

# The *Wednesday*

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Magazine of the Wednesday Group - Oxford



## Editorial

### *Subjectivity and the Pandemic*

There is some optimism that we are seeing the end of the Covid pandemic but what are the lessons to be learnt from this experience? I want to discuss here the idea of the 'subject' and what has happened to this concept, especially the idea that the subject is a construct of the modern system of control and incarceration. This is the idea promoted by Foucault and has a strange relevance to the current lockdown experience.

The subject, in the philosophical sense, is what is normally referred to as a 'person', an 'individual', or a similar term. The concept of the subject has had mixed fortunes in philosophical discourse. Descartes came up with the Cogito: 'I think, therefore, I am.' Kant gave it a transcendental status with his concept of 'the transcendental unity of apperception' or the 'I think' which accompanies all my representations. But apart from the period of Transcendental Idealism that emphasised the Absolute, the move has been more towards emptying the subject of any transcendental pretensions and towards a more naturalistic conception.

One such trend is the argument that the subject is a construct of knowledge and power. Knowledge here means ways of collecting information about the human subject through the social and political sciences, and power means the constant observation of the subject. Foucault thought that the concept of the subject was new in Western culture. He connected it with the new sciences and new methods of discipline and punishment. This forms the modern system of control, through watching and reporting, or the forms of seeing and saying. This was exemplified, for him, in the experience of prison. He then generalised it to the whole of society.

Foucault used the example of the architectural structure of a prison designed by the philosopher Bentham and called the Panopticon.

The Panopticon was designed in such a way as to allow all prisoners to be observed by a single security guard, without the inmates being able to tell whether they were being watched. The important point is that the system of observation makes the inmates act as though they are always being watched, even when they are not. The result was a system of self-surveillance, and the system produced the required behaviour in the inmates. The Panopticon was conceived by Bentham as not only applicable to prisons, but hospitals, schools, asylums and other institutions. It is in this generalised use that Foucault was interested in it.

A new book has revived the idea of the Panopticon in the climate of the pandemic. *The Crowdsourced Panopticon: Conformity and Control on Social Media* argues that online communication and ubiquitous recording devices have created the phenomenon of an invisible anonymous crowd combined with the exposed individual life before that crowd. The worry is what may happen when our lives are increasingly broadcast online. But this worry is different from what I am referring to here. If the subject is constituted by the information gathered about it, and the system of surveillance, then the reliance on online communication during the pandemic is at a peak. Subjectivity is then subjected to a total system of control. But is this the case? I think we all have the intuitive feeling that there is an interiority to the subject beyond the external observation. Foucault himself realised this. Subjectivity will always resist and create room for independence and freedom. However, Foucault did not accept the traditional idea of the subject and he had an interesting idea to replace it through different regimes of caring for the self. It is the idea of creating your own subjectivity. But then, if you don't have a subjectivity in the first place, what is the agency that creates subjectivity? More discussion is needed.

*The Editor*

## The Incompleteness of Meaning

Careful analysis of the nature of language reveals that the relationship of referential meaning between a sentence and the proposition it expresses cannot be completely defined for certain self-referential cases.

CHRIS SEDDON

### Propositions

*My dog whines at an unfamiliar door to get out. I open the door.*

Even if they are never put into words, we can guess another's beliefs and intentions and act in accordance with our own. They precede language.

*My dog believes this door is the way to get out and she wants to get out.*

Our beliefs are how we think things are. Our intentions are how we would like them to be. They are propositions even if they are not put into words.

*It was just a cupboard. She looks at me.*

A belief may be mistaken. An intention may be unrealised. Having or recognising them involves understanding that a proposition may be false.

### Concepts

*How did I know my dog wanted to get out? Because I know about dogs, and doors, and wanting to be out. Why did she whine at the door? Because in her own way she knows about such things too. She has a concept of doors as ways to get out.*

Ascribing or having specific beliefs and intentions only helps when they are seen as part of a pattern of general beliefs and intentions. Seeing a specific proposition as an instance of a general proposition is to see both propositions as combinations of shared concepts.

Most concepts arise from our shared way of life, but the concept that a proposition may be false and the concept that one proposition may be an instance of a more general one are fundamental.

Recognising or taking intentional actions requires the ability to combine concepts to form propositions, even if they are never expressed in language.

