

The *Wednesday*



Weekly Magazine of the Wednesday Group at Albion Beatnik - Oxford

Editorial

The Need for Transcendence

I mentioned in a previous editorial some of the attempts to explain away the Ontological Need, particularly in Adorno's *Negative Dialectic*. The need in question is the feeling that reality is bigger than what science takes it to be, if science to be understood in a materialist sense. However, science doesn't have to be materialistic. It could be neutral towards a question that goes beyond the domain of its discourse. But philosophers who ally themselves with science and assume that reality is all that falls under sense experience tend to restrict philosophy to the empirical realm. However, our relation to reality is much larger and includes the domains of morality and aesthetics. Other philosophers, particularly Adorno, see the talk about Being or ontology as meaningless and the concept itself vacuous. Behind his objection to Being is the Feuerbachian, Marxist (following Hegel), form of human alienation and the attempt to escape the lived reality. But is Feuerbach right? The way to defeat his and the other arguments that reject the ontological-metaphysical need is to show not only the possibility of transcendence beyond the material reality (in the scientific view or the historical materialistic conception of human life and society), but the necessity of it.

One way of demonstrating the ontological need is to refer to morality and aesthetic experience. In both fields, we assume ourselves to be free and not limited by the material condition in which we exist, in terms of the material environment or the condition of human society. We feel instead that we can remake reality according to our own conception. In moral action, we try to bring some conception we have into reality. In aesthetic experience, we try to do this by recreating reality in a more free and imaginative way. The aim in both cases is to bring about a better and more

beautiful world. Kant, who talked about the three domains of epistemology, morality and aesthetics, had a more transcendent (although he would say: 'transcendental') solution by assuming that there is a super-sensible realm that joins the realm of freedom and that of necessity or subjectivity and nature. Fichte, who didn't talk much about aesthetics, thought that we create reality through our moral actions, putting much emphasis on subjectivity and practical reason. The German Romantics opted for full transcendence and became obsessed with the 'Absolute'. They also believed in the power of the subject to create reality (or what Novalis termed 'Magical Idealism'). However, the subjectivity here is rooted in an unknowable Absolute (unlike Fichte who thought of some sort of self-grounding subjectivity).

Transcendence seems to enter the picture once we look for meaning, value and beauty. Human beings cannot live their life with partial or total surrender of their freedom. They are not robots. Reality for them is more than the material conditions they face. That is why Kant thought that we discover our moral worth in the experience of the Sublime. When the one is in a thrilling but potentially dangerous situation, such as being on the edge of a cliff, or finding oneself in deep water, one gets over the fright by discovering the courage to face up to the situation.


But we may need transcendence to feel that there is a room for possibility and hope and not to fall into pessimism and despair. Possibility shows that there is an alternative, and a 'not yet', which leads to transcendence, and opens up the ontological need again and confirms it. Otherwise one might mistake what is contingent to be necessary and permanent, as does Adorno in some of his pessimistic statements.

The Editor

Exile as a Place

KAMEL SHIAA' ABDULLAH

A letter from the exiled Iraqi writer Kamel Shiaa' Abdullah to his brother in London Faysal Abdullah in 1990. After the change in Iraq in 2003, Kamel went back home only to be assassinated in August 2008. The letter contains his reflections on his home-country and exile.



Kamel Shiaa' Abdullah

"To Faysal: I always sit under your shade when I write. There is a place for every experience. The crossroads of the determined order of things, and our choices, willed it that there would be a place for our experiences outside our country. And if our imposed exile for not a few years of our lives has given us anything, it has aroused in us longing glances at our first country, and unending remembrances of what we were and were not; of our fates as signs of difference. We and our present country became involved in a continuous struggle over belonging and identity. Is it our strange journey or is it this country's journey which led to this tragic separation?"

Since neither of us has received his answer yet, we were left to picture our anomalous stay here with the lustre of our first country or with the ashes of its destruction. We forget. We forget the exile and we turn it into a mere footbridge for crossing over or a transient station on our imaginary victory march towards that country – the mirage.

Although human nature does not, deep down, accept belonging to more than one country, it does, in experience,

abandon its former commitments in order to comprehend them. This probability has come to pass in contemporary cultural experience, with its sharp awareness of disorder in the scheme of things, which is the feature of our human experience. It also makes the repetition of the originals carries with it the possibility of making it more ideal, and hence more illusory. So, has the time come to suspend temporarily our propensity for seeking metaphysical significance in order to discover the actual map of present experience? Or to stop delaying reflection on our present experience of exile for the sake of idealised visions of our past?

