may be create something that has a universal

truth, regardless of what the chosen medium, painting, sculpture, music, poetry, dance etc.

Artists have always been seen as people who probably see more than the average person. They see both the outside and the inside world, whom they may have challenged, and are also revered because of the commitment to this vocation, regardless of money and security.

The Art World as a business only exists on the back of what has been created. At the time that this Art was created, it may have challenged the accepted establishment, powers and norms of the day, and have been rejected and labelled as bad or have been negatively criticized. But as time passes and the world changes, or tries to catch up because of change, so as to carry on making profits, it accepts the views of bygone Art. The obvious example is when the first show of the Impressionists caused a fight between viewers and things got heated; it was negatively reviewed in the papers of the day, and as time passed and peoples' understandings changed so today, Impressionism is widely accepted and admired. The world keeps spinning and our perceptions keep changing.

Through the discoveries of science and inventions, our understanding of the past is greater. It seems to me, that what human beings discover has always been there, but to use the word 'discovered' doesn't really feel right. Instead, a word like 'realized' should perhaps be used. Until humanity as a species has evolved enough, and until we stop creating systems that are hierarchal and that seem to have a divisive nature that create the 'Master



The Art world

and Slave' mentality, there is always going to be a divide and conflict of perspectives and interests, regardless if it is Labour and Conservative or Art and the Art World.

It doesn't matter if you are right wing or left wing, you need two wings to fly a plane.

It seems to me that agreeing to disagree,

acknowledging and celebrating differences of expression is the only way to harmony and peace for our species. Art is in all of us, we just have to feed and nurture it. Art and the Art World are opposite sides of a coin. They are symbiotic.

The Wednesday

Editor:

Dr. Rahim Hassan

Contact Us:

rahimhassan@hotmail.co.uk

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Contributors:

Barbara Vellacott

Paul Cockburn

Prof. Chris Norris

Prof. Nona M. Ferdon

Dianne Cockburn

David Solomonn

Fred Cousins

David Clough

Raymond Ellison

David Burridge

Ranjini Ghosh

Sara Berti

David Jones

Monika Filipek

Erica Warburton

Scharlie Meeuws

Dennis Harrison

Paul Enock

Mike England

Edward Greenwood

Mohamed Mustafa Kamal

Urinal 1917



*(Duchamp's exhibit was voted in 2004
the most important work of modern times)*

Lugged-in ceramic, hung-up but not connected, as if a plumber couldn't be found.
Perhaps they were all pissing in trenches.

Gore and urine rivuletting in mud until the Armistice clocking-off.

Something ceramic – a chamber-pot reminder as eyes were dulling.

A searing sight that up-ends the needs hierarchy.

Bursting pain – spilling shame.

Enough to send a gent *Munch*-screaming,
down the corridor with the door ajar at the end.

But its stone curves might inspire a sense of individual salvation;
returning the racing heart-beat to a gentle mallet-tap.

Though when peace is restored, uniforms buttoned up
for the long march home, I think I prefer to stare
straight-ahead at Matisse's *Seated Odalisque*.

David Burridge