### Language

Our shared way of life leads us to see similar patterns – we have similar concepts and combine them in similar ways to form similar propositions. Our vocabulary

associates shared words with concepts. Our grammar associates ways of combining words with ways of combining concepts.

Language grows out of the need to express beliefs and intentions.

### Mathematics

The trivially true proposition is a trivial belief which needs no evidence, an intention that needs no action. Mathematics studies the different ways in which concepts can be combined to form the trivially true proposition. The application of mathematics is to validate that inferences which need no evidence hold between propositions that do.

An operational grammar relates any operator and operand concepts to at most one operation concept, and any operand and operation concepts from at least one operator concept. Within an operational grammar the concept of negation – that multiple propositions are false – appears to be sufficient to define all mathematical structures.

### Definition

We use our vocabulary and grammar to understand a sentence. We may adjust them permanently or temporarily as a result.

*If I understand the grammar, and the other words are already part of my vocabulary, I can understand the sentence below without previously understanding the words 'love', 'lover', 'beloved', or 'context':*

*Whatever love is, if for every lover, beloved, and context, the fact that the lover has love for the beloved in that context is equivalent to the fact that the lover will adopt the needs of the beloved in that context, then... I have love for my dog.*

Generalisations may be notated using variable declarations, but they are conceptual structures. The effective instances of a completely universal generalisation can be restricted by conditions within the generalisation. Definitions can be conceptual structures, and need not



## Follow Up

### *Reports of The Wednesday Meetings Held During May 2021*

Written by RAHIM HASSAN

## Why is Art Important?

### *Notes of The Wednesday Meeting Held on 5th May.*

The question of the importance of art was discussed in this meeting. The artist in the group, Mike England, gave a very interesting talk on the topic under the title 'Why I think Art is Important'. It was a first-hand account of art, based on personal experience but it also benefited from a long theoretical debate about the value of art.

Mike presented the thesis that the nature of art is similar to what he called 'visual philosophy'. Philosophy presents its ideas in an abstract, detached way, but art puts the same ideas in a sensual, imagistic way. He connected art with our instinctive response to the world. It starts from childhood and the playing instinct of children. It is also connected to human curiosity which is at the roots of philosophy as well. However, according to Mike this spontaneous response to the world gets conditioned later on and there is a loss of the sense of freedom. Social indoctrination restricts the freedom that a child initially has. But art reignites the flame of freedom and instinctive creativity once again.

Art frees its artists. It challenges us to think for ourselves: 'it offers another perspective on this existence that we call reality. It questions the priorities and intentions of the collective mind. Art can be political. It transcends the accepted norms and shows a way to be free of the conditioning of society.' One lovely phrase from Mike is that 'one needs to think outside the box.'

A question was raised by the audience: does art come naturally to all of us? Because some of us are not artists. Mike answered that art is not about a set of rules. Even when the artist learns the rules or techniques, he has to throw them away at a later stage in order to be creative. Mike pointed out that art has a history, and it consists of a catalogue of characters, that society calls 'artists', that came before, and who pushed the boundaries of accepted social and artistic norms.

Mike then expanded on the power of art, especially in the political sphere. For him 'Art has power, and can be uncomfortable for establishments and bullies, as it represents the opposite of being controlled'. He gave an example of the influence of Picasso's Guernica. Apparently, a replica of this painting was hanging in the very room in which the decision to invade Iraq was taken. However, it was covered over so as not to remind the leaders meeting there of the horrors of war, and to increase the chances of getting the decision to invade.

Mike said that human beings understand reality outside them not only in terms of logic and reason, but also with emotion. For him, 'art makes sense of impermanence, of letting go. Letting go of our understanding of what life means to us, to let go of all preconceptions'.

Mike concluded that 'art is like a torch shining its light into the shadows. Art frees. It does not control. That is why I think art is important'.



# Spinoza and The Emotions

## *Notes of The Wednesday Meeting Held on 19th May.*

Spinoza's ideas are witnessing a revival not seen since Lessing, Herder and Goethe generated interest in his philosophy a century after his death. Edward Greenwood gave an excellent presentation to *The Wednesday* group on Spinoza's theory of the emotions. This came after his talk a few months ago on the philosophy of Hobbes. There are some similarities between the two philosophers, especially in their political philosophy.

Spinoza discussed the Emotions in part 3 of *The Ethics* called 'Concerning The Origin And Strength Of The Emotions' and the final part, part 4 'Of Human Servitude, Or The Strength Of The Emotions'. Spinoza stated his theory in a set of propositions and Edward discussed a number of these propositions.