We are not going to differ over the idea that exile, however long, means remaining on the margin – a margin that does not get smaller as we continue to express our urgent needs, and does not take away our idealised vision. So, we must give this margin due attention because potentially it is the main text [and not a margin or a footnote - Ed.], for it is the other face of our first country. When we dream of Ithaca we should prepare for the journey! [A reference to the poem *Ithaca* by Constantin Cavafy - Ed.]

Home and Hotel: A country of pictures

The word 'exile' has many connotations, such as refuge, security, freedom, open space (as opposed to other negative ones), but the term 'separation' stands out as the core theme of the exile's lived reality and what it means for us. All the other meanings suggested by words related to 'exile' are secondary to that of 'separation' – the separation that exists between 'home' and 'hotel'. With this separation that is experienced both physically and spiritually, the boundaries of our imaginary connection to the world start to disappear, bringing confusion to perceptions of present and future. What is Iraq in the midst of this disarray? Does it mean peaceful images from a past that some of us want to defend in

a spirit of premature martyrdom? Is it simply an addition to a totally blank CV? Is it an authority to which we can refer our differences but whose judgement we never listen to?


We don't want to have a country of mere images. We don't want it to be an easy subject for our narcissism or a monologue of despair. We don't hesitate to confess that our level of consciousness is inadequate to the situation. It doesn't help us to try to rectify things by choosing to live in a utopian past. We don't want to live behind the walls of our vanished civilisation [Babylonian, Assyrian and Islamic past – Ed.] trying to repair its façade and closing its doors as we get older.

Place: Form and Content

The notion of place, from a philosophical point of view, is one of the main dimensions of human experience [according to Kant, space and time are the forms of human experience -Ed.]. Its order reveals the foundation of the human experience itself. But the irony that we observe is that the experience of place, which of course is the result of its order [we experience the world as ordered-Ed.], seems to be in inverse proportion to its aesthetic attractiveness [in the artist's mind – Ed.]. Is the nostalgia of the artist for the old places essentially a longing to posit unordered places that are also charged with philosophical and social meanings?

There are few who imagine that they can escape that by living in emotionally neutral places across the world. In that case, the value of the place in the relationship to self and the world would be reduced to zero. Since the relationship with place is one that contains the presence of the past, and such presence leads to a longing for it, the identification with space is not possible if such particular details [past and emotions – Ed.] were effaced.

The relationship with place then, if it is the result of a lived or imagined experience, goes



beyond the relationship with natural objects. That is, it is not a relationship of a human body with external objects, nor one that can be represented aesthetically as it is, because it is a hermeneutical relationship which has social meanings. Here is the characteristic difficulty: it is an experience that is different from, and in its ultimate meaning, goes beyond both the involuntary absorption into the world of the original country, and abstracting from it; beyond levels of both primitive forms and the meanings that emerge from them.

Our rejection of both natural and imagined places, leads us to consider our relationship to place as first of all one of content that bestows authentic aesthetic values which start from its function as the container for historical development, and not from its antiquarian value. According to this view, the form of any space carries a specific significance. The place, as content, can be compared with other places rather than being just a form. And so, the starting point that makes country and exile into two complementary places is at the same time the point that makes their differences seem less obvious than was seen at first. We are concerned with showing the differences as a source of aesthetic enjoyment.

The Rise and Fall of Place

A place rises just once - to say goodbye to

its inhabitants forever, as it marches towards annihilation; then it may rise again from zero. Even those who remember it in words and photographs only do so through their imagined stories and the memories of their former homes. The meaning of a place cannot be expressed through its physical existence, because it is held in imagination and memory which we rarely check against reality.

The experience of exile and the experience of the first country are essentially different. They cannot be compared. In the first country everything seems to be in its proper place, and we have an organic relationship with that place. We cannot, however, have an organic relationship with our place of exile because it is simply functional and does not carry memories or projections of the ego. The country of exile cannot 'receive' the exiled artist. It presents material resistant to the imagination - beautiful but abstract and it is not invested with memories. All that this place offers to the artists is a room, a corner, that allows them to live with hope.