Spinoza's philosophy is deterministic. Human beings are natural beings and their behaviour is governed by natural laws. For him, an emotion is a modification of the body. It shows that the subject suffers modification from external causes. The mind in this case forms confused, or in his terminology, an inadequate conception of these external impacts and so it is passive towards them. But when the mind has an adequate conception, it is active and less liable to be determined by such emotions. So, according to Spinoza, we have passive and active emotions. The active emotions are related to understanding the causes. The more knowledge one has of the causes of the emotion the more one will be free from their influence. This idea has roots in the philosophy of the Stoics and Spinoza seems to have read them well.

Spinoza also holds the idea that everything has a *conatus* or a striving force towards staying in existence. This striving either achieves its aim and gains an increase in power or fails to do so and suffers a decline in power. The increase in power is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure and failure is felt as pain.

Edward observed that 'proposition 27 seems to go



Spinoza

astray phenomenologically in its claim that if we see an emotion in another we feel 'a modification of our body similar to that emotion.' As Max Scheler claimed in his *Theory Of The Emotions* we can see someone is in fear without feeling fear and the bodily changes fear provokes in us.'

Edward also noticed a tension in two of Spinoza's propositions. When in proposition 56 Spinoza tells us that temperance and chastity as opposed to drunkenness and lust arise from a 'strength of mind' which moderates the latter he seems to be inconsistent with his later claim in Part 4 'The Strength Of The Emotions' proposition 7 that an emotion can only be checked by a stronger emotion. The only way to reconcile the two claims is to see that the mind's rational urge to check an emotion is itself an emotion, namely the desire to be reasonable. Indeed proposition 15 tells us that a true knowledge of good and evil in so far as it is an emotion can check a propensity to evil.

But the greatest love for Spinoza is the intellectual love of God and Proposition 28 tells us that 'the greatest virtue of the mind is to understand or know God.'

Edward also gave a brief mention of Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico Politico* which deserves a separate treatment, possibly in another meeting.

# A Space for Freedom

## *Notes of The Wednesday Meeting Held on 26th May.*

Ruud Schuurman suggested that we discuss freedom and free will in this meeting. He asked every member of *The Wednesday* group attending the meeting what they thought about freedom. Their answers were then subjected to a prolonged debate. We soon realized that the topic is very broad, vague, and multi-faceted. Ruud's role changed to that of the moderator of the meeting. He raised the following questions in advance of the meeting: What is freedom? What does 'free' mean? Free from what? Can human beings be free? Do we want to be free? Is it desirable?

The topic was divided into two; one is freedom and the other is free will. A definition of freedom was presented by one member as the absence of control. But is that external or internal control? Aristotle thought control comes through rationality. Apparently, he thought that a drunkard, losing control over his behaviour, is not exempted from punishment. Aristotle valued reason and thought the drunkard impaired their capacity to think and so lost control. Some other philosophers, such as Hobbes, thought that our behaviour is not controlled by rationality and free choice, but it is directed by the appetite, or desire generally. This moved the debate to the second topic: can we speak about freedom without free will?

If the definition of freedom was a slightly non-controversial matter, things are different with free will. There were divided opinions as to what this involves and whether it is possible or desirable. One opinion is that free will is just how humans behave and how they take themselves to be. Human beings are not machines and machines are not described in terms of free will. Causal explanations dominate in the mechanical world

but meaning and understanding are features of human conduct. For example, what distinguishes human beings from animals is that we have language to express ourselves in thought and art.

Do we need freedom to escape from the restrictions of the social world? Should we seek freedom in the natural world? This was how one participant put the case but there was a reply in support of the need of the other for our own freedom. We need freedom but we also rely on each other and act with an orientation to the future, i.e. changing the future, say tackling climate change. Events happen to us, but we need to act and freedom is necessary for the manifestation of our values in our actions. But freedom should carry with it its own constraints.

One participant thought that the question about freedom and free will should be discussed in the social context. The advantage is to move away from metaphysical matters. This was applied by another participant to the idea of punishment. He suggested that instead of punishment there should be a desire to manage. Another opinion was that freedom should be directed towards the good and should be connected with something bigger than the human.

Psychology was also invoked. Victor Frankl had the idea that freedom is located between stimulus and response. This suggests that there are degrees of freedom. It was further suggested that freedom is not absolute but depends on our circumstances and personality. Creativity was considered a possible remedy for someone in bad circumstances. It can create a space for freedom.



# Panopticism: from Foucault to Bentham


## *Notes of The Wednesday Meeting Held on 12th May.*

URSULA BLYTHE

Love or loath Michel Foucault (1926-84), he still remains an influential figure in post WWII philosophy. His work was multidimensional as he drew on historical, psychological, sociological, and philosophical insights. In his famous book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975), Foucault revived interest in the concept of panopticism. Jeremy Bentham's (1791) architectural design allowed close observation (-opticon) of all prisoners (pan-) without the incarcerated knowing whether they are being observed. Therefore, conveying the sentiment of an omnipotent invisible sovereign through the presence of a central watch tower. Fundamentally, the control of prisoners is more likely to be achieved through this psychological fear of surveillance, rather than physical constraints or close supervision.

Foucault uses Bentham's panopticon diagram as a metaphor for modern disciplinary society. He primarily addressed the relationship between power and knowledge, and how they can be employed as a form of social control through public institutions. Foucault begins with a description of the measures taken during "the plague" which included conducting inspections, partitioning of space, closing off houses, and public registration. One may ask why "the plague" yielded mechanisms of power within penal design and modern societies. When the plague strikes the boundaries between normal and abnormal are blurred, as anyone can become infected which is dangerous to the wider population, particularly during this early pandemic. Indeed, the plague is met by strict processes of quarantine and operations of purification. Infected people are excluded from everyday life, in order to separate them from a purer society. These measures become standard practice with little care or concern for the infected population, as they are now classified as 'abnormal'.

Foucault draws on Bentham's panopticon diagram as a symbol of his argument. He argues that panopticism is the instrument through which modern discipline has been able to replace historic sovereignty (i.e. Kings, Rulers, and Judges), as the fundamental relation of power. It represents the subordination of bodies that increases the utility of power while dispensing with the need for physical violence. The panoptic design develops out of



**A modern Panopticon**

the need for separation and surveillance of people as shown in the plague. This psychological mechanism is in contrast to the public spectacle or theatrical rituals of torture and execution. Foucault details the disfigurement and slow death of the last convict to be executed in France in 1757 which produced several unintended consequences, including public outcry concerning the inhuman cruelty. Subsequently, the public spectacle is abolished and replaced with a more behind the scenes psychological method of observation and control.

Foucault's classification of the panoptic design is a paradigm of the modern state which observes its citizens, gathers data about them, and thereby exercises power over them. Bentham (1785) proclaimed that 'power should be visible yet unverifiable'. He described the Panopticon prison system as a 'new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example'. Bentham's prison project was an architectural prototype of modern discipline and economic control. Foucault argues that more advanced societies offer greater opportunities for observation and state power, because they examine pupils, employees, and patients, classify them and endeavour to get them to conform to the 'norm'. In fact, the modern citizen spends much of their life within institutional regimes, such as education, work, and hospitals.

- *This report is a summary of Ursula Blythe's talk to The Wednesday meeting on 12<sup>th</sup> May.*

## Intact

Uptown, shortly after the last turnoff,  
in fields of uncut grasses, dry and torn,  
a group of teasels next to the Cycle Park.

It is late autumn. No idea why  
these tall and stalky plants,  
are still standing, robbed,  
forgotten and colourless,  
their tattered leaves waving flags,  
their cracked confusion, left alone  
in the rags of autumn.

Around them long grasses whisper,  
deny them, blow their way back and forth,  
how incredulous  
at such a breakdown and dusty ending,  
unconvinced of their perseverance  
when withstanding the winds,  
their green time spent, their petals forfeited,  
as a memorial, perhaps,

that everything was already over  
and in the first falling snow they shine  
as if wrapped in silver shrouds  
yet still defying the wind and the cold.



Gradually to die, oppose the expectation  
and time, this steady descent,  
could one day be my fate.

Red kites whistle high up in the sky.  
I can still hear them behind the clouds,  
like ghostly messengers,  
when I get home with my bouquet  
of teasel brushes bristly intact.

**Poem and Artwork by *Scharlie Meeuws***

## The Romanticist in Spring: ten sonnets

I have said that poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till, by a species of reaction, the tranquillity gradually disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind.