Nevertheless, on reflection, this unyielding place [the original country – Ed.] has an unfailing virtue: it has the virtue of revealing the differences between the two places.

Exile and the Artist

What space does the situation open up for the artists? Which city or country should they paint when they are afflicted with feelings of alienation, and beset by change? Where will they end up when their collective memory has become weakened and corrupt? Where will they put us - we who are killed, or frightened, or exiled? Will it be the dangerous places or the vanishing quaint old places?

For us, art is more than the showing of formal external relationships, and more dangerous than an opium for memory. Art may be dreams of the past, but it is also a challenge that leads to the creation of new meanings. The



Kamel Shiaa' Abdullah, who was assassinated in Baghdad on 23 August 2008 at the age of 54, was one of a small number of Iraqi intellectuals who had returned to their country after the US-led invasion. He worked as adviser to the Ministry of Culture.

Mr. Abdullah was born on February 5th 1954. He was trained as an English teacher. But he had to leave Iraq in 1979 because of the increasing repression in the country, settling in Leuven (Louvain), Belgium, in 1983. He obtained an M.A. in Philosophy in 1989 at the Catholic University at Louvain. His thesis was entitled 'Utopia as a Critique'. While he was living in Leuven, Kamel worked as a journalist and wrote for different Arab newspapers and magazines.

utopian desire of our artist must not be seen as mere escape from a desperate reality, nor a repetition of the past. It should be a motive for envisioning *what does not yet exist*. The consciousness of existing in two places, and of the difference between them, forms the ground on which the artist stands. It is a temporary ground: that is all that is left to us.

Final Remarks

In the end, we have to admit that our deep desires and petty deceptions have made exile palatable for us. Through long-term alienation we have created a place of freedom and flourishing for ourselves. We have ended up in such exile, but this has been the hardest of life struggles. Have we suffered the fracture of

our universalist dreams? Exile is an unending story, and all that concerns us now is to express our part in it as contemporary artists, and not be addicted to mere memories and political fairy tales. Between what is present and what is denied to us, between commitment and nihilism, we want to tell our first country about exile, and exile about itself. We want to break the cycle of estrangement and broken communication. We call it 'no place' in that it allows us to see where different paths cross, and in that it gets us away from nostalgia for the past in a time of defeat.

25th April 1990"

**Translated and edited by Rahim Hassan
and Barbara Vellacott.
Photos by Koutaiba Al-Janabi**

Two Centuries of Hegel's Logic

Report on Heidelberg conference to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the publication of *HEGEL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA LOGIC*.

PHIL WALDEN

This took place from 2nd to 5th November. I was there. Among the speakers were Stephen Houlgate, Robert Pippin, Dean Moyar, Sally Sedgwick, Christopher Yeomans, Michela Bordignon, Anton Koch, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Friderike Schick, Jean-Francois Kervegan. The conference demonstrated the continuing relevance of Hegel's work to humanity's situation today. Here I can only give a flavour of some of the issues raised. Houlgate, in a paper entitled "Hegel's Theory of the State," said that he agreed with Klaus Wieweg that a well-educated society is essential to a rational state. Also, in Hegel's view it is undemocratic for the head of state to be the same person as the head of the executive.

Dean Moyar, in a paper entitled "The Proximity of Philosophy to Religion: Hegel's Evaluative Reason," argued that it is time for Hegel's view that philosophy and religion should share their own content, given that ethnic nationalism and consumerism have filled a lot of the space that religion once occupied, and given that there is no clear occupant of the 'ultimate' space in liberalism. Public philosophy should appeal to the *Good Life*, since ontology is axiology. The answer to Euthyphro's Dilemma is that it is right because it is rational, rather than it is right because God wills it.

Sally Sedgwick presented a paper entitled "Hegel's 1817 Encyclopaedia as the Science of Freedom". It

came out in the questioning that Hegel is appealing to a model: the freedom to abstract within time. So, Hegel is not invoking a special capacity that nobody else has. Robert Pippin presented a paper entitled "Hegel on Logical and Natural Life". Hegel's view is that the determination (the determined character) and purpose of the philosophy of nature is that spirit should find its own essence, its counterpart, i.e. the Concept, within nature. Christopher Yeomans presented a paper entitled "Systematicity and the Tension between Multiple Perspectives: the Encyclopaedia as a Presentation of Historical Experience". In the discussion it was suggested that Heidegger concentrates only on a natural conception of time, but misses what time became in Geist as Hegel had established. Michela Bordignon in her talk said that she is trying to do what Hegel puts forward in Paragraph 15 in the *Encyclopaedia*. She said she uses analogy because she is aware that talking about logical determination in terms of sets is problematic. She is trying to show that Hegel supersedes not only classical logic but also dialetheism.