Wordsworth, 'Preface to the Lyrical Ballads' (1800)



CHRIS NORRIS

The analogues come readily, I find,  
The metaphors and images of Spring,  
Drawn from the poets chiefly, brought to mind  
As only nature-poetry can bring  
Past scenes to life, recapture everything  
Of last year's season in more vivid hues,  
And hold in store, for readers' cherishing,  
Whatever short-lived moments they may choose  
As keepsakes when all nature pays its dues  
To transience and it's words alone, by grace  
Of poets' notice, that ensure we lose  
No detail, keep that vision still in place.  
Should I now quit my study, check that they  
Stayed 'true to nature', who or what's to say?



Some think my constant reading's left me blind  
To nature's endless glories, made me cling  
To texts and variant readings, hide behind  
The scholar-critics' commentaries that wring  
Some paltry point from words which else might sing  
A song unburdened by their terms of art,  
Unstudied, un-notated, taking wing,  
Like Shelley's skylark, simply heart-to-heart,  
And so annulling what delusive part  
I might have claimed in helping poems live  
Across the years, not have the reader start  
From scratch in finding all they have to give.  
'Should he not venture out on this first day  
Of Spring, it's that dull task keeps him away!'

And yet we scholars have our special muse,  
Not so capricious, not so apt to space  
Her longed-for visits out, more prone to cruise  
The textual gaps and cruces, bid us trace  
The errant readings, then make out a case  
For our improved conjecture, one that she –  
No flighty guide – prefers we should embrace  
After due thought, when sound and sense agree  
And our informed close-reading holds the key  
To passages that may have sprung from who  
Knows where yet now depend on us to see  
By what meandering paths the sense comes through.  
Look kindly on us, therefore, should we stray  
Outdoors awhile to greet the month of May.

Too quickly you suppose we scholars flee  
The 'natural world', use calendars to chart  
The seasons' progress, conjure flower and tree  
From our old stock, and count ourselves too smart  
For nature's over-laden appplecart,  
Preferring to seek out whatever meets  
Our own requirement from the book-shelf mart  
Of Spring-themed tropes in Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats,  
Or Coleridge. Yet think: their famed retreats,  
Their sylvan glades, their refuge from the din  
Of city life, all half-admit what cheats  
Their wish: 'one life, without us and within'.  
All's mediated, nothing left to play  
Dame Nature to that prodigal array.

## Poetry

It's when they hear of Kant the doubts begin,  
When those Romantic poets brave the peaks  
And troughs, have their ideas sent in a spin  
By the chief message of his three *Critiques*.  
'Each impulse from a vernal wood' bespeaks  
Not wood or nature in themselves, but our  
Responses to them, what the poet seeks  
To pass off as the mind-transcendent power  
Of great creating nature, like a flower  
At Spring's approach, or arbour newly green  
In every leaf, just like his lime-tree bower,  
Yet letting on how mind must intervene.  
No scene of nature but will soon betray  
The serpent's trail, mentation's overlay.

You scorn my studies, mock my office-bound  
Researches, satirise my dull routine,  
And say – what goes yet further to compound  
The offence – that only an arch-sceptic keen,  
Like me, to raise a *nomos*-shielding screen  
Against the threat of *physis* could assert  
The existence of that Kantian gulf between  
Subject and object, mind and the inert  
'External' realm where living things revert  
To lifeless stuff, where mind consents to dwell  
Within its private sphere, and thoughts exert  
No vital power or nature-quickening spell.  
Your constant plaint: I have the woods decay,  
Decay and fall, no comforts to convey!

Naive or sentimental? Guess you'd opt  
For 'sentimental', though the issue fell  
Out differently for Schiller once he dropped  
The strictly Kantian line and chose to tell  
A more exalted tale that turned out well  
For mind-and-nature. Yet – much as it pains  
Me always to remark – his thoughts compel  
A sceptical response since any gains  
Chalked up by such all-reconciling strains  
Of visionary transcendence often tend  
To self-undo when inspiration wanes,  
Then fall to wishful thinking in the end.  
Like it or not, where time and change hold sway  
There's no idealist creed keeps them at bay.





A killjoy scholar, you'll conclude, no friend  
To nature, Spring, or poetry, a type  
Too often found in academe, who'll spend  
His life informing us the time's not ripe  
(And never was) for simple souls to pipe  
Their native woodnotes wild, for words to rhyme  
With thoughts or minds with nature, since he'd wipe  
Our memories clean of any place or time  
When we attained our glimpse of the sublime,  
Some hint, however brief, of what they got  
Those words to do: slip finite bonds and climb  
Above (say it: 'transcend!') the humdrum plot  
Of times filed loose-leaf in some dossier  
But junked in soul's poetic resumé.



This much I'll grant, and readily: I'm not  
Your Keatsian celebrant, Wordsworthian sage,  
Or Shelleyan hierophant of nature hot  
For new epiphanies from page to page,  
Now aped by countless acolytes who wage  
Their puny war on form and intellect,  
Conceived as joining hands at every stage  
To stifle inspiration and protect  
The reader from confronting it direct,  
That Dionysian frenzy uncontained  
By Apollonian discipline, unchecked  
By thought's review of passions real or feigned.  
Think twice, my friend, before you opt to pay  
In valid coin what passion can't defray.

Consider: how should poems *not* reflect  
What poets read, what vision recreates  
In nature's image yet part-recollects  
(Ah, Coleridge!) in all that resonates  
With psyche's tuning. Think how, in late Yeats,  
A strict *askesis* strives to purge the style  
Of pastoral tropes or artificial traits  
So nature has its say, though all the while  
Supplying further items for the file  
Marked 'nature reimagined', one that shows  
A hybrid realm with forms as versatile  
As any natural kind that lives and grows.  
The art of nature: 'Lord, what would they say  
Did myriad-minded Coleridge walk their way?'



“Hyperspace” (2021) oil on canvas (60cm x 80 cm)

## Hyperspace: Fiction or Science?

Dr ALAN XUEREB

A few years back I read a wonderful book written by theoretical physicist Professor Michio Kaku entitled *Hyperspace: A Scientific Odyssey Through Parallel Universes, Time Warps, and the 10th Dimension*. Michio Kaku tries to explain higher dimensions by first analysing the history of higher dimensions of space and the struggle to unite quantum mechanics and general relativity in one theory. He then uses, what Daniel Dennett would call an ‘intuition pump’, to explain higher dimensions. His thought experiment hubs around the satirical novella by the English schoolmaster Edwin

Abbott, entitled *Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions*, first published in 1884. Kaku draws on Abbot to explain in some detail theories concerning the 2-D world (Flatland) in order to explain the incomprehensibility of the third dimensions to *flatlanders*. Kaku constructs a parallelism with our difficulty to comprehend higher dimensions.

Hyperspace is a concept popularised by science fiction and theorised by cutting-edge physics relating to higher dimensions and a superluminal method of interstellar travel.

In a few words, imagine a 3D Euclidian space that has been exhaustively partitioned into a continuum of parallel, non-intersecting, 2D planes – ‘Flatlands’. Suppose that some of these planes are inhabited by sentient, two-dimensional Flatlanders, who can move around freely within their home planes but cannot move from one plane to another.

All other causal processes are similarly barred from crossing planes, and the laws of nature vary from plane to plane. Thus, a given Flatlander has access only to the contents of his own plane and is causally isolated from other planes and their inhabitants. There is, however, always some determinate spatial distance between him and any other entity in the encompassing 3-space, and he can be arbitrarily spatially near to inhabitants of other planes.

Similarly, to Kaku, according to Hudson’s hyperspace hypothesis, our 3-space (or 4D-spacetime) is just one ‘slice’ in a literal continuum of (largely) physically independent, (mostly) causally isolated 3-spaces that together form a 4-space (or 5D spacetime). Despite our causal isolation from things in other 3-spaces, we always stand in determinate spatial or spatiotemporal relations to those things, and they can be arbitrarily near to us. One can easily understand the ramifications and implications all this would have on our understanding of metaphysics and epistemology.

My painting “Hyperspace” is inspired by these ideas. I imagine how going through hyperspace would appear to the human eye, how the human brain would handle it and interpret it.

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## *Spinoza's Eternity*



There's an uncertain measure  
In death's unfathomed choice,  
And all you treasure,  
At which you now rejoice,  
A single day  
May bear for all eternity away.

And yet it makes good sense  
To accept that things must perish,  
Not moan the transience  
Of all the goods we cherish,  
Set sad thoughts by  
That everything that lives must some day die.

Spinoza calls that being wise  
Whose measured mind resists  
Despairing at what dies,  
But nurtures what exists.  
Eternity is caught  
By making life, not death, the theme of thought.



Spinoza

*Edward Greenwood*

The *Wednesday* – Magazine of the Wednesday group.

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