(**Dialetheism** is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called "true contradictions", *dialetheia*, or nondualisms. - Wikipedia)



Stephen Houlgate



Robert Pippin

“Oasis” by the Iraqi artist Sadiq Toma



Philosophical Reflections

DAVID JONES

Different Realities

Some thinkers quantify degrees of reality in terms of the extent to which things last in time, independently of other criteria. Those who ascribe reality in terms of persistence in time usually regard ideas as more real than any particular physical thing. In addition, such thinkers might say that the particular things present only the images of their concomitant ideas and, like all particular physical things, will have a purely transitory existence.

Other thinkers accord reality quite differently. They will prioritise objects and processes which can be perceived and measured, and will derive confirmation of their reality ascriptions from the predictability of patterns of behaviour in the natural world by which their knowledge

becomes useful in technologies. These thinkers will often regard ideas as illusory subjective images of the particular physical things and the forces that act between them.


It is interesting to observe how often it is insisted that modern science is an entirely empirical activity. This can contrast with the fact that it increasingly allows, under its banner, abstract mathematical models of what it regards as some 'reality' underlying what the rest of us mistakenly take to be real. Such models can never be more than hypotheses which are yet to be disproved. Whatever the final status of such models, the general approach curiously reintroduces the priority of the reality of pure ideas.

The Abstract And The Real

The way in which a person understands a class of objects under a general term is usually regarded as abstract. Some people think of such 'abstractions' as objects of consciousness in a person. Under this way of thinking, if there were no conscious minds then there could be no such 'abstractions'. However, when I ask people to consider the concept 'gravity' it seems to be a general abstract concept in consciousness but people usually agree that if there were no human beings then there would still be gravity in the universe. So, in this case the 'abstract'

concept of gravity is a way of referring to 'an actual pattern of behaviour' in the natural world whose existence is not dependent on the existence of human consciousness.

If human beings and human behaviour are regarded as a part of the natural world in the sense that they are a 'continuation' of the natural world then it is not impossible, if a person is willing, to think of 'justice' and 'love' in a similar way. That these concepts refer to something that is a real pattern of behaviour in the universe albeit of a type that works through the actions of human beings.



Plato

Aristotle

Aristotle's Four Causes And Modern Science

Aristotle surveys the various ways in which people ask and answer the question 'why'. He wants to discover whether when people ask 'why' it is always in the same way or whether there are many ways, and if there are many ways, are there an unlimited number or a limited number of ways. The result of this enquiry is his famous four causes. Modern science is not so concerned with human

explanation. It seeks for patterns of behaviour in the natural world which are unchanging and which can therefore be used to develop technologies. Some people are so enthusiastic about this quest that they make it into a criterion for 'reality' and say that only that which is determinable is real and nothing else has 'real' existence but only has an illusory or apparent existence.

Someone Asked If Plato Would Accept Modern Democracy

If Plato were living today then he would have grown up in a different world with different expectations and values. Plato seemed clear that he thought that to be a tyrant would be the least fortunate way of life for a human being. It follows from this that Plato would not wish to decide for others or impose ways of life upon others. He seemed to respect that each person needs to discover knowledge freely in their own way according to their particular journey through lives and not have ideals

imposed upon them from others outside. This is why his central character Socrates regards his dialectical activity with his fellow Athenians as merely that of a 'midwife' who only wishes to deliver the well formed and healthy wisdom that each person creates from within themselves. If Plato were alive today I hope he would still do the same thing and also continue to warn against presuming that one knows what is best for everyone else.

Sestina: Walter Benjamin at Port Bou

CHRIS NORRIS

So here it is, my one last border-zone.
No going back but no way forward; the signs
Were always bad and worse each time I left
Some latest short-stay refuge. Clear to read,
Those lethal constellations where my life
And death lie open to the scholar's gaze.

What price my cultivation of that gaze,
That famous eye for detail, if its zone
Of reference finds no room for such real-life
Events or factual details, just for signs
That rival schools of exegetes can read
In ways to please all parties, right or left.



I bore their quarrels with me when I left,
Good comrade Brecht who begged me lift my gaze
From cryptic texts for once and try to read
Dispatches from the latest battle-zone,
And shrewd Adorno who detected signs
Of occult thinking in my work and life.

He had a point, let's face it: not a life
That came to much, and now with no time left
To make sense of those constellated signs,
Those scattered indices that met my gaze
Years back when first I strayed into their zone,
But only now, near death, have learned to read.

I'll leave my colleagues something more to read,
My eighteen 'Theses', fragments from a life –
A damaged life – beyond the contact-zone
Of all but exiled souls, a message left
To dark cryptanalysts whose alien gaze
Alone might help decipher my last signs.

No symbol glows translucent in these signs.
They're allegories which he who runs may read,
Or he who turns a disaffected gaze
On all past portents of a better life,
Such as might elevate whatever's left
Of mine into some all-redemptive zone.

Why take those signs for tokenings of life?
How learn to read the idioglyphs I've left?
What errant gaze might scan that trackless zone?



Walter Benjamin

Fichte: Philosopher of the 'I'

My initial response to reading Fichte's ideas

DAVID BURRIDGE

Along with other Romantic philosophers, Fichte was seeking to replace the old order of metaphysics, constructed on the premise of the existence of God, with a new philosophy, substantiated only by the *self*. Kant had started the great heave toward pure reason, but was criticised for leaving the God space empty. Schelling wrote to Hegel on January the 6th 1795:

‘Philosophy is not yet an end. Kant has given results; the premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises.’ (Quoted by Eckart Forster: *The Twenty Years of Philosophy*, P154.)

Fichte responded to this challenge by asserting a new freedom validated by the true self. (*Wahrhaftiges Ich*), not one dictated by society or by the authorities that controlled society. The French revolution inspired thinkers with the possibility of overturning authority with the will of the people. (But of course, replacing it with the Reign of Terror and supporters of the revolution in Germany and England, the German and the English Romantics as well as Fichte became disillusioned by this development.)

Fichte acknowledged the empirical self, but posited also a transcendental self. The two were in fact opposite ends of the same continuum and the realisation of the true self might be achieved either by starting with the empirical self and working towards the transcendental (in what Fichte called ‘Intellectual Intuition’) or vice-versa. So we could take the world in

front of us and search for deeper dimensions, or start with a high principle and seek to realise it in the world.

The transcendental self is in our subconscious and he set the scene for the work of psychoanalysts at a later date. He tells us we have two dimensions to our minds. We have an inner state of mind which is dealing with restricting anxieties and unfulfilled needs, independently of anything we are consciously experiencing. His transcendental self was not a *memory stick*, opened up by empirical experience, but an interactive part of the thinking self.

Fichte saw the self as an active force which only became real if it was in the process of creation. Kant argued that this would lead to circular reasoning: *The self can only be known by the self which is predetermined*. In other words: I see what I see, because I am seeing what I am meant to see.

Fichte accepted this closed loop, but argued that the self is not a thing but a process: “*Ich bringe Mich als Ich hervor; darum bin Ich.*” Which might be translated as: I produce my *Self*, therefore I am.

In fact he mocked Kant’s “thing in itself” with the logic: how can there be such a thing which is never manifested through appearance? In fairness to Kant all he was saying (*in my view*) is that things can have an objective existence beyond our perception.

The true self needed to be realised through the



Kant



Fichte

force of imagination. Fichte used the word: *Einbildungskraft*. This was the start of his thinking. I will call it *Creative Force*. Release the creative force within us and we discover our true selves.

He acknowledged that there are pressures inside us, which may frighten us into avoiding freedom. We hide and surrender to domination. Our self lies unrealised. This he believed needs to be resisted. Admirable! But equally, we should not forget there are many people, who are content and feel fulfilled in the social roles assigned to them.

Creative force should indeed be given an outlet and if one is living in an oppressive or immoral society then there is a valuable struggle for freedom to be necessary.

On the other hand, I think self is not totally independent of society, for its development, its expression or its responsibility. We are both social and individual animals and we need to be conscious of and active in both dimensions.

Later ideologists would either deny the existence of society, or as an alternative, feel that self should be suppressed in the interest

of the *People*. I believe the fulfilment of the true self is a laudable process, provided that the self, that we are giving freedom to, is not some swollen monster. Nietzsche for example took the *Free Spirit* into a vile direction. In his book *Beyond Good and Evil*, 44, he argues:

‘We think that the hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart... serves the enhancement of the species “man”...’

In the same piece he decries as false free spirits, those who would strive with all their powers for the universal green-pastures happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort and an easier life for everyone.

One wonders what he would have made of the recent pronouncement of E.O. Wilson, who has validated altruism as a real trait in animals and by doing this has undermined the *Selfish Gene*, as an explanation of evolution.

As animals with a higher self-consciousness, we have the ability to discover the *wahrhaftiges Ich- true self*, in our relationships with other people, loving our neighbour as ourselves.

Notes on the Wednesday Meeting 8th of November 2017.

Is common sense a good starting point for philosophy? Philosophy, most of the time, calls for the suspending of ordinary consciousness, or bracketing out the empirical strand of consciousness, or talks about the possible rather than the actual. We discussed the 'common-sense' philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was perhaps the most famous. In response to philosophers such as Berkeley who denied the existence of the external world, he thought many things were self-evident, we do not need to prove them by rational argument. We are not brains in vats, even if ingenious arguments can be thought up which seem to make this idea possible.

Philosophy can often be too abstruse and divorced from the assumptions and beliefs of ordinary people. And so, it seems that common sense is not always a good guide to philosophy. Sometime philosophers and logicians consider thought experiments that seem unbelievable by ordinary common-sense consciousness. For example, the whole field of Possible Worlds feels strange even to some philosophical minds, especially when

some logicians, such as David Lewis, become realists about them. Is there really another possible world in which I do exist but have different house or wife than the one I do in reality? One might say that it is a dream world but these realists think that it is as real as the world we live in. Another example, think of Nietzsche's thought experiment of eternal recurrence. It is an attractive idea but is it real?

Reason and the emotion came up for discussion. Hume thinks reason ought to be the 'slave of the passions'. Kant was concerned to refute this, and to base morality on the 'categorical imperative', which is rational and universal (and also keeps God out of the picture). So, for him we should not decide our actions on the basis of our feelings. However, in practice it seems our choices are based on our feelings and our rationality. One view was that we should limit the role of feelings as we are all different, whereas rationality could be universal. Thomas Reid however believed feelings do not cause our judgments, rather, the judgments cause or are accompanied by our feelings.

One view which was expressed is that rationality is not the only route to knowledge. It may also be the case that philosophers have chosen to be rational, and suppress the 'reasons of the heart' so to speak.

There followed a discussion of duty versus inclination. Kant's moral good is about doing things not out of inclination but from duty. For example, you may visit a sick person in a hospital not because he is your friend but because you feel it is your duty to offer him some support or help.

Poetry

David Burrige read some of his poems. One



David Hume

Poems

was about the plaques in the pavements in Cologne which commemorate Jews who vanished in the concentration camps in the 2nd World War. This poem was clearly about how he felt about this – angry and sad.

Other Topics

There are contrasting ways of ‘doing’ philosophy: should philosophy be dialectical or figurative (more imaginary)? Or both? This topic was mentioned before and it is worth an extensive discussion: could the arts help?

Transcendence was also mentioned: Can we be deceived by the blinding shining light of too much transcendence? It seems that for some religious believers this is possible. Is immanence a suitable alternative? Questions worth discussion in future meetings.

Paul Cockburn

Underfoot In Cologne

DAVID BURRIDGE

I foot-slip, recover, and look down -
five squint-small plaques embedded but proud.
Members of the same family bully-pushed through
their own front door, into a blind van - lugging cases,
hardly filled,
yet more than they would need. Its seventy years or so.
Their house long since swallowed by marble walls;
their trail now a stretch of city rush.

I trip to meet tombless names and whisper-wish;
perhaps one survived, sat old in the park, in a wince of sun.
There must be other plaques across this city- in other
cities - other countries. Every cold victim should be
so honoured until pavements strain under the weight
of brass and we all stumble, never to forget.

Anger still catches when I see old footage;
brown sleeves grasp armfuls of books;
reason and humanity tossed to the flames -
scenes that sew yellow stars inside us all.

The Wednesday

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The Wednesday

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Written by friends.. for friends



Please keep your articles, artwork,
poems and other contributions coming.